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From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen 
Subject: May 17 update 
Date: Fri, 18 May 2012 17:04:35 +0000 
17 May, 2012 
Article 1. 
The Economist 
Greek politics: Slouching towards the drachma 
Article 2. 
The Moscow Times 
Why Putin Is Afraid of the People 
Vladimir Ryzhkov 
Article 3. 
The Washington Post 
Muslim Brotherhood presidential candidate 
Ernesto London° 
Article 4. 
Guardian 
Mubarak's repression machine is still alive and well 
Hossam el-Hamalawy 
Article 5. 
The Washington Post 
Pakistan blew its chance for security 
David Ignatius 
Article 6. 
Foreign Policy 
Israel's Image Revisted 
Aaron David Miller 
Article 7. 
The Washington Institute 
Secret Hamas Elections Point to Internal Struggle 
Ehud Yaari 
Article 8. 
The Washington Post 
Is the U.S. going too far to help Israel? 
Walter Pincus 
The Economist 
Greek politics: lonching towards the 
drachma 
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May 16th 2012 -- PITY Karolos Papoulias. The 82-year-old president of 
Greece has spent over a week trying to persuade the country's fractious 
political leaders to form a government after a general election on May 6th 
failed to produce a clear winner. Mr Papoulias, a soft-spoken former 
foreign minister, handed out mandates to various party leaders, none of 
whom could deliver, and made a three-day effort of his own, before finally 
giving up yesterday. 
Success would have given Greece breathing space, if only for a few 
months, to pursue urgent reforms—such as recapitalising its insolvent 
banks and getting on with privatisation—to help restore its credibility with 
European partners and financial markets. Instead, another election now 
looms, on June 17th. Until then the country will be run by a caretaker 
government under Panagiotis Pikrammenos, Greece's most senior judge. 
Lucas Papademos, the ex-European central banker who has run a coalition 
government for the last six months, overseeing a E206 billion sovereign-
debt restructuring and Greece's second bail-out, was not asked to stay on. 
The transcripts of Mr Papoulias's last three meetings, made public at the 
request of Alexis Tsipras, the leader of Syriza, a hard-left coalition, and 
Greece's rising political star, reveal a disturbing lack of vision among the 
men who are supposed to be Greece's leading politicians. Rather than 
tackle serious issues, such as how to keep Greece in the euro, they swapped 
insults and shrugged off a warning that a bank run was imminent. "They're 
all irresponsible, none of them is capable of ending this crisis," says 
Aristomenes Antonopoulos, a lawyer. "How to vote now?" 
Support among Greeks for staying in the euro is up from 70% to 80% over 
the past three months, according to opinion polls. Yet fears that prolonged 
political instability could trigger a "Grexit" are also increasing. Greek 
savers withdrew E3 billion from local banks—about 2% of total deposits-
as hopes of forming a coalition collapsed. Greece has seen a steady erosion 
of bank deposits over the past two years, yet few bankers were prepared for 
such a rapid acceleration of withdrawals. Deposits had increased in March 
and April, thanks to smooth handling of Greece's partial default. 
Today, cash was being taken away from the banks in orderly fashion. There 
were no queues outside branches in central Athens or its suburbs. 
Customers ordered cash by telephone and picked it up 24 hours later. Some 
went straight into safety-deposit boxes at the same bank; some was stashed 
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beneath mattresses in case Greece has to re-adopt the drachma. "People are 
taking preventive measures," says one veteran banker. "If you own a pile of 
euros, you'll feel rich in a drachma environment." 
Despite their enthusiasm for holding on to the euro, Greeks are fed up with 
the austerity that German politicians say is the price of continued 
membership. Syriza suggests that such views are compatible, arguing that 
Greece can stay in the euro but also reverse the reforms imposed by the 
"troika" (the European Union, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund). 
This is a message Greek voters appear to like. A recent poll found that 
Syriza would win the next election with 20.5% of the vote, just ahead of 
the pro-euro New Democracy party on 19.4%, but well short of an overall 
majority. The PanHellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), the only other 
electable party that supports reform, would come a distant third with 
11.8%. 
Mr Tsipras is reorganising his party and renewing his campaign, 
neighbourhood by neighbourhood, in Athens and other cities. His rhetoric 
is sharper than ever, yet his dream of forming a left-wing government is no 
closer to being realised than at the previous election. Potential partners 
have sounded more cross than co-operative since Mr Tsipras bounced into 
second place behind New Democracy on May 6th. 
Antonis Samaras, the New Democracy leader, will pull out all the stops. If 
his centre-right party cannot form a government this time, his career will 
be over. A new alliance with a small liberal party should give him another 
couple of percentage points at the election. As for Evangelos Venizelos, the 
Pasok leader and a potential coalition partner, he is struggling to prevent 
more voters defecting for Syriza. 
Even with the extra 50 seats that go to the party that comes first, the two 
pro-bailout parties will still struggle to form a government after the second 
election. The long-suffering Mr Papoulias is likely to be back in action on 
June 18th. 
Anicic 2. 
The Moscow Times 
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Why Putin Is Afraid of the People
Vladimir Ryzhkov
16 May 2012 -- After Moscow's large protests on May 6 and the following 
days, we can easily dispel two widely held opinions — that the protest 
movement had fizzled out and that Putin had overcome his fear 
of demonstrations. As it turns out, the protest mood among Russians is 
stronger than ever and the paranoia of the ruling regime is getting worse. 
On the way to his inauguration on May 7, Putin's motorcade traveled along 
completely empty Moscow streets. Minutes later, he accepted the oath 
of office in marble- and gold-bedecked Kremlin halls, where he was met 
by a more than 3,000 members of his loyal political elite who owe their 
privileged status to his generous patronage. 
While jubilant supporters of French President Francois Hollande filled 
the streets to celebrate his victory on May 6, the deepening chasm between 
Putin's regime and the people resounded with an ominously hollow echo 
along Moscow's empty streets a day later. 
Despite his claims that the people adore him, Putin has become even more 
frightened of them. After the inauguration and the chilling reception 
in Moscow, it is no surprise that he rushed off to Nizhny Tagil — an island 
of pro-Putin supporters only because it is home to the Uralvagonzavod tank 
and train-car plant that prospers because of generous government contracts 
ordered by Putin himself. Putin is afraid to meet with people who are not 
dependent upon his largesse. Private-sector workers are still the majority 
of Moscow's population, and that is why Putin fears Muscovites most 
of all. This explains why he didn't want to encounter them on the day he 
ascended the Russian throne for the third time. 
Few thought that the March of a Million rally on May 6 would have a large 
turnout. Only 7,000 people had registered to attend on Facebook, and it 
seemed that most opposition-minded Muscovites would leave the city 
for the weekend to take advantage of the rare warm weather for early May. 
But more people showed up on May 6 than they did on Pushkin Square 
and Novy Arbat in March. 
In addition to the large protest on May 6, writers Boris Akunin and Dmitry 
Bykov and musician Andrei Makarevich led about 15,000 people 
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on Sunday on a writers' walk from Pushkin Square to Chistiye Prudy. All 
of this shows that dissatisfaction with Putin and his regime remains high 
and that people are prepared to take to the streets, even at the risk of being 
beaten by police. Another, perhaps even larger protest rally could take 
place in Moscow on Russia Day, a national holiday on June 12. 
The May 6 protests could have ended in serious violence. The more radical 
protesters happened to be at the front of the crowd and seemed to be eager 
to clash with riot police. The authorities, for their part, were well prepared 
for a confrontation. Riot police carried tear gas and gas masks, and behind 
police cordons several water-cannon trucks stood ready. The situation 
could easily have degenerated into a massive, deadly riot. Fortunately, 
the violence did not escalate, although many were injured. 
In contrast to rallies in December, February and March, the May 6 rally 
was not well organized. What's more, some of the leaders planned 
beforehand that they would remain at the site after the approved time 
for the rally had expired. This led to clashes with police, who broke up 
the unauthorized action. 
The authorities also took advantage of the poor coordination by rally 
organizers to create an artificial bottleneck, leaving only a narrow corridor 
for thousands of protesters to enter Bolotnaya Ploshchad. This caused 
havoc and provoked demonstrators to clash with police. Most of the blame 
for the violence lies with the authorities, but the event organizers are 
partially to blame as well. 
For the first time since Dec. 10, a protest rally ended with police disbursing 
demonstrators before they could formulate explicit demands to the 
authorities. Coverage by state-controlled television focused on protesters 
clashing with the police, but it ignored the opposition's political motivation 
behind the rally. It is even possible that provocateurs were planted in the 
crowd to trigger the violence. They were active in previous opposition 
rallies. After all, it is advantageous for the authorities to portray 
demonstrators as anarchists or radicals who commit gross violations of law 
and order in an attempt to lead the country into chaos and revolution. Not 
surprisingly, that is exactly how the state-controlled media described 
the events of May 6. 
The radicalization of the protest movement plays into Putin's hands. It 
gives him a carte blanche to unleash both the state-controlled media 
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and the police force against demonstrators. By contrast, the regime is 
threatened by peaceful rallies with clearly defined political demands, 
where organizers maintain order and hand over provocateurs to the police. 
The country's leaders have no arguments to oppose the opposition's 
demands and complaints, and are helpless in the face of large, peaceful 
rallies. We should learn lessons from the May protest to make the June one 
larger and even more effective. 
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a State Duma deputy from 1993 to 2007, hosts 
a political talk show on Ekho Moskvy radio and is a co-founder of the 
opposition Party of People's Freedom. 
A,tklc 3. 
The Washington Post 
Muslim Brotherhood  presidential candidate 
an underdog in Egypt
Ernesto London() 
May 17 -- CAIRO — Had Egypt's post-revolutionary political winds held 
steady, Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood's presidential 
candidate, would have been coasting to victory in this month's election. 
Instead, he's running an underdog campaign. The group's prodigious 
political machine, which turned the once-besieged opposition movement 
into the dominant force in parliament early this year, has to contend with 
an uncharismatic candidate and a shift in public opinion as many Egyptians 
have soured on the venerable Islamist organization. 
The Brotherhood's political stock is plunging, analysts and ordinary 
Egyptians say, because its political party has backtracked on promises and 
accomplished little since a predominantly Islamist cadre of lawmakers was 
sworn in in January. 
In the working-class Cairo neighborhood of Abbasiya, where the 
Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party campaigned vigorously in the 
weeks before the parliamentary elections, shopkeeper Abbas Helmi, 58, put 
down a Koran he was reciting softly to talk politics. On the eve of those 
elections, he said, Freedom and Justice campaigners set up stalls to sell 
residents subsidized meat and vegetables, drawing large crowds. 
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"People went and bought their meat," Helmi recalled. "But after the vote, 
[the party workers] disappeared, and the people felt deceived." 
The backgrounds of the two front-runners — a former foreign minister 
who served under now-deposed Hosni Mubarak and a moderate Islamist 
who broke away from the Brotherhood — suggest that Egyptians may want 
a statesman who is more inclusive and less dogmatic about the role of 
Islam in governance than the devout politicians who control parliament. 
But experts caution that it would be a mistake to dismiss Morsi's chances 
outright. His rivals might be generating more enthusiasm and doing better 
in the polls, they say, but none has the Brotherhood's mighty machinery or 
its network of allied preachers and local operatives. 
"They go into full mobilization mode on Election Day," said Shadi Hamid, 
an Egypt expert with the Brookings Doha Center who has studied the 
Muslim Brotherhood for years. "They play old-fashioned bare-knuckles 
politics, and they're in it to win it." 
In addition to its robust get-out-the-vote campaign, the Brotherhood's 
endurance of decades of oppression under Mubarak probably helped it to 
win sympathy during the parliamentary elections. But the group's short 
stint in power has proved largely disappointing. 
The Brotherhood-dominated parliament has passed no laws of consequence 
since its January inauguration. Many Egyptians have been disenchanted by 
the Brotherhood's refusal to prioritize the repeal of the reviled emergency 
law, which has been used for decades to crack down on dissidents. 
The Brotherhood's handling of another controversial issue, the use of 
military trials to prosecute civilians, has angered human rights activists. 
Parliament recently restricted the president from referring civilians for 
prosecution in military court, but it stopped short of also barring the armed 
forces from doing so. 
Despite occasional public statements criticizing the ruling military council, 
the Brotherhood has had a surprisingly cooperative relationship with the 
generals who were once instrumental in keeping the group oppressed and 
politically disenfranchised. The Brotherhood has often discouraged its 
followers from joining protests against the military, infuriating other 
political factions, which view the Islamist group as opportunistic. 
`Renaissance' candidate 
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Senior Brotherhood officials acknowledged in interviews that Morsi might 
lack charisma, but they disputed the notion that his campaign for the two-
day election next week is floundering. 
"Egypt doesn't need a charismatic president," said Essam el-Erian, an 
influential Brotherhood legislator. "It needs a president who can deal with 
the government and with the parliament." 
In recent weeks, some rallies for Morsi have seemed tailor-made for 
ultraconservative Muslim voters, whom the campaign is trying to woo. It 
has also enlisted radical clerics to rally voters, in an apparent attempt to 
excite and broaden the party's base. 
Morsi, 60, has dismissed as flawed polls that show him lagging and has 
pointed to large turnouts at campaign rallies nationwide as evidence that 
his presidential bid is not doomed. 
He is branding himself a "renaissance" candidate and the only contender 
who would bring impeccable Islamist credentials to the presidency. A vote 
for him, Morsi has assured Egyptians, is a way to ensure that the spirit of 
the revolution that ousted Mubarak from the presidency in February 2011 
endures. 
"I want the revolution to stay alive after the president is elected," Morsi 
said at a recent rally. "We will not allow another dictator to control Egypt." 
Morsi was not the Brotherhood's first choice when the group reneged on its 
vow not to field a presidential candidate. The group says it broke the 
promise because it believes the military council that replaced Mubarak has 
mismanaged the transition to democratic rule. 
The Freedom and Justice Party nominated Khairat el-Shater, the 
Brotherhood's top strategist and biggest bank roller, as its candidate in 
March. Anticipating that Shater could be disqualified, Morsi's name was 
registered as a backup. 
Shater was among 10 contenders disqualified last month by the country's 
presidential election commission, an unexpected move that forced the 
Brotherhood to thrust little-known Morsi into the spotlight. Shater was 
disqualified because the commission ruled that the time he served as a 
political prisoner during the Mubarak regime made him ineligible. 
Morsi, an engineer with a doctorate from the University of Southern 
California, had a relatively low profile until he became the Freedom and 
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Justice Party's chairman when the long-banned Muslim Brotherhood was 
allowed to register as a political party after Mubarak's ouster. 
`Not sticking to their word' 
A senior Brotherhood leader who offered his candid assessment of the 
Morsi campaign on the condition of anonymity said there is deep angst 
about the race among the movement's old guard. 
"I think they made a mistake in making too many promises and then not 
sticking to their word," the veteran Brotherhood figure said. "As Islamists, 
they should have stuck to their word. People are now calling the Muslim 
Brotherhood dishonest." 
Besides reneging on its promise not to field a presidential candidate, 
Brotherhood leaders have raised eyebrows by warming up to Washington 
and suggesting that they would honor Egypt's unpopular peace deal with 
Israel. 
Morsi's main competitors are former foreign minister Amr Moussa, the 
Arab League's erstwhile chief whose appeal stems largely from his name 
recognition and his hard-line stance against Israel, and Abdel Moneim 
Aboul Fotouh, a former Brotherhood leader who is regarded as a moderate 
Islamist. Aboul Fotouh supporters have sought to disparage the 
Brotherhood. New billboards that have gone up around Cairo in support of 
Aboul Fotouh call the candidate's former group the "Machiavellian 
Brotherhood." 
Abdul Ghamed Ahmad Abdel, a 69-year-old taxi driver, said the 
Brotherhood's popularity has slipped in his district of Imbaba in Cairo. 
"They took control of the parliament because they are deeply entrenched in 
the rural areas," he said. But their lackluster performance in office is sure 
to hurt them, he added. "They've been exposed for what they are." 
Anicle 4. 
Guardian 
In Egypt, Mubarak's repression machine is 
still alive and well 
Hossam cl-I lamalawy 
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16 May 2012 -- A little over a week ago, in Obour City, hundreds of 
Egypt's notorious Central Security Forces (CSF) conscripts mutinied over 
torture received at the hands of their officers. The conscripts took to the 
highway, blocked the road, and even started chanting a famous anti-police 
song composed by the Ultras White Knights, one of the country's football 
fan groups. The mutiny was put down quickly by the army, together with 
concessions and promises offered. 
This was not the first time such a mutiny has occurred since the January 
2011 revolution. Several mutinies occurred on the "Friday of Anger". The 
following day, I met a guy in Mohamed Mahmoud Street while marching 
on the interior ministry who was a CSF conscript who escaped from his 
camp to join the protesters. Repeated mutinies were reported in Cairo, 
Alexandria and elsewhere over the course of the following months, over ill 
treatment by officers, long working hours and bad food. The CSF is the 
interior ministry's army, and its central arm in crushing street dissent. 
Those conscripts are poorly paid, poorly fed, tortured, and made to do the 
state's dirtiest job. The last time they undertook a full-scale mutiny was in 
1986. It was brutally crushed by Mubarak who sent in the army. 
Civil servants at the interior ministry have also been on strike, over 
pensions, pay and abusive treatment of civilians by police officers. That 
follows a national strike by police corporals, over pay, work conditions and 
again, ill-treatment by officers. The corporals demanded an end to military 
tribunals in the police force. Workers at eight factories owned by the 
interior ministry, producing consumer goods for officers, have also gone on 
strike over contracts. 
Make no mistake, Mubarak's interior ministry is still alive and well. We 
dealt some heavy blows to it on the Friday of Anger and the police were 
heroically fought on several occasions, including the mini uprising in 
November 2011. But still, the CSF, the SS (or what's now called Homeland 
Security) and most of the repression machine is intact, and moreover is 
receiving the direct help of the military police and the army's intelligence 
services. 
Even if the ruling army generals manage to crush the ongoing police 
protests and prevent them from spreading, the objective conditions for 
another 1986-style mass scale mutiny are still there. Those new waves of 
conscripts are not only the sons of poor peasants and workers, who have no 
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love for their middle-class officers, but the context is one of revolution. 
Those new conscripts have witnessed it, and could well have participated 
in it prior to their conscription. 
The interior ministry will not be able to restructure its CSF. There is not the 
political will; the current police generals who belong to Mubarak's interior 
minister Habib el-Adly's clique are more than happy to see the status of 
their army of slaves remain unchanged. The army generals too would love 
to see Mubarak's CSF revived and for it to take charge of putting down 
protests instead of having to involve the military police. As we continue to 
organise and fight against the interior ministry, in an effort to dissolve it 
and replace it with community policing, such strikes and mutinies by the 
conscripts, corporals and civil servants should be supported by the 
revolutionary forces to create more fractures in this machine of repression. 
Hossam el-Hamalawy is an Egyptian journalist from Cairo. He blogs at 
arabawy. org 
Article 5. 
The Washington Post 
Pakistan blew its chance for security 
David Ignatius 
May 17 -- As America begins to pull back its troops from Afghanistan, one 
consequence gets little notice but is likely to have lasting impact: Pakistan 
is losing the best chance in its history to gain political control over all of its 
territory — including the warlike tribal areas along the frontier. 
Pakistan has squandered the opportunity presented by having a large U.S.-
led army just over the border in Afghanistan. Rather than work with the 
United States to stabilize a lawless sanctuary full of warlords and terrorists, 
the Pakistanis decided to play games with these outlaw groups. As a result, 
Pakistan and its neighbors will be less secure, probably for decades. 
This is a catastrophic mistake for Pakistan. Instead of drawing the tribal 
areas into a nation that finally, for the first time since independence in 
1947, could be integrated and unified, the Pakistani military decided to 
keep the ethnic pot boiling. It was a triumph of short-term thinking over 
long-term; of scheming over strategy. 
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America has made many blunders in Afghanistan, which will have their 
own consequences. But U.S. problems are modest compared with those of 
Pakistan, which nearly 65 years after independence still doesn't have 
existential security as a nation. Like most big mistakes people make in life, 
this is one that Pakistan's military leaders made with their eyes wide open. 
The Group of Eight and NATO will hold summits in the coming days and 
announce the exit strategy from Afghanistan. Fortunately, President Obama 
is planning a gradual transition, with at least 20,000 U.S. troops remaining 
until 2024, if necessary, to train the Afghan army, hunt al-Qaeda and steady 
Afghans against the danger of civil war. 
But what can Western leaders say when it comes to Pakistan? Basically, the 
Pakistanis blew it. By playing a hedging game, they missed a moment 
that's not likely to return, when a big Western army of well over 100,000 
soldiers was prepared to help them. Instead, Islamabad used the 
inevitability that America would be leaving eventually as an argument for 
creating a buffer zone that was inhabited by a murderous melange of the 
Taliban, the Haqqani network and other Pashtun warlords. 
Yes, it would have been hard to bring under Pakistani law the rebellious 
badlands known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. I have a shelf 
full of books describing how the process of pacification eluded the British 
raj and was gingerly handed over to the new government of Pakistan like a 
bag of snakes. But hard is not impossible — especially when you have 
modern communications and transportation and the most potent army in 
history ready to help. 
What comes through reading these old books is how long the problem has 
persisted. A 1901 British "Report on Waziristan and Its Tribes" lists the 
tribes, clans and sub-clans the British were paying off more than a century 
ago through their political agents, rather than risk a fight with these 
stubborn warriors. After their disastrous Afghan wars, the British decided 
that payoffs made more sense than shootouts — a decision the Pakistanis 
have repeated ever since, at the price of permanent insecurity. 
The notion of the tribal areas as a warrior kingdom, impenetrable to 
outsiders, has a romantic "Orientalist" tone. I was disabused of it in 2009 
when I met a group of younger tribal leaders who had gathered in 
Islamabad to tell U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke that the region 
needed economic development, good governance and less hanky-panky 
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from the central government. In a move that embodied everything that's 
wrong with the Pakistani approach, these brave young men were 
intercepted on the way home by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and 
quizzed about why they had dared talk to the farangi. 
Surely the most foolish move the Pakistanis made was to compromise with 
the terrorist Haqqani network, which operates from its base in Miran Shah, 
a few hundred yards from a Pakistani military garrison. This was like 
playing with a cobra — something the Pakistanis seem to imagine is an 
essential part of regional realpolitik. No, you kill a cobra. If the ISI had 
been up to the task, it would have had some formidable snake-killing allies. 
The Pakistanis lost a chance over the past decade to build and secure their 
country. It won't come back again in this form. That's a small problem for 
the United States and its allies, but a big problem for Pakistan. What a 
shame to see a wonderful nation miss its moment so completely. 
Artick 6. 
Foreign Policy 
Israel's Image Revisted 
Aaron David Miller 
May 16, 2012 -- Writing in the Wall Street Journal this week on the 
occasion of Israeli Independence Day, Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren 
penned a powerful op-ed on the erosion of Israel's image. 
His conclusion: Israel's image has deteriorated in large part because of a 
"systematic delegitimization of the Jewish state." 
"Having failed to destroy Israel by conventional arms and terrorism," he 
writes, "Israel's enemies alit on a subtler and more sinister tactic that 
hampers Israel's ability to defend itself, even to justify its existence." 
First, some full disclosure. I like and respect Michael Oren. He's a 
remarkably talented historian, astute analyst, and able diplomat. 
I also have no doubt that there are efforts to delegitimize Israel, that anti-
Semitism pervades some of the anti-Israel rhetoric, that Israel is one of the 
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few countries in the world that's judged by impossibly high standards, and 
that the perception and reality of its power causes many to ignore the 
realities of its vulnerability. 
But I just don't buy the argument that Israel's image has eroded principally 
because of a dedicated campaign to delegitimize it. 
Three other factors drive Israel's very bad PR: the realities of nation-
building, the image of the asymmetry of power, and Israel's own actions, 
which, like those of so many other countries, value short-term tactics over 
long-term strategy. 
City on a Hill? 
If Israel was created to be a paragon of virtue and a "light unto the nations" 
-- the proverbial city on the hill -- it picked the wrong hill. 
Whatever the Zionist ideologues who founded Israel may have intended, 
the creation of the state of Israel and the realities of nation-building quickly 
became a quest for normalcy in highly unusual and abnormal 
circumstances. 
Unlike the United States, which had non-predatory neighbors to its north 
and south and fish to its east and west, Israelis perceived themselves to 
have had no security space and little margin for error, let alone the quiet 
miracle of a normal life. Born in war, Israel has remained in an active 
conflict zone ever since. That it has succeeded in creating as much 
normalcy as it did is a remarkable testament to its leaders and the 
capacities, strength, and will of its people. 
But along with that normalcy came the normal aging process of a small 
state built on socialist and Zionist values turning into a modern 
industrialized nation focused on material advancement and modern 
comforts. Israel's idealized image of itself -- the one idealized by its 
founders and much of the American Jewish community -- could only 
change for the worse. 
For Israel, part of being normal has also meant acting like a normal state, 
with all of the contradictions, political expediency, hypocrisies, and self-
justifying policies that such normalcy entails in a world that is still ruled by 
power and self-interest. Israel's loyal ally, the United States, operates in 
that world too. 
Why would anyone believe that Israeli behavior would be any different? 
Are the Israelis more ethical, democratic, and moral than we are? Israel's 
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image has eroded because it lives in the real world as a flawed and 
imperfect nation. And frankly, though it's only 60-plus years old, its abuses 
and flaws have yet to rival any of the European colonial powers, let alone 
the Russians or the Chinese. 
Big and Small 
The erosion of Israel's image is also inextricably linked to its emergence as 
a regional power with a vibrant economy, a dynamic high-tech sector, and 
a powerful military. The images in Leon Uris's classic book Exodus and the 
Hollywood movie version with Paul Newman leading a ragtag Israeli 
militia against a sea of hostile Arabs have now been reversed. David has 
become Goliath. 
In the eyes of the world, Israel has shed its image of a small state 
struggling against impossible odds. Israel now has "security needs" and 
"requirements" rather than existential fears; its power obligates it to be 
more magnanimous and forthcoming on peace issues; its strength should 
produce restraint, not excess. 
Indeed much of the erosion of Israel's image is driven by the realities and 
perceptions of an asymmetry of power that now pits the nation with a per 
capita GDP of $31,000, 100 companies on the NYSE, and nukes in triple 
digits against a weak Palestinian quasi-state and an Arab world that's 
dysfunctional and imploding. 
There's much truth in this image of Israeli might, and anyone who denies 
that capacity trivializes what the Israelis have accomplished and does them 
a grave disservice by portraying them as victims. 
But there's also truth in Israel's vulnerabilities, too. But the asymmetry of 
power doesn't work in Israel's favor here, either. Remember the summer of 
2006, when 5,000 Hezbollah fighters equipped with rudimentary rockets 
shut down the northern half of the region's strongest military power for 33 
days? The day before the war ended, Hezbollah fired more rockets than on 
any previous day. Nuclear weapons and overwhelming force don't add up 
to much if they can't be used and don't deter. 
Israeli Actions 
Finally, Israel's eroding image flows from its own actions and behavior. 
These seem to fall into three categories. 
The first are those actions that are legitimate expressions of Israel's real 
security needs, but for which Israel is roundly and unfairly criticized (the 
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1981 attack on the Iraqi reactor; the 2007 preemptive strike on the fledging 
Syrian one). 
Second are those policies that not only make little sense morally or 
strategically but are deemed to be ideological and undercut other Israeli 
goals, such as peace with the neighbors (see: settlements). 
Third are those that are dumb, arbitrary, or disproportionate in terms of loss 
of life (see: Ehud Olmert's massive invasion of Lebanon in 2006, as well as 
many of Israel's occupation policies that humiliate Palestinians, including 
collective punishment, housing demolitions, and so on). And many of these 
derive from the reality that small powers, particularly those with 32 
different governments in 60-plus years, don't have long-range policies and 
strategies. Instead, they maneuver, react, and preempt to buy time and 
space. 
The notion that Israel's unfavorable image is a result of some evil cabal 
that plots daily against it infantilizes the Israelis and takes them out of 
history as real-world actors who sometimes do well in pursuit of their 
interests and at other times screw up badly. Israel is a remarkable state that 
has sought to preserve its moral and ethical soul in a cruel and unforgiving 
world. But it is still only a nation of mortals trying to survive in that world. 
Israeli founding father David Ben Gurion reflected the mood and mindset 
perfectly: It doesn't matter what the goyim say; what matters is what the 
Jews do. For better and almost certainly worse, Israel will be judged 
accordingly. 
Aaron David Miller is a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars. 
Anicic 7. 
The Washington Institute 
Secret llamas Elections Point to Internal 
Struggle
Ehud Yaari 
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May 16, 2012 -- The ongoing Hamas elections will strengthen the military 
wing, weaken Khaled Mashal, make reconciliation with the PA more 
difficult, preserve close collaboration with Iran, and, perhaps, forge closer 
ties with Egypt. 
The secretive elections for new Hamas leadership bodies are unofficially 
scheduled to continue until later this month, but it is already safe to point 
out some emerging trends as the movement struggles to cope with fierce 
debate over its future course. Top leader Khaled Mashal has been 
considerably weakened as his rivals in Gaza gain more influence and 
commanders in the military wing assume a much broader political role. In 
all likelihood, these developments will further complicate the group's 
stalled reconciliation efforts with the Palestinian Authority, accelerate its 
dash to achieve mass self-production of longer-range, more accurate 
missiles, and prevent -- at least for the foreseeable future -- a political 
divorce from Iran. 
UNPRECEDENTED TURNOVER 
As a rule, Hamas does not publish any election details, including the names 
of candidates, the number of voters, the location of polling stations, the 
institutions for which elections are held, or the results. Citing "security 
considerations," the group keeps all such information secret and prohibits 
campaigning. Despite these efforts, a fairly complete picture of the group's 
internal political struggle is already emerging. According to one senior 
Hamas official, more than 30 percent of members in the organization's 
different leadership institutions have been replaced by new faces. That is a 
dramatic change for a conservative movement that has been very reluctant 
to oust veteran figures. 
Initially, separate elections were to take place in each of the movement's 
four designated regions. Two of these "regions" are now expected to 
bypass voting and instead select their representatives through a process of 
"consultations" (e.g., appointments). 
First, Hamas prisoners will no longer choose their delegates through a 
complex system of mouth-to-ear ballot casting as they did in the past. 
Instead, those who already serve as the "command" for Hamas inmates --
usually in dealings with the Israeli Prison Service -- will be nominated as 
members-in-absentia to the movement's supreme bodies. Among these 
nominees will be convicted arch-terrorists such as Ibrahim Hamed, former 
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chief of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades in the West Bank; Abbas al-
Sayyed, mastermind of the 2002 Passover Eve massacre in Netanya; 
Hassan Salameh, architect of the group's suicide bombings in the 1990s; 
and Jamal Abu al-Haija, former Qassam commander in the Jenin district. 
Their participation in leadership deliberations will be limited to occasional 
requests for their opinions, submitted through their lawyers and family 
visitors. Yet it should be pointed out that during recent negotiations to end 
a prison hunger strike, these leaders of "the prisoners movement" -- as it is 
known in Palestinian political jargon -- essentially dictated to the rest of 
the Hamas leadership the terms for a deal with Israel, brokered by Egyptian 
intelligence. 
Second, the West Bank is likely to skip Hamas elections for the first time 
ever given the difficulties posed by continuous harassment and detention of 
group members by both PA and Israeli security agencies. Saleh al-Aruri, 
who founded the Qassam Brigades in the West Bank and was released from 
an Israeli prison in March 2010, is now the key man in determining which 
Hamas members in the defunct Palestinian Legislative Council will be 
selected to fill this region's quota in the leadership bodies. Aruri has been 
operating for some time out of Turkey -- with Ankara's tacit blessing -- in 
an effort to resurrect Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank. He is now 
recognized as the group's de facto top leader in the West Bank at the 
expense of veteran local political figures, and has thus acquired important 
standing in the new Hamas hierarchy. 
In the third region—Gaza—elections were concluded in late April, with 
12,000 voters delivering a severe defeat to supporters of Mashal, head of 
the Hamas Executive Committee (a body established in 2009 yet never 
proclaimed as the official replacement for the old Political Bureau). Few if 
any Mashal loyalists made it to the different elected institutions: namely, 
the various district shura councils, the seventy-seven-member Gaza Shura 
Council (expanded from fifty-nine seats), and the fifteen-member Gaza 
Political Bureau (Salah al-Bardawil, Muhammad al-Jumasi, Issam 
Daghlas, and other key members lost their seats in the latter body). So-
called moderates such as Ahmed Yousef and Ghazi Hamad were defeated, 
while sworn Mashal rivals enjoyed victories: Imad al-Alami -- former chief 
of the "military (or intifada) committee" who recently returned from 
Damascus after long years of tension with Mashal -- was elected deputy to 
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Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh in the latter's unannounced other 
capacity as head of the local Political Bureau. 
MILITARY ASCENDANCE 
Although Haniyeh once again proved to be the most popular Hamas leader 
in Gaza, he is quite reluctant to claim overall leadership and often avoids 
controversy by letting more outspoken colleagues speak their minds. 
Alami, now widely perceived as a potential future successor to Mashal, 
better represents the most salient trend: the "Pasdaranization" of Hamas. 
Similar to the way the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (or Pasdaran) 
have managed to take over Iran's state apparatus over the past decade, the 
Hamas military wing is now assuming control over the movement's 
political course. 
For example, perhaps the biggest winners at the Gaza polls (which are 
usually placed in mosques or charities) were Qassam Brigades 
commanders and their political partners. Muhammed Deif -- the behind-
the-scenes Qassam shadow supremo who has yet to fully recover from the 
severe injuries he suffered during an Israeli assassination attempt ten years 
ago -- did not run himself, preferring to maintain his traditional low profile. 
Yet others won impressive victories on their way to the Political Bureau: 
Qassam leaders Ahmed Jabari and Marwan Issa; Yahya al-Sinwar and 
Rawhi Mushtaha, Qassam commanders who were released from Israeli 
prison as part of the Gilad Shalit deal; and Hamas interior minister Fathi 
Hamad, a close collaborator with the military chiefs. Aside from Mahmoud 
al-Zahar (who managed to overcome military attempts to subvert his 
candidacy), all of the other elected "civilians" were supported by the 
significant percentage of votes controlled by the Qassam Brigades, 
including such figures as Khalil al-Hayya and Nizar Awadallah. 
"OUTSIDE" MEMBERS STILL VOTING 
At present, Hamas is still conducting elections in the fourth region, which 
consists of a few thousand "outside" members (including around a 
thousand from the group's disbanded Damascus headquarters, currently 
scattered in different Arab and Muslim countries). Voting is taking place at 
Hamas branches in the Persian Gulf states, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, and 
Europe, and the expectation is that at least some of Mashal's lieutenants 
may lose their seats in the fifteen-member "outside" Political Bureau. One 
key outside member -- Mustafa al-Leddawi, a first-generation Hamas 
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leader deported from Gaza by Israel -- was the first to come out publicly 
against Mashal, and was subsequently kidnapped for a few days in late 
April from his home in the Yarmouk refugee camp near Damascus. The 
unknown gunmen who seized him were widely believed to be enforcers 
employed by the remnants of Mashal's entourage. 
The main challenge to Mashal's faction in the outside region comes from 
his deputy and rival Mousa Abu Marzouk, whom Egyptian authorities 
permitted to settle in Cairo after the dissolution of the Damascus 
headquarters, whereas Mashal was compelled to pitch his tent in Doha, 
Qatar. A native of Rafah in southern Gaza, Abu Marzouk has cultivated 
much closer contacts with the Gaza leadership than Mashal (originally 
from a West Bank village) can hope to achieve. The rivalry between the 
two stems not from ideological differences, but mainly from longstanding 
personal competition, since Mashal replaced Abu Marzouk as Hamas chief 
when the latter was detained in the United States. 
IMPLICATIONS 
In the end, a combination of the Gaza military and the Abu Marzouk camp 
will likely control the top leadership institutions: that is, the Hamas 
General Shura Council, composed of sixty members from all regions, and 
the nineteen-member Executive Committee, which runs the group's daily 
affairs. 
For his part, Mashal will enjoy the support of most, but not all, of the West 
Bank representatives, though he will not command a majority. There are 
some indications that he may be reelected as Executive Committee head 
even though he announced in a secret Hamas gathering in Khartoum early 
this year that he does not intend to run for a third term. He was apparently 
hoping that his colleagues would plead with him to change his mind, but 
that did not happen. Still, his rivals aim not to depose him, but rather to 
limit his room for maneuver and submit him to majority rule. They have no 
interest in creating an open divide in the movement, and even his harshest 
critics realize the extent of his popularity among Palestinians. 
Prior to the elections, Mashal sought to lead Hamas toward comprehensive 
reconciliation agreement with Fatah and was willing to sacrifice the 
movement's monopoly of power in Gaza to this end. His hope was to win 
future elections in the West Bank and take over the Palestine Liberation 
Organization. This policy was vehemently rejected and, in the end, foiled 
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