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From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹
> 
Subject: October 15 update 
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2012 18:53:29 +0000 
14 October, 2012 
Article 1. 
NYT 
U.S. Suspects Iran Was Behind a Wave of Cyberattacks 
Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger 
Article 2. 
AI-Monitor 
Egypt's Morsi Gets Marks for Speed, Not Style in Foreign 
Policy 
Nabil Fahmy 
Article 3. 
Asharq Alawsat 
American election: It is not the economy, stupid! 
Amir Taheri 
Article 4. 
The Daily Star 
New hope, and fears, in the Arab world 
Rami G. Khouri 
Article 5. 
The Washington Post 
A preemptive strike on the foreign policy failures of the 
next administration 
Daniel Byman 
Article 6. 
The National Interest 
China's Uncertain Path 
Jonathan Levine 
Article I. 
NYT 
U.S. Suspects Iran Was 
a Wave f 
Cyberattacks 
Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger
October 13, 2012 -- American intelligence officials are increasingly 
convinced that Iran was the origin of a serious wave of network attacks that 
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crippled computers across the Saudi oil industry and breached financial 
institutions in the United States, episodes that contributed to a warning last 
week from Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta that the United States was at 
risk of a "cyber-Pearl Harbor." 
After Mr. Panetta's remarks on Thursday night, American officials 
described an emerging shadow war of attacks and counterattacks already 
under way between the United States and Iran in cyberspace. 
Among American officials, suspicion has focused on the "cybercorps" that 
Iran's military created in 2011 — partly in response to American and 
Israeli cyberattacks on the Iranian nuclear enrichment plant at Natanz —
though there is no hard evidence that the attacks were sanctioned by the 
Iranian government. 
The attacks emanating from Iran have inflicted only modest damage. 
Iran's cyberwarfare capabilities are considerably weaker than those in 
China and Russia, which intelligence officials believe are the sources of a 
significant number of probes, thefts of intellectual property and attacks on 
American companies and government agencies. 
The attack under closest scrutiny hit Saudi Aramco, the world's largest oil 
company, in August. Saudi Arabia is Iran's main rival in the region and is 
among the Arab states that have argued privately for the toughest actions 
against Iran. Aramco, the Saudi state oil company, has been bolstering 
supplies to customers who can no longer obtain oil from Iran because of 
Western sanctions. 
The virus that hit Aramco is called Shamoon and spread through computers 
linked over a network to erase files on about 30,000 computers by 
overwriting them. Mr. Panetta, while not directly attributing the strike to 
Iran in his speech, called it "probably the most destructive attack that the 
private sector has seen to date." 
Until the attack on Aramco, most of the cybersabotage coming out of Iran 
appeared to be what the industry calls "denial of service" attacks, relatively 
crude efforts to send a nearly endless stream of computer-generated 
requests aimed at overwhelming networks. But as one consultant to the 
United States government on the attacks put it several days ago: "What the 
Iranians want to do now is make it clear they can disrupt our economy, just 
as we are disrupting theirs. And they are quite serious about it." 
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The revelation that Iran may have been the source of the computer attacks 
was reported earlier by The Washington Post and The Associated Press. 
The attacks on American financial institutions, which prevented some bank 
customers from gaining access to their accounts online but did not involve 
any theft of money, seemed to come from various spots around the world, 
and so their origins are not certain. There is some question about whether 
those attacks may have involved outside programming help, perhaps from 
Russia. 
Mr. Panetta spoke only in broad terms, stating that Iran had "undertaken a 
concerted effort to use cyberspace to its advantage." Almost immediately, 
experts in cybersecurity rushed to fill in the blanks. 
"His speech laid the dots alongside each other without connecting them," 
James A. Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, wrote Friday in an essay for ForeignPolicy.com. 
"Iran has discovered a new way to harass much sooner than expected, and 
the United States is ill-prepared to deal with it." 
Iran has a motive, to retaliate for both the American-led financial sanctions 
that have cut its oil exports nearly in half, and for the cybercampaign by 
the United States and Israel against Iran's nuclear enrichment complex at 
Natanz. 
That campaign started in the Bush administration, when the United States 
and Israel first began experimenting with an entirely new generation of 
weapon: a cyberworm that could infiltrate another state's computers and 
then cause havoc on computer-controlled machinery. In this case, it 
resulted in the destruction of roughly a fifth of the nuclear centrifuges that 
Iran uses to enrich uranium, though the centrifuges were eventually 
replaced, and Iran's production capability has recovered. 
Iran became aware of the attacks in the summer of 2010, when the 
computer worm escaped from the Natanz plant and was replicated across 
the globe. The computer industry soon named the escaped weapon Stuxnet. 
Iran announced last year that it had begun its own military cyberunit, and 
Brig. Gen. Gholamreza Jalali, the head of Iran's Passive Defense 
Organization, said the Iranian military was prepared "to fight our enemies" 
in "cyberspace and Internet warfare." Little is known about how that group 
is organized, or where it has bought or developed its expertise. 
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The United States has never acknowledged its role in creating the Stuxnet 
virus, nor has it said anything about the huge covert program that created 
it, code-named Olympic Games, which was first revealed earlier this  year 
by The New York Times. President Obama drastically expanded the 
program as a way to buy time for sanctions to affect Iran, and to stave off a 
military attack on the Iranian facilities by Israel, which he feared could 
quickly escalate into a broader war. 
In advance of Mr. Panetta's speech in New York on Thursday, senior 
officials debated how much to talk about the United States's offensive 
capabilities, assessing whether such an acknowledgment could help create 
a deterrent for countries contemplating attacks on the country 
But Mr. Panetta carefully avoided using the words "offense" or "offensive" 
in the context of American cyberwarfare, instead defining the Pentagon's 
capabilities as "action to defend the nation." 
"We won't succeed in preventing a cyber attack through improved defenses 
alone," Mr. Panetta said. "If we detect an imminent threat of attack that 
will cause significant, physical destruction in the United States or kill 
American citizens, we need to have the option to take action against those 
who would attack us to defend this nation when directed by the president. 
For these kinds of scenarios, the department has developed that capability 
to conduct effective operations to counter threats to our national interests in 
cyberspace." 
The comments indicated that the United States might redefine defense in 
cyberspace as requiring the capacity to reach forward over computer 
networks if an attack was detected or anticipated, and take pre-emptive 
action. These same offensive measures also could be used in a punishing 
retaliation for a first-strike cyberattack on an American target, senior 
officials said. 
One senior intelligence official described a debate inside the Obama 
administration over the pros and cons of openly admitting that the United 
States has deployed a new cyber weapon, and could use it in response to an 
attack, or pre-emptively. 
For now, officials have decided to hold back. "The countries who need to 
know we have it already know," the senior intelligence official said. 
Anicic 2. 
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Al-Monitor 
Egypt's Morsi Gets Marks for Speed, Not 
Style in Foreign Policy 
Nabil Fahmy 
(Translated from: Al-Masry Al-Youm — Egypt) 
Oct 13, 2012 -- President Mohammed Morsi did not list Egyptian foreign 
policy as one of the five issues that would be prioritized during the first 
100 days of his presidency. He specified these priorities to be: providing 
citizens with bread, energy stability, security and cleanliness, as well as 
solving the problem of traffic  jams. These priorities bewildered us, and 
through them, Morsi hit and missed at the same time. 
It confused us, because he included issues that are impossible to solve in 
100 days. He put himself into a dilemma, and it was inevitable that the 
public's assessment concerning his ability to solve these issues would be 
negative. 
The president did well, because it is only natural to give priority to the 
internal Egyptian situation, led by finalizing new Egyptian state 
institutions, and on the basis of a constitution that brings us all together, 
guarantees us equal rights and provides a civilized foundation for the 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled, and between citizens in 
general, to ensure that democracy is achieved and remains. 
Morsi also made a mistake, because you cannot separate our foreign 
relations from our internal affairs or vice versa. Egypt's regional status in 
Africa and the Arab world is a part of its identity, and Egypt's regional and 
international weight serves our internal projects. 
Furthermore, regional and international parties and events will not wait for 
Egypt to organize itself internally, and whoever doesn't participate in these 
events becomes subordinate to them and those driving them. 
Then President Morsi surprised us by the fact that his actions during the 
first 100 days did not correspond to what he had said. On the international 
front, he set out actively and with force. 
Foreign relations enjoyed the largest part of his attention at the expense of 
other issues, with one exception: He regained his authority as the president 
of the republic, ending an era of military rule in the country that had lasted 
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since 1956. He visited approximately 10 foreign countries, which is more 
than the number of Egyptian governorates he visited in this period. 
He gave an important speech at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
summit, and participated in the annual session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, leaving the prime minister and his cabinet to implement 
his domestic electoral program. 
It is not logical or fair to assess general policies — whether they be 
domestic or foreign — on such a short period of time. It's too early to 
assess President Morsi's domestic and foreign policy, it is imperative that 
we allow for enough time for these policies to be translated into reality. 
We must allow for these policies to have reverberations among public 
opinion, even if a candidate was overly excited prior to the elections and 
made unrealistic promises for his first 100 days to attract voters, by 
appealing to their emotions and hopes rather than their minds and realities. 
Naturally, this applies to Morsi's foreign policy and his first 100 days, 
especially given that he didn't promise to achieve anything relating to these 
matters during this period. 
But it is our right — rather our duty — to assess the performance of the 
president up until now when it comes to foreign policy in order to decide 
whether we support it or not, and in order to maintain Egyptian national 
interests after the 2011 revolution. 
The practice of democracy is an ongoing political process between the 
ruler and the ruled, and does not end with the election of the president, nor 
is it merely delayed until the next electoral process. Otherwise, we would 
just be electing autocratic regimes for given periods of time between one 
election and the next. 
Morsi's performance related to foreign policy has been characterized by 
rapid movement and activity, and that in itself is a positive development to 
his credit. This movement in itself reflects the availability of energy and 
enthusiasm to enable the state — if all the necessary elements exist — to 
be effective or influential regionally or internationally. 
Moreover, President Morsi's movement was characterized by diversity —
he visited countries in Asia, the Arab world, Africa and Europe, in addition 
to the United Nations — which is also a good thing. 
If he seriously uses this to his advantage, this can open the door to 
diversification and plurality in the options available to Egypt at the 
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international level. This would remove us from being aligned with the East 
or the West, at a time when we boast about the fact that we make decisions 
for ourselves and are a non-aligned state. 
The Egyptian president took a strong stance when he participated in the 
Non-Aligned Movement summit despite all of the pressure, as well as 
when he announced his strong position in Tehran, saying that he was an 
opponent of the Syrian regime and stood firmly with the Syrian people. 
These are positions that I fully support. 
The president's performance at the foreign level was characterized by 
movement and had positive aspects, however there were also quite a few 
negative points and errors made. 
The first error was that he rushed to take action without giving himself the 
opportunity to prepare a general assessment of the international situation, 
or to envision the configuration of the international community and Egypt's 
neighboring region in the Arab world and Africa over the next five or 10 
years. This would have allowed him to specify goals and priorities, and to 
determine opportunities and challenges ahead of us in the near future, in 
order to develop the necessary plans and foreign policies to achieve 
specific goals and preserve our interests. 
How can we implement a policy without having a basic vision for the 
political arena or the circumstances that we are operating in? Foreign 
policy always faces the challenge of reconciling between our interests and 
priorities on the one hand, and the visions of other countries on the other. 
This policy requires serious consideration, proper planning and deliberate 
action — things which we have yet to see. 
The second error relating to President Morsi's performance at the 
international level is that he acted without explaining his philosophy or 
goals, not even to the Egyptian people who participated in the 2011 
revolution. 
If he aspires to participate in the present administration of the country and 
to help plan for its future, the Egyptian president must explain his 
philosophy relating to foreign policy to both the Egyptian and foreign 
public before continuing forward with his actions. This will ensure that he 
involves the people and gains their support. 
I think that he will find the required support — regarding Arab and African 
relations — very quickly. An explanation of this philosophy is also 
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required so that the people can warn him of any unexpected inclinations 
that the people may not agree with, as we saw recently regarding the idea 
of sending Egyptian forces to Syria.
Moreover, this is necessary so that every foreign move we make is not 
explained as being based on already existing Egyptian relations. This is a 
claim that was repeated in the US, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates at the announcement of presidential visits to China and Iran. 
The third mistake relating to the president's performance is that he still 
looks at the world from the perspective of a representative of the Egyptian 
Islamic movement, not from the perspective of Egypt's president and a 
representative of all Egyptians. 
His foreign policy speeches always begin with religious approaches at the 
beginning. His reference to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad at 
the onset of his speech in front of the NAM summit is an example of this. 
Furthermore, Morsi's comments during his recent visit to New York were 
largely defensive, focused on reassuring the audience of the moderateness 
of the political approaches of the Egyptian Islamic movement. He also 
gave a traditional speech in front of the UN General Assembly, the largest 
of the world's political theaters. 
In this address he reiterated traditional positions expressed by former 
Egyptian presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni 
Mubarak, rather than adding any new notions regarding perspectives of 
"revolutionary Egypt," "future Egypt" or "democratic Egypt." 
Another indicator that political Islamic perspectives would continue to 
dominate was the fact that the Egyptian president canceled his visits to 
Brazil and to attend the Arab-South American Summit in Peru in order to 
attend the Turkish Justice and Development Party's annual conference. 
This is despite the fact that in the near future — before the end of this year 
— Egypt and Turkey will exchange presidential visits once again. 
My fourth objection relates to a lack of transparency. Reasons for foreign 
action are not explained before action is taken. Moreover, no one gives an 
explanation for the cancelation of planned visits — such as the visit to 
Brazil — and no official statements are released following interviews with 
the president regarding the content of these meetings. 
This places the presidency in a constant state of self defense, denying or 
correcting what is published in papers and attributing it to a foreign 
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element. 
There are many examples of this, such as the when the Egyptian president 
exchanged messages of congratulations and thanks with Israeli president 
Shimon Peres, or regarding the content of the president's meetings and 
phone calls with Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. 
There was an announcement that President Obama had invited President 
Morsi to attend the UN General Assembly meeting, which was later 
corrected. It was also announced that the British prime minister had 
promised to return all of the Egyptian money smuggled into Britain, when 
in fact all that he promised was to provide technical expertise that would 
enable Egypt to meet the requirements that will allow proper progress 
related to the return of smuggle funds. 
In addition to all of this we have repeated the practices of the past, relating 
to exaggeration and inaccuracy in statements regarding the president's 
international contacts. 
This is particularly true regarding talks involving foreign aid to Egypt —
whether they be in China, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Turkey or the US. This aid is frequently characterized by loans, short-term 
deposits or memorandums of understanding, rather than grants or foreign 
investment in Egypt. Furthermore, there is uncertainty regarding our 
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, something we support 
at times and oppose at other times. 
Concerning foreign policy, Morsi's performance has somewhat succeeded 
in attracting the attention of the Egyptian public, as he is looking to restore 
Egypt's role regionally and internationally. He also succeeded in 
announcing Egypt's desire and willingness to take action on the 
international front, because this action has thus far not benefited from the 
momentum of the Egyptian revolution. 
This is because we have yet to announce new titles for our foreign policy 
programs, and haven't even proven that Egypt is capable of regaining its 
full role. We are still strongly dependent on foreign states both financially, 
militarily and politically, and there are many sensitive and complex issues 
we have yet to deal with. 
One of these issues is our relationship with other Middle Eastern states. 
The president hasn't mentioned the word "Israel" in any of his speeches, 
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yet official contacts with Israel — regarding both military and security 
issues — have continued and intensified since his election. 
Where are we in all of this? It is imperative that Morsi harmonize relations 
between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and work to reignite Egypt's 
relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
It is notable that officials from these countries have not visited Egypt —
even after the elections — despite the fact that Morsi visited Saudi Arabia 
multiple times, and was invited to visit the Emirates. Furthermore, the 
president did not visit Sudan, despite the importance of this relationship to 
Egypt historically, as well as in the present and future. 
No progress has been made on issues relating to the Nile River Basin, 
despite resounding statements regarding the opening of a new page in these 
relations. 
How can Egypt preserve its political independence at a time when it needs 
to borrow furiously from abroad, and will soon need to import power, as it 
is already doing for food? 
This has made us consider resorting to Iran, despite what that would 
involve in terms of violating the sanctions that have been imposed on it. 
The president must reconcile between Egypt's desire to restore its role and 
its independent position, with the continuation of our important 
relationship with the US, despite the sensitivity of issues relating to the 
Middle East, and we must continue to cooperate with them in matters 
relating to terrorism, as well as on other issues. 
All of this is possible if Egypt continues with its active movement, and this 
is done in the framework of an integrated plan and transparent study to 
maintain Egypt's national interests. 
Nabil Fahmy is the dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy 
at the American University in Cairo. He served as Egypt's ambassador to 
the United States from 1999 to 2008, and as envoy to Japan between 1997 
and 1999. 
Artick 3. 
Asharq Alawsat 
American election: It is not the economy, 
stupid! 
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Amir Taheri 
12 October 2012 -- Seduced by catchy formulae, American punditry is 
often a prisoner of clichés. One such is: "It's the economy, stupid!", 
initially circulated by Bill Clinton's first presidential campaign. For 
decades the meaningless phrase has cast a shadow on American politics. 
Uttering it clinches an argument, presenting the utterer as a man of 
wisdom. 
Thus, the current presidential election is presented as a clash of rival 
economic programs. 
A closer look reveals a more complex picture. 
More than ever, this presidential race might be about rival visions of 
America. 
Until Barack Obama appeared on the scene, all those who aspired after the 
presidency agreed on a number of beliefs, or foundation myths if you 
prefer, regarding the United States. 
Obama has questioned those beliefs with a mixture of annoyance and 
humor. 
The first belief is that of American special-ness. From George Washington 
to George W Bush all US presidents were convinced, or pretended to be, 
that the United States is a special nation, an unprecedented and so far 
unique phenomenon in history. 
Obama has tried to de-bunk that by suggesting that other nations, for 
example the Greeks, could also claim "special-ness". If "special-ness" is a 
sentiment all nations share, claiming it for the US is meaningless. If 
everybody is somebody, then nobody is anybody. 
The second belief questioned by Obama is that the United States' manifest 
destiny is to provide leadership. By its very creation the US led humanity 
away from arbitrary rule. The War of Independence, dubbed "the 
Revolution" by Americans, inspired the French Revolution and, thence, the 
revolutionary experiences of all other nations. US leadership in two world 
wars and the Cold War saved humanity from domination by totalitarian 
powers. 
Obama has challenged that belief with his "leading from behind" strategy. 
He has apologized for America's "past behavior" and indicated that the US 
does not even aspire to be primus inter pares. All US presidents since 
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James Monroe developed a "doctrine" to define American leadership. 
Obama has not done so. 
The third belief challenged by Obama is that of American individualism 
based on the myths of pioneers, frontiersmen and, yes, the Lone Ranger. 
According to that belief it is the individual that makes scientific and 
technological discoveries, creates art and culture, and produces wealth. 
American states are full of commemorative icons celebrating individuals of 
exceptional achievement in all walks of life. 
Obama has questioned that belief by asserting that without social support, 
including the government, individuals could achieve very little. For 
example, Michael Phelps who won six gold and silver medals in the 
London Olympics would have achieved nothing without the help of 
coaches and sponsors. Beyond the role of parents, one needs "a whole 
village to raise a child". 
In this regard, Obama's views are close to those of Western European 
Social Democrats who claim that without state support, guidance and 
regulation the individual would not only achieve less than he could but 
might even harm himself and society. Obama's healthcare initiative is the 
most dramatic example of the belief that individuals need state 
chaperonage even to cater for their health needs. 
The fourth belief challenged by Obama is that of the necessity of a "big 
stick" to ensure American security. With the exception of the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 the US had never experienced an invasion 
since 1812 Yet, fear of foreign aggression and a quest for military 
supremacy have been major themes of American politics. The American 
collective mental landscape is filled with images of conflict, from the War 
of Independence to Civil War, Indian wars, wars with Mexico and Spain, 
two world wars, and the wars in the Korean Peninsula and Indochina, not 
to mention more recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Obama has tried to shift the emphasis to "soft power", including his own 
powers of persuasion, to ensure American security. He has presided over 
massive cuts in the defense budget with promises of more to come, if re-
elected. Obama hopes that, under his leadership, America would be loved 
rather than feared. After all he attracted 200,000 people in Berlin before 
becoming president and won the Nobel Peace Prize even before he had 
done anything. 
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Perhaps without knowing it, Obama subscribes to Wittgenstein's dictum: 
"The possibility of a thought ensure its truth!" 
Obama is also uneasy with a fifth traditional American belief, that of the 
primacy of English language and literature as vehicles for national self-
expression. Along with European post-modernists, Obama believes in the 
equal value of all languages and literatures as expressions of cultural 
diversity. Also like European post-modernists he rejects any hierachization 
of cultures in the name of respect even when the object of respect is not 
respectable. 
There is a sixth belief that Obama implicitly rejects, that of a national 
history seamlessly traced back to the Founding Fathers. For him, the 
United States is a constantly changing reality, or, in Hegelian jargon, a 
"becoming" not a "being". The original WASP founders have been in 
constant retreat since the massive arrival of black slaves from Africa. In the 
19th century the US absorbed millions of immigrants from Europe, and 
since the 1970s it has been the destination of some three million 
immigrants each year, not to mention wetbacks. In the past three decades, 
the overwhelming majority of new immigrants have come from 
"developing nations" in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 
In the three most populous states of California, New York and Texas 
WASPs are either already in a minority or will be within a decade. The 
"melting pot" has evolved into a "salad bar" of parallel communities with 
individuals claiming double-barrel identities. By underlining his African, 
as opposed to African-American, identity mixed with his Islamic 
background and Asian childhood experience, and a possible conversion to 
Christianity, Obama casts himself as the new homo Americanus. 
Not surprisingly, strongest support for Obama comes from minorities 
notably African-Americans, Latinos, Jews, Arabs, Muslims, and native 
Americans along with social minorities such as gays and lesbians and 
feminists. 
Aristotle taught that, in a democracy, leaders should resemble the people 
they represent. Thus the real question in this American election is whether 
Barack Obama or Mitt Romney, not physically but culturally and 
philosophically, more resembles a majority of the new America that has 
emerged in recent decades. 
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The question is what America believes itself to be and what it hopes to 
become. It is not the economy, stupid! 
Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, 
London and Paris. Taheri has published 11 books, some of which have 
been translated into 20 languages. Taheri's latest book "The Persian 
Night" is published by Encounter Books in London and New York. 
The Daily Star 
New hope, and fears, in ti
-e)31(ifiAl 
Rami G. Khouri 
October 13, 2012 -- It has been almost 22 months now since the Arab 
uprisings erupted in rural Tunisia, triggering dramatic events and structural 
changes across much of the Arab world, though the outcomes of the 
historic transformations under way remain largely unclear. Some of the 
pressing issues still to be decided include the outcome of the struggle for 
Syria, whether North African countries creating new governments can 
establish credible and stable political systems, and whether most Arab 
countries can create enough new jobs to stave off new uprisings. 
A common question around the region and the world is whether the 
Islamist groups that are doing well in most new elections will consolidate 
their democratic legitimacy, or in some cases use their power to force an 
Islamization of society. 
The widespread realization has set in that we may not have definitive 
answers to these and other key questions for some years. It is useful 
nevertheless to step back a bit from day-to-day events, or even short-term 
trends, and try to identify some of the changes that are apparent in both 
political realities and the mindsets of ordinary people. The latter issue —
how ordinary Arab men and women feel about themselves, their societies 
and their future prospects — now matters more than it did during recent 
decades, because we have seen the consequences of mass action by such 
people. 
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I learned something about this matter when I had the pleasure this week in 
Washington, D.C. of being on a panel at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. The session discussed a report on Arab youth produced 
by the institute that I direct at the American University of Beirut — the 
Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs — with the 
support and cooperation of the Unicef regional office for the Middle East 
and North Africa. My fellow panelist was Dalia Mogahed, a senior analyst 
and executive director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, who has 
tracked and analyzed attitudes of citizens in Muslim majority countries for 
the past decade. Her observations on some of the changes in the past 22 
months are worth noting, because they point to both the positive 
developments in our region as well as some of the continuing 
vulnerabilities. Among the points she made were the following: 
Broadly speaking, people across the region in countries where democratic 
transitions have started to occur are more optimistic than before about their 
country and themselves. They expect that the changes under way will 
eventually lead to better governance systems and improvements in their 
own sense of well-being. People also feel more empowered, in the sense 
that they feel they have the ability to improve conditions when those 
conditions are unsatisfying to them. 
This mood coincides with the general increase in trust in government 
institutions. People's faith in the honesty of elections has risen from 20 
percent to over 90 percent in some countries. 
Ironically, this has happened while daily economic conditions have 
worsened in most countries, and at a time when more citizens feel that 
security conditions are worse now than they were before the uprisings. 
Citizens' fear of crime has increased in countries where regimes were 
overthrown, even though the formal crime rate based on reported attacks or 
robberies has not changed significantly. 
Despite these economic and security problems, Mogahed noted, majorities 
of citizens in countries in transition (Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya) still 
feel that conditions and their own well-being will improve in coming years. 
People's faith in their ability to bring about changes for the better through 
peaceful means has also increased broadly, which parallels their increased 
confidence in state institutions such as the judiciary, parliament and 
constitutional systems. 
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The danger here, though, she noted, is that the stubborn expectations of 
better days ahead may not be fulfilled in all cases. And if today's high 
expectations are dashed, we might face unpredictable responses or even 
new threats. 
One fascinating new trend she pointed out has been the increase in 
criticisms of American policies in the region. For example, about 60 
percent of Egyptians before the uprising felt the United States was not 
serious about promoting democracy and opposed receiving American aid. 
Both those figures have risen to 80 percent today. 
Looking beyond the transitioning countries, she noted appreciable 
differences between the views of their publics and the views in countries 
that have not experienced uprisings and regime changes. Countries that did 
not experience uprisings mostly looked with anxiety at countries in the 
midst of often messy transitions, which they saw mainly in terms of 
difficult economic, political and security challenges, and even chaos. They 
also tended to see a foreign hand in some of the uprisings, while the 
citizens in transforming countries saw their changes as a consequence of 
indigenous action and will. 
This divide between these two groups of Arab countries may grow in the 
future, Mogahed suggested, and this may have unpredictable 
consequences. 
Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly by THE DAILY STAR. 
Arttcic 5 
The Washington Post 
A preemptive strike on the foreign policy 
failures of the next administration 
Daniel Byman 
Question: Is the following a critique of U.S. foreign policy during Mitt 
Romney's first term or President Obama's second term? 
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October 2016 
To say that the administration has dropped the ball on foreign policy would 
be a gross understatement. 
The full list of disasters resulting from neglect and inaction is too long to 
recount, but we can highlight the most damning: Israel and the Palestinians 
are further from peace than ever. Egypt's once-promising move toward 
democracy has stalled as the Muslim Brotherhood government has become 
more authoritarian. Narcotics continue to flow north into American cities 
while a drug war bleeds our southern neighbor. And of course, the 
Europeans still have not gotten their economic house in order. 
Yet, the administration's greatest failures came about in those key moments 
when it lacked decisiveness, ignored complexity and relied on flawed 
analysis. In Syria, it refused to deploy the U.S. airpower that had been so 
effective in Libya. Instead, it embraced an effort to arm the self-evidently 
ineffective and incoherent opposition in its doomed effort to overthrow 
Bashar al-Assad. The administration said Assad's fall was inevitable but 
refused to make it so. Thousands died as Washington fiddled; instability 
and violence spread into Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan; and U.S. weapons 
leaked into terrorist hands. Now civil war has virtually engulfed the most 
strategic region in the world, making it a playground for al-Qaeda and 
Iran's Quds Force. 
The administration's effort to get tough on China also backfired. Rather 
than seek to integrate a power whose unstoppable rise was clear to all who 
cared to look, the administration built up the U.S. military presence in 
Asia, criticized China's human rights abuses and increased trade 
restrictions on Chinese goods. Beijing responded with predictable wrath 
and flexed its new muscles, slowing its purchases of U.S. Treasury bills 
and restricting U.S. goods coming into China, which plunged the United 
States back into recession. China is now doubling its defense budget, 
demanding that Washington end military assistance to Taiwan and making 
grandiose claims about extending its territorial waters — leaving us with 
the miserable choice of abandoning our allies to a bully or risking military 
conflict. 
The chaos in Syria and the setbacks in China, however, are nothing next to 
the looming war between India and Pakistan, which threatens to be the first 
war between two nuclear powers. The administration focused on the 
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problems of the past, wasting its energy on East Asia, Europe and the 
Middle East, and missed the obvious crisis in South Asia. 
Despite repeated acts of terrorism sponsored by Pakistan against India, 
somehow the administration failed to heed its own intelligence predicting 
the brutal Lashkar-i-Taibaattacks on hotels and tourist sites in Mumbai last 
month — attacks that paralleled strikes in 1993, 2006  and 2008. (Just see 
today's Washington Post column by David Ignatius, in which he quotes 
intelligence warnings about the risk of a terrorist attack emanating from 
Pakistan and describes the heroic but unsuccessful efforts of senior military 
and counterterrorism officials to get the administration to listen.) Policy 
toward the subcontinent before the attacks consisted of drone strikes, troop 
withdrawals from Afghanistan and neglect — no wonder Pakistan thought 
it could act with impunity. 
This time, however, India is not turning the other cheek. Nationalistic 
politicians are calling for blood, and India is massing troops along the 
border. Had the administration not spent the past four years obsessing 
about a possible Israeli strike on Iran — a transparent bluff— it might 
have prevented the escalation toward nuclear war that now confronts us. 
Answer: Either one — take your pick. 
Will all the failures described here come to pass in the next four years? 
Probably not. But international crises occur during virtually every 
administration, and a Romney presidency or an Obama second term would 
be no exception. And when crises happen, opponents and experts will 
decry Washington's responses as failures. These problems were 
"inevitable" or "obvious" or "preventable," they'll say. 
While the criticisms may ring true in hindsight, they'll be unfair. Presidents 
must act before history is written, often with incomplete information and 
uncertain odds. (Imagine perceptions of Obama's foreign policy credentials 
if the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound had failed, as it easily could 
have.) 
At times we truly face no-win situations. Syria, no matter what the United 
States does, will have a grim future. Meanwhile, Washington has tried to 
engage Beijing, but China is still increasingly aggressive in Asia. A tougher 
U.S. stance might make China throw its weight around even more; then 
again, a softer American approach might make the Chinese sense 
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weakness. Which stance is right? Whichever one happens to work out —
and it's very hard to know ahead of time which one will. 
Even as we criticize policy failures, we often ignore real achievements. 
Most victories are subtle and apparent only in hindsight. Peace has 
prevailed among the great powers for decades. We have avoided nuclear 
conflict. Democracy has spread, albeit fitfully, across the globe. These are 
huge successes, but we take them for granted, even as we dissect the 
problem of the day in exhaustive and damning detail. Our perceptions 
change only slowly, with the benefit of time. George H.W. Bush, for 
instance, is increasingly considered a skilled foreign policy president, even 
though he left office with the Balkans descending into the abyss and 
Saddam Hussein clinging to power — two "failures" that many thought 
would forever taint his legacy. 
With foreign policy problems, the United States is usually choosing 
between bad and risky options: For example, do you let Iran go nuclear, or 
do you conduct or support a military strike that could fail and backfire? 
Timing, implementation and luck all come into play. Indeed, the United 
States needs to plan for failure as well as success. 
Americans like to think that all problems can be solved and that, if they 
aren't, incompetence or malfeasance is to blame. Often, however, the 
challenge is overwhelming and U.S. influence is limited. The problem is 
not that Democrats are wimps, that Republicans are warmongers or that 
Washington's halls of power are filled with the greedy and the hapless, but 
rather that few foreign policy problems can truly be solved. Most can at 
best be managed, and just getting by is often the best we can do. 
This should be the standard by which the foreign policy of the next 
administration is measured. But one of the few sure predictions we can 
make is that it won't be. 
Daniel Byman is a professor in the security studies program at Georgetown 
University's School of Foreign Service and the research director of the 
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. 
Anicic 6. 
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The National Interest 
China's Uncertain Path 
Jonathan Levine 
October 12, 2012 -- With the announcement that November 8 will mark the 
official Chinese leadership transition, the country brings to a close what 
has at times been a painful process. The decennial communist ritual has 
been marred this year by a series Q embarrassing scandals [6], including 
Bo Xilai's fall from grace and the dismissal of a corrupt railways chief. 
While China's current lame-duck cadres do their best to mop things up 
before the big day, their woes of the last few months are only dress 
rehearsals for the far more consequential difficulties that will face the 
incoming leadership of president-"elect" Xi Jinping and Premier Li 
Keqiang. Over the next decade, China will have to grapple with a number 
of structural dilemmas, and the potential solutions go well beyond the 
current reforms. Whether the new leadership is up to the task remains an 
open question, but no one can deny that Mr. Xi will enter office next year 
with a very full plate. 
Islands of Instability 
In 1831, the underwater volcano Empedocles erupted off the coast of Sicily 
and resulted in the emergence of new island, Ferdinandea. But before the 
lava had even cooled, England, France, Spain and the Kingdom of Sicily 
had laid claim to the simmering rock, stoking waves of popular nationalism 
in the press. Conflict was only averted when erosion caused the fiery island 
to sink back into the sea. It is doubtful that China and its Asian neighbors 
will be so lucky in their island disputes. 
As I have written before, China's international actions over various 
disputed islands have caused a balancing coalition to form, which seems 
likely to become a long-term geopolitical headache for leaders in Beijing. 
But the islands' effect on China's domestic landscape may prove a much 
more profound predicament. 
As popular protests convulsed the capital and major cities last month, the 
world saw firsthand one of China's great demons: nationalism. The force 
of popular anger has toppled more than one government in China's past. 
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