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Article 1. 
Article 2. 
Article 3. 
Article 4. 
Article 5. 
The cow_. 
0 
u 
Presidential News Bulletin 
The Financial Times 
It's time to park the peace process 
Gideon Rachman 
The National Interest 
Abbas's Breaking Point 
Ilan Berman 
NYT 
Bad Borders, Good Neighbors 
Ephraim Sneh 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Cyber Attacks, Real or Imagined, and Cyber War 
James Andrew Lewis
Foreign Policy 
The next U.S.-Russia missile race 
David E. Hoffman 
Article 6. The Guardian 
Do humans have a role in the robot wars of the future? 
Barbara Ehrenreich 
Article 7. NYT 
In Search of a Robot More Like Us 
John Markoff 
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The Financial Times 
It's time to park the peace process 
Gideon Rachman 
July 11, 2011 -- A lot has changed in the Middle East since the Arab 
uprisings began. But one thing that remains constant is the obsession 
of international diplomats with theIsraeli-Palestinian "peace process". 
Monday saw yet another effort to drag the unwilling parties back to 
the negotiating table. A meeting of the Quartet (the US, the UN, the 
European Union and Russia), held in Washington, was expected to 
call for talks to restart, as a matter of urgency. 
Nobody seems minded to point out an obvious fact. With the Middle 
East in turmoil, starting a new round of Israeli-Palestinian talks is 
completely pointless. 
Speaking last week Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief, 
made the opposite case, listing several reasons why she thinks it 
crucial to start talks. Reason number one was "changes in the 
surrounding neighbourhood" — which seems a rather mild description 
for revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, civil wars in Syria and Libya, 
and the destabilisation of Arab states from Morocco to Saudi Arabia. 
In fact, it is precisely the "changes in the surrounding 
neighbourhood" that make it a bad idea to waste precious energy on a 
peace process that is now a sideshow. 
Some European diplomats cling to the idea that the Palestinian 
issue remains at the heart of the instability in the Middle East. But 
that is a theological position that can only be upheld by resolutely 
ignoring actual events. If there is one thing that the uprisings across 
the Middle East have in common, it is that they have very little to do 
with the Palestinians. What is more, despite the eager predictions of 
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many outside analysts, the occupied Palestinians territories have not 
(so far) exploded into Egyptian-style insurrection. 
The main bearing that the Arab spring has had on the Palestinian 
issue is to change the calculations of both sides to the conflict, in 
ways that make them even less likely to risk negotiating a peace 
settlement. 
At a time when Arab leaders everywhere are under attack for being 
remote, corrupt and elitist, it is simply too risky for the leadership of 
Fatah, the Palestinian faction in control of the West Bank, to enter 
into tortuous negotiations with the Israelis that will inevitably lead to 
accusations that they are selling out their own people. For the 
moment, the Palestinians seem much more interested in trying to 
reconcile Fatah and Hamas — and in pursuing the possibility of 
recognition of a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly in 
September. 
The Israelis are also in a defensive crouch. Israel's regional policy 
was built around a peace treaty with Egypt, cordial relations with 
Turkey, a cold peace with Syria and a shared interest with Saudi 
Arabia in the containment of Iran. The upheavals across the Middle 
East raise questions about the durability of all of these arrangements 
— which make it highly unlikely that the Israeli government will take 
any further risks by pulling troops out of the West Bank. 
There is, of course, real doubt about whether the current Israeli 
governmentactually has a genuine interest in trading "land for peace". 
But even an Israeli government that was completely committed to the 
idea of a "two-state solution" would hesitate to take any long-term 
decisions in such a rapidly-changing environment. 
One of the great potential rewards for the Israelis of an eventual 
peace deal with the Palestinians is the prospect that it will lead to a 
permanent peace with the wider Arab world. But with almost all of 
the Arab regimes tottering, Israel could have no guarantee that such a 
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peace would last. There are also certain practical difficulties. Any 
peace with Syria would involve Israel handing back the occupied 
Golan Heights — but the government of Bashar al-Assad is otherwise 
engaged, right now. 
Rather than waste time trying to pursue a final peace settlement, the 
"international community" should set more modest goals. The key 
point, at the moment, should be to try to stop either side from doing 
things that make a future peace deal actually impossible. 
When it comes to the Palestinians, that means continuing to put 
pressure on Hamas to recognise the state of Israel. Without that, it is 
hard to see the Israelis agreeing to start talks. As far as Israel is 
concerned, the US and Europe should take a much harder line on 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories that continue to eat into 
the land of a future Palestinian state. In an ideal world, the Obama 
administration would cut aid to Israel every time a settlement was 
expanded. Instead, Congress is currently waving the financial big 
stick in the wrong direction, at the Palestinians — for having the 
temerity to pursue their UN bid in September. Yet Israeli and 
Congressional hostility to the Palestinian charge at the UN is 
overdone. A General Assembly resolution without Security Council 
backing would change very little, legally or politically. 
Still, the Americans and the Europeans do not relish the idea of being 
put on the spot at the UN. That might explain their eagerness to get 
talks started again. The plan seems to be to start a pointless peace 
process, in the hope of averting a meaningless UN declaration. 
Meanwhile, the real action in the Middle East is going on in Egypt, 
Libya, Syria and the Gulf. Until the outcome of those dramas 
becomes much clearer, trying to force progress on the Palestinian 
question is a futile displacement activity. 
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Artick 2. 
The National Interest 
Abbas's Breaking Point 
Ilan Berman 
July 11, 2011 -- What could Mahmoud Abbas be thinking? The soft-
spoken Palestinian Authority president, now in his seventh year in 
office, has never been known for the kind of political brinksmanship 
that characterized the rule of his predecessor, PLO leader Yassir 
Arafat. And yet, recent months have seen Abbas's government make 
a pair of deeply provocative moves, with potentially catastrophic 
consequences for Palestinian prosperity, as well as for prospects of a 
lasting peace with Israel. 
The first was its plan, floated in earnest this spring by a number of 
Palestinian Authority officials, to forge ahead with a unilateral 
declaration of statehood this fall. Now, the idea of a Palestinian state 
is neither new nor controversial; indeed, a "two-state solution" is the 
logical terminus of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process begun in 
Oslo, Norway in 1993. But the belief that such a political reality can 
be created unilaterally is both. It undermines the long-running 
dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, and the role of the United 
States as its facilitator. It also calls into question the fate of a series of 
so-called "final-status" issues (like final borders, sovereignty over 
Jerusalem, water rights and the Palestinian "right of return") that 
require bilateral consensus in order to be truly settled. 
That Abbas's government has chosen to pursue such an option, 
therefore, seems more the product of frustration than of long-term 
strategy. The Palestinian Authority chairman said as much in a recent 
interview with Newsweek, in which he griped about a lack of support 
from Washington for his efforts to erect a Palestinian state. The 
resulting logic is clear: if statehood is too difficult to attain via 
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drawn-out negotiations, it might be accomplished by simply making 
it a fait accompli. 
But betting a Palestinian state can be created in this fashion is an 
exceedingly risky gamble. The idea is bound to get a sympathetic 
hearing at the United Nations General Assembly, where the so-called 
"Arab bloc" of the Palestinian Authority's Middle Eastern allies has a 
considerable voice, when it convenes this September. But it is highly 
unlikely to pass muster with the Security Council, the UN's highest 
authority. That is because the United States, which holds a permanent 
seat on the Security Council and wields veto power over any 
resolution presented before it, has already made clear that it believes 
statehood must come about as a product of bilateral agreement rather 
than unilateral decree. And without Washington's endorsement and 
support, substantive Palestinian statehood will be slow in coming. 
If, indeed, it comes at all. The current political conditions in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip dramatically reduce the possibility that the 
international community might see the creation of a Palestinian state 
as anything resembling a good idea. In late April, Abbas's ruling 
Fatah faction unexpectedly signed a "unity" deal with Hamas, the 
Palestinian Authority's main Islamist movement, bringing the latter 
into the political fold and making it a key partner in future 
governance. While working out the kinks of this arrangement has 
proven harder than originally envisioned, it is already clear that the 
marriage of convenience between the secular PLO and its radical 
religious opposition will have potentially catastrophic consequences. 
For one thing, it makes the idea of renewed negotiations with Israel—
the real path to a two-state solution—a virtual non-starter. While his 
government remains willing to make far-reaching concessions in 
pursuit of peace, Israel simply "will not negotiate with a Palestinian 
government backed by the Palestinian version of Al Qaeda," Prime 
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Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear in his May address to 
Congress. 
For another, it is bound to complicate the international support so 
crucial for Palestinian legitimacy. In his back-to-back speeches on 
Mideast policy this spring, President Obama used his considerable 
powers of persuasion to urge a re-start of the moribund Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. But the stubborn reality that at least one 
part of the new, hybrid Palestinian government is committed to 
Israel's destruction is sure to frustrate those plans. So will Congress, 
where lawmakers from both political parties have condemned the 
Hamas-Fatah merger and threatened to cut off American aid to 
Abbas's government if it doesn't break with its new political partner. 
Even Europe, which historically has waxed sympathetic to the 
Palestinian cause, is likely to remain divided over support for 
Palestinian statehood absent serious revisions to the "unity" 
government. 
None of which necessarily means that Abbas and company will back 
away from their bid to unilaterally establish "Palestine," or their ill-
conceived partnership with Hamas. But it does make the prospects 
for real, lasting prosperity for the inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip more distant than ever. For that, the Palestinians have only 
their leaders to blame. 
Ilan Berman is Vice President of the American Foreign Policy 
Council in Washington, DC. An expert on regional security in the 
Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation, he has 
consulted for both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. 
Department of Defense. 
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AniCIC 3. 
NYT 
Bad Borders, Good Neighbors 
Ephraim Snell 
July 10, 2011 -- TODAY, as American, European, Russian and 
United Nations officials meet in Washington to discuss the future of 
the Middle East peace process, Israel's prime minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, remains adamant that a peace deal premised on returning 
to Israel's pre-1967 borders poses an unacceptable risk to its security. 
He is right: the country's 1967 borders are not militarily defensible. 
But his use of this argument to reject the only viable formula for 
Israeli-Palestinian peace — a negotiated two-state solution based on 
mutually agreed upon land swaps — is wrong, and it does not serve 
Israel's security interests. Israel needs peace with the Palestinians, 
and that will likely require a return to the 1967 lines with a few 
adjustments. These borders can be made defensible if they come with 
a security package consisting of a joint Israeli-Palestinian security 
force along the West Bank's border with Jordan, a demilitarized 
Palestinian state and a three-way Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian 
defense treaty. Combined with such a package, the balanced formula 
President Obama outlined in his May 19 speech can give Israel the 
security it needs and deserves. Until June 1967, Israelis feared that a 
swift Arab military move could cut Israel in two at its "narrow waist" 
— an area near the city of Netanya, where the country is less than 10 
miles wide. By doing so, Arab tanks and artillery could have reached 
Tel Aviv within a few hours. In the 44 years since, the geography has 
not changed, but the threat has. Today, there is a new menace that we 
did not face in 1967. Short- and medium-range rockets, mortars and 
missiles supplied by Iran are making the lives of Israeli civilians a 
nightmare. Thousands of these rockets have been launched from 
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Gaza into Israeli towns and villages since Hamas wrested control of 
Gaza in 2007; and if an independent Palestine emerges on the West 
Bank, these weapons could find their way there, too. 
That is why the border between the West Bank and Jordan must be 
made impenetrable. This cannot be done remotely, from the 1967 
lines; it will require a joint Israeli-Palestinian military presence along 
the Jordan River. Such joint military activity would not violate 
Palestinian sovereignty and could be modeled on Israel's current 
coordination with Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. It 
would be far more effective than deploying an international force. 
After all, United Nations forces in southern Lebanon have failed to 
prevent a colossal military build-up by Hezbollah since Israel 
withdrew from the area in 2000. Second, the Palestinian state must be 
demilitarized. No tanks, artillery or missiles can be deployed within 
its boundaries. In the absence of this weaponry, international 
guarantees will ensure Palestine's security and territorial integrity. 
Third, an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian defense treaty is necessary to 
safeguard their common strategic interests. Joint military planning 
and sharing early warning systems to prevent threats from Iran, its 
proxies and other jihadist forces in the region would cement this 
treaty. This security package would make the 1967 borders 
defensible, and keep Palestine from becoming another launching pad 
for terror. Moreover, an Israeli-Palestinian agreement would bring 
about a dramatic, strategic change in the Middle East. It would 
remove the obstacle preventing moderates in the region from uniting 
against militant Islamist extremists and lay the groundwork for a new 
strategic alliance in the region, including the Persian Gulf countries, 
which are natural business partners for Israel, Jordan and Palestine. 
As a result, Israel would be able to extend its hand to new democratic 
and secular governments in the Arab and Muslim world. And those 
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committed to Israel's destruction would be confronted by a new 
alliance with enormous economic and military power. 
I have devoted more than three decades of my life to defending Israel, 
from the Litani River in Lebanon to the western bank of the Suez 
Canal in Egypt, and I would never support irresponsible, hazardous 
solutions to Israel's security problems. I don't believe durable peace 
in the region is possible unless Israel remains the strongest military 
power between Tehran and Casablanca. 
We have no choice but to protect ourselves in a perilous world of 
aggressive Islamist fanatics and complacent, confrontation-averse 
Western democracies. But nurturing settlements in the West Bank 
and maintaining an occupation in order to protect them is not the 
proper way to do it. 
Following that path will lead to disaster. Israel could become a 
binational state of first- and second-class citizens at war with each 
other; a third Intifada could break out, damaging Israel's economy 
and destroying Palestine's nascent infrastructure; or the pro-
negotiation policy of the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, 
could collapse, allowing Hamas to take power in the West Bank. If 
this happens, the doomsday prophecy of rockets raining down on 
Ben-Gurion International Airport just might be fulfilled. 
To avoid this fate, we must embrace the proposals of our American 
friends, end this conflict and allow Israel to become an active 
member, rather than an isolated actor, in the rapidly changing Middle 
East. 
Ephraim Sneh, a retired general in the Israel Defense Forces, was 
Israel's deputy minister of defense from 1999 to 2001 and from 2006 
to 2007. 
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AnkIC 4. 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Cyber Attacks, Real or Imagined, and 
Cyber War 
James Andrew Lewis 
Jul 11, 2011 -- Assorted "cyber attacks" have attracted much 
attention in the past few months. One headline in this genre recently 
proclaimed "Anonymous Declares War on Orlando." This is wrong 
on so many levels that it almost defies analysis. A more precise 
accounting would show that there have been no cyber wars and 
perhaps two or three cyber attacks since the Internet first appeared. 
The most ironic example of hyperbole catching itself involves the 
new Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, which says that the 
United States reserves the right to use military force in response to a 
cyber attack. Since many reports call everything—pranks, 
embarrassing leaks, fraud, bank robbery, and espionage—a cyber 
attack, the strategy led to expressions of concern that the United 
States would be shooting missiles at annoying teenage hackers or 
starting wars over Wikileaks. In fact, the strategy sets a very high 
threshold that is derived from the laws of armed conflict for defining 
a cyber attack. Nothing we have seen this year would qualify as an 
attack using this threshold. 
Only by adopting an exceptionally elastic definition of cyber attack 
can we say they are frequent. There have been many annoyances, 
much crime, and rampant spying, but the only incidents that have 
caused physical damage or disruption to critical services are the 
alleged Israeli use of cyber attack to disrupt Syrian air defenses and 
the Stuxnet attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities. An extortion 
attempt in Brazil against a public utility may have backfired and 
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temporarily disrupted electrical service. A better way to identify an 
attack is to rely on "equivalence," where we judge whether a cyber 
exploit is an attack by asking if it led to physical damage or 
casualties. No damage, no casualties, means no attack. 
Many militaries are developing attack capabilities, but this is not 
some revolutionary and immensely destructive new form of warfare 
that any random citizen or hacker can engage in at will. Nations are 
afraid of cyber war and are careful to stay below the threshold of 
what could be considered under international law the use of force or 
an act of war. Crime, even if state sponsored, does not justify a 
military response. Countries do not go to war over espionage. There 
is intense hostile activity in cyberspace, but it stays below the 
threshold of attack. 
The denial-of-service efforts against Estonian and Georgian websites 
in 2007 and 2008 were not attacks. The Estonian incident had a clear 
coercive purpose, and it is worth considering whether the denial-of-
service exploit against Estonia could have become the equivalent of 
an attack if it had been extended in scope and duration. The exploits 
against Georgia, while undertaken with coercive intent and closely 
coordinated with Russian military activities (and a useful indicator of 
how Russia will use cyber warfare), did no damage other than to 
deface government websites. 
The recent escapades involving groups like Anonymous or Lulzsec 
do not qualify as attacks. Anonymous and Lulzsec did not disrupt 
critical operations of the companies or agencies they struck. There 
was embarrassment, but no damage, destruction, or casualties. These 
were political actions—cyber demonstrations and graffiti—spun up 
by media attention and copycatting. 
Some nations—Russia in particular—argue that political actions are 
in fact the core of the new kind of warfare, and the issue is really 
"information warfare" rather than "cyber warfare." They have said 
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that information is a weapon and that the United States will exploit 
the Internet to destabilize governments it opposes. Information is a 
threat to authoritarian regimes, and they want to limit access to 
websites and social networks. This effort to extend cyber attack to 
include access to information, however, makes little sense. It distorts 
long-standing ideas on warfare and military action by disconnecting 
them from the concept of the use of armed force and violence. The 
use of force produces immediate physical harm and is central to 
defining attack and warfare. The concept is incorporated in elements 
of the UN Charter and the Hague and Geneva Conventions. 
Publishing or sharing an idea is not the use of force. Though an 
expanded definition of warfare may serve the political interests of 
authoritarian regimes, it is not an accurate description of military 
action or attack. 
There are countries that could launch damaging cyber attacks. At 
least 5 militaries have advanced cyber-attack capabilities, and at least 
another 30 countries intend to acquire them. These high-end 
opponents have the resources and skills to overcome most defenses. 
Just as only a few countries had aircraft in 1914 but most militaries 
had acquired them 10 years later, every military will eventually 
acquire some level of cyber-attack capability. Cyber attacks will 
likely be used only in combination with other military actions, but 
they will be part of any future conflict. We can regard them as 
another weapons system with both tactical and strategic uses, similar 
to missiles or aircraft that can be launched from a distance and strike 
rapidly at a target. 
Stuxnet, for example, was a "military grade" cyber exploit and a 
precisely targeted alternative to an airstrike on Iranian nuclear 
facilities. It did less damage than an air attack but avoided distressing 
photos of burning buildings and claims of civilian casualties. The 
political effect on the Iranian people was negligible, while an 
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airstrike would have prompted an emotional reaction. Military 
planners now have an additional system to consider in their portfolio 
of weapons and attacks, which offers a new and attractive 
combination of effect and risk. 
The Aurora test at the Idaho National Labs and the Stuxnet worm 
show that cyber attacks are capable of doing physical damage. 
Leading cyber powers have carried out network reconnaissance 
against critical infrastructure in preparation for such attacks. But 
these infrastructure are the most dangerous form of attack, and 
therefore hold the most risk for the attacker. At the onset of conflict, 
attacks that seek to disrupt and confuse are more likely than 
infrastructure attacks. Cyber warfare will begin with the disruption of 
crucial networks and data and seek to create uncertainty and doubt 
among opposing commanders. The goal will be to increase the 
Clausewitzian "fog of war." This "informational" aspect of cyber 
war, where an opponent might scramble or erase data or insert false 
information to mislead an opponent, is a new and powerful military 
tool. 
The Battle of Britain is a historical example of this kind of warfare. If 
the Germans had first destroyed the relatively simple network of 
sensors, control facilities, and communications systems used by 
Royal Air Force Fighter Command to maneuver defending aircraft, it 
would have seriously degraded British air capabilities and made 
ultimate success much more likely. They did not because they did not 
fully realize how warfare had changed to emphasize the importance 
of these intangible assets. Exploiting signals, data, and 
communications had become essential for military superiority. Future 
warfare between advanced opponents will begin with efforts to 
degrade command and control, manipulate opponent data, and 
misinform and confuse commanders (accompanied by electronic 
warfare actions, along with kinetic strikes on communications 
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networks and perhaps satellites). Cyber exploits will be the opening 
salvo and a short-notice warning of impending kinetic attack. 
Strikes on critical infrastructure carry a higher degree of risk for the 
attacker if they are used against targets outside the theater of military 
operations or in the opponent's homeland. An attack on the networks 
of a deployed military force is to be expected. Attacks on civilian 
targets in the opponent's homeland are another matter and may 
escalate any conflict. Military planning will need to consider when it 
is beneficial to launch cyber attacks that damage critical 
infrastructure in order to strain and distract the opposing political 
leadership, and when it is better to limit any cyber strikes to military 
targets in theater. 
This is one area where cyber attack, because of its global reach, may 
resemble nuclear war. Just as the U.S. Single Integrated Operations 
Plan and other documents listed and prioritized targets for nuclear 
weapons, based on satellite and other forms of reconnaissance, an 
astute cyber planner will identify and prioritize targets for cyber 
strikes under different conflict scenarios. 
A full-blown, no-holds-barred cyber attack against critical 
infrastructure and networks might be able to reproduce the damage 
wrought by Hurricane Katrina, with crucial services knocked out and 
regional economic activity severely curtailed. While Katrina brought 
immense suffering and hardship, it did not degrade U.S. military 
capabilities and would not have led to a U.S. defeat. Multiple, 
simultaneous Katrinas would still not guarantee victory and could 
risk being seen as an existential threat that would justify a harsh 
kinetic response. There are many examples of militaries attacking 
targets that were irrelevant to success and only inflamed the 
opponent, so we cannot rule out such attacks (which could be very 
appealing to terrorist groups, should they ever acquire the ability to 
launch them), but no one should believe that this is a decisive new 
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weapon. The only "decisive" weapons ever developed were nuclear 
weapons, and even then, many would have been needed to overcome 
an opponent. 
Pure cyber war—"keyboard versus keyboard" or "geek versus 
geek"—is unlikely. Cyber attacks are fast, cheap, and moderately 
destructive, but no one would plan to fight using only cyber weapons. 
They are not destructive enough to damage an opponent's will and 
capacity to resist. Cyber attacks will not be decisive, particularly 
against a large and powerful opponent. The threat of retaliation that is 
limited to a cyber response may also not be very compelling. Cyber 
attack is not much of a deterrent. 
Deterrence uses the implied threat of a damaging military response to 
keep an opponent from attacking. "Cross-domain" deterrence (where 
a cyber attack could result in a kinetic response) works at some 
levels—no nation would launch a cyber-only attack against the 
United States because of the threat of retaliation. But deterrence does 
not stop espionage or crime because these actions do not justify the 
use of military force in response. Since our opponents stay below the 
threshold of war, this limits what we can "deter." 
In the future, even this limited deterrence may not work against 
terrorist groups or irresponsible nations like Iran or North Korea. For 
nonstate actors, such as terrorists, it is hard to make a credible threat, 
since they lack cities and infrastructure to hold hostage and can be 
willing to commit suicide in an attack. Nations such as Iran and 
North Korea may have a very different calculation of acceptable risk, 
being willing to do things that strike other nations as insanely risky 
(as when North Korea torpedoed a South Korean patrol boat). Iran, 
North Korea, and others may miscalculate the reactions of the West 
to a limited cyber attack. When these less deterrable actors acquire 
advanced cyber capabilities, the likelihood of cyber attack will 
increase. 
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A century ago, armies discovered that technology could be the key to 
victory. Since then there has been a steady stream of new weapons, 
new technologies, and new ways to attack. Perhaps it is best to see 
the Internet and cyber attack as the latest in a long line of 
technologies that have changed warfare and provided new military 
capabilities. We have only begun to explore the uses of this new 
capability, and as the world becomes more dependent on networks 
and computer technology, the value and effect of cyber attack will 
grow. 
James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the 
Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies in Washington, M. 
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IN 
Foreign Policy 
The next U.S.-Russia missile race 
David E. Hoffman 
July 11, 2011 -- Only two countries on Earth possess thousands of 
nuclear warheads: the United States and Russia. Together, they 
account for 95 percent of the existing 20,500 weapons; no other 
nation has more than a few hundred. Despite the new U.S.-Russia 
strategic arms limitation treaty, there is plenty of room for deeper 
reductions in these two arsenals, including tactical nuclear weapons, 
which have never been covered by a treaty, and strategic nuclear 
weapons held in reserve. 
This December will mark the 20th anniversary of the Soviet collapse 
and end of the Cold War, a largely peaceful finale to an enormous, 
costly competition between two blocs and two colossal military 
machines. Today's threats are different: terrorism, cyber attacks, 
pandemics, proliferation and conventional wars. As Leon Panetta told 
the Senate Armed Services Committee at his confirmation hearing to 
be Secretary of Defense: "We are no longer in the Cold War. This is 
more like the blizzard war, a blizzard of challenges that draw speed 
and intensity from terrorism, from rapidly developing technologies 
and the rising number of powers on the world stage." 
Yet the United States and Russia, no longer adversaries, seem to be 
sleepwalking toward the future. Perhaps the drift is the result of the 
approaching election season in both countries. Unfortunately, politics 
makes it harder to embrace new thinking. But honestly, haven't we 
learned anything in two decades? 
Instead of moving to the next stage in reducing nuclear arsenals, the 
two countries are debating stale arguments of yesteryear. 
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Take missile defense. A generation ago, President Reagan proposed 
research into a global shield to defend against ballistic missiles. At 
the Reykjavik summit in 1986, Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev came close to a deal that would have dramatically slashed 
offensive strategic nuclear arms. But it fell apart because Reagan 
insisted on his dream of a global missile defense shield. Even today, 
many Americans remember this dramatic moment as a triumph by 
Reagan. The globe-straddling sheild was never built, although one 
legacy of that era is that missile defense still enjoys enormous 
political support in Congress. Many of the vexing technical hurdles to 
building an effective sheild remain unresolved. 
Today, a fresh divide over missile defense separates East and West. It 
should not be as momentous as the last one. NATO and Russia are 
discussing a U.S. plan to build a limited European ballistic missile 
defense system, known as the Phased Adaptive Approach, largely 
aimed at defending against medium-range missiles from Iran. The 
scope would be more modest than Reagan's 1983 idea. Nonetheless, 
Russian officials have expressed fear that improvements in the 
NATO system by the end of this decade could threaten Moscow's 
nuclear deterrent. Russia has asked NATO for legal guarantees that 
the system would not be used to neutralize its strategic missiles. In 
response, NATO has been trying to hammer out a method of 
cooperation—two hands on the joystick?—to meet the Russian 
concerns, so far without success. 
The Russians have been warning that should this effort stall, it may 
not be possible to negotiate deeper cuts in existing nuclear arsenals. 
Also, partly in response to uncertainty over missile defense, Russia 
has taken the first steps to design a new liquid-fueled, multiple-
warhead intercontinental ballistic missile. Such a project would take 
years, huge investments, and might never materialize, but it has 
appeared on the drawing boards. 
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These may be just negotiating feints. But it will be a real shame if an 
impasse over missile defense prevents progress on negotiations for 
deeper cuts in existing nuclear arsenals, or if it begets a new weapons 
system. 
Last week, one of Russia's leading defense industry chiefs, Yuri 
Solomonov, who heads the Moscow Heat Technology Institute, 
which built the Topol-M and Bulava missiles, presented some hard 
truths in an interview published by the newspaper Kommersant. He 
called plans to build a new heavy liquid-fueled missile "outright 
stupidity." On missile defense, he said there has been talk about a 
shield for half a century; nothing has come of it, and nothing will 
come of it. He said ballistic missile defense would always be easier to 
defeat with countermeasures, which Russia has developed. 
So, let's hope NATO and Russia can find a way to agree on limited 
missile defense, if only to pave the way for genuine cooperation on 
what's really important: reducing the existing outsized nuclear 
arsenals. Should arms control negotiations stall, and Russia builds the 
new heavy missile, it will stimulate a response in the United States, 
where the military services are already preparing modernization plans 
for the next generation of subs, missiles and aircraft to carry nuclear 
weapons. A new Russian heavy missile would be just the threat they 
need to justify massive new spending. 
A revived nuclear arms race is the last thing the world needs to mark 
the 20th anniversary of the end of the Cold War. 
David E. Hoffman is a Pulitzer Prize-winning author and a 
contributing editor to Foreign Policy. 
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