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From: Office of Tetje Rod-Larsen 
Subject: March 1 update 
Date: Sat, 01 Mar 2014 17:05:47 +0000 
1 March 2014 
Article I. 
NYT 
What Is Russia's Aim in Ukraine? 
Editorial 
Article 2. 
The Washington Post 
Iran deal could encourage rather than limit nuclear activity 
Yuval Steinitz 
Article 3. 
The Washington Institute 
Netanyahu and Obama to Review Progress on Iran 
Patrick Clawson 
Article 4. 
The Council on Foreign Relations 
Obama's March Summit with Prime Minister Netanyahu 
Robert M. Danin 
Article 5. 
NYT 
Why Israel No Longer Trusts Europe 
Clemens Wergin 
Article 6. 
Agence Global 
What Are the Motives and Meanings of a Jewish State? 
Rami G. Khouri 
Article 7. 
Al Monitor 
US, Saudi still far apart on regional issues 
Abdulmajeed al-Buluwi 
Article R. 
Politico 
The Ambivalent Superpower 
Robert Kagan 
Anecle I.
NYT 
What Is Russia's Aim in Ukraine? 
Ed t o r a 1 
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Feb. 28, 2014 -- President Vladimir Putin of Russia played the genial host 
at the Olympic Games in Sochi, but his dangerous approach to geopolitics 
could be his true legacy. 
On Friday, Ukraine's ambassador to the United Nations, Yuriy Sergeyev, 
said that Russian troops had taken control of two airports in Crimea and 
that the Russian Navy was blocking the Ukrainian Coast Guard. 
Moscow denied that it had sent troops in. But the fact is, Russia was 
outrageously provocative when it put 150,000 troops on high alert on 
Wednesday for war games near Ukraine's border and then on Friday 
allowed the deposed Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to give a 
news conference when he showed up in the Russian city Rostov-on-Don. 
The situation has now gone from chaos to the verge of military 
confrontation. The pro-Russia region of Crimea is seething, and the new 
central government that took over in Kiev after Mr. Yanukovych fled is 
barely functioning. 
President Obama, speaking at the White House, was right to warn Russia 
against any military move and to indicate that the United States would join 
the world in condemning a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty. He also said 
that "there will be costs" for any intervention in Ukraine, though it was not 
clear what, if realistically anything, that might involve. 
Mr. Obama spoke after armed men of uncertain allegiance took up 
positions at two airports in Simferopol, the regional capital of Crimea. 
Their military uniforms bore no insignia, and it was not obvious who they 
were or who was commanding them. 
There were no immediate signs of confrontations or panic, but The Times 
reported that armored personnel carriers with Russian markings appeared 
on roads outside Simferopol, sometimes alone but at other times in long 
columns of military vehicles. It was unclear whether the movement was a 
Russian push to occupy the city, a show of strength or simply a routine 
rotation of Russian military equipment. 
Russia has many military facilities in Crimea, where its Black Sea fleet is 
based, and the area has stronger historical ties to Russia than to Ukraine's 
central government in Kiev. While promising to defend the interests of 
Russian citizens in Ukraine, Moscow has said it will not intervene by 
force. 
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But whether Mr. Putin will abide by that promise is unclear. In 2008, he 
sent Russian forces into neighboring Georgia, ostensibly to protect the 
secessionist Georgian enclave of South Ossetia; the real goal was to 
weaken the pro-Western government in Tbilisi. 
Russia and the West both have legitimate interests in Ukraine and its 
future. Fomenting more tension in a country that is already in upheaval is 
not in anyone's interest. Nor is encouraging a permanent break between 
Crimea and the rest of Ukraine. 
Russia and the West need to work together to help stabilize the country 
politically and develop an economic and trade package that will begin to 
resolve the economic crisis. 
Mr. Putin's dangerous tactics are sure to backfire and do more to alienate 
Ukrainians than to encourage them to accept any Russian role in their 
nation's future. 
The Washington Post 
Iran deal could encourage rather than limit 
nuclear activity 
Yuval Steinitz 
A final deal that allows Iran to retain centrifuges for uranium enrichment 
ultimately would allow the development of nuclear weapons in Iran, 
encourage a Sunni-Shiite arms race in the Middle East and weaken 
counterproliferation efforts worldwide. 
Iran already possesses ballistic missiles suited to carry nuclear warheads 
and advanced knowledge of weaponization. Given that the production of 
fissile material — whether by enriching uranium in centrifuges or 
extracting plutonium from nuclear reactors — is the principal stage in the 
process of making a nuclear weapon, acquiescing to Iranian enrichment is 
tantamount to legitimizing Iran's status on the nuclear threshold. Proposals 
for the final agreement to restrict the number of centrifuges are almost 
irrelevant. Even if Iran were forced to reduce its number of centrifuges to 
only 3,000, its stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.5 percent would allow 
the production of enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb within six 
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months. If forced to start from scratch with 3,000 centrifuges, Iran could 
still produce enough fissile material to make a nuclear weapon within one 
year. The chances of Iran developing the bomb as a "threshold country" are 
considerable: North Korea did so after signing a similar deal in 2007. 
Becoming a nuclear power was the ayatollahs' initial objective and the 
reason Tehran invested around $50 billion in this project. Yes, there are 
other countries on the nuclear threshold, but unlike Germany and Japan, 
Iran is unlikely to maintain its threshold status. The ayatollahs' regime 
poses a threat to its Sunni neighbors. Tehran calls for the annihilation of the 
Jewish state and sponsors terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Islamic 
Jihad, all of which sparks fear in other countries. Sooner or later, Tehran's 
anxiety over potential retaliatory actions against its regime, including its 
nuclear project, would increase pressures within Iran to dash toward a fait 
accompli nuclear weapon. As for the Sunni-Shiite arms race, the critical 
reaction to an international agreement would be not in Washington but in 
Cairo, Ankara and Riyadh. Even if the Western powers express confidence 
in Iran's commitment and pledge a vigorous economic and military 
response to any Iranian violation, regional players will render their own 
judgments. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's "charm offensive" has had 
a dramatic effect in the West, but no one in the Middle East buys Iran's 
projection of pacifism. Indeed, Tehran's direct involvement in Sunni-Shiite 
carnage in Syria, Lebanon and 
has sharpened its image. Iran's 
breakout capability will be pivotal in regional assessments, with most 
governments likely to conclude that if the deal leaves Iran only a year or 
two away from the bomb Tehran ultimately will go nuclear. 
Any deal that legitimizes Iran as an unpunished, sanctions-free country on 
the nuclear threshold might spark a nuclear arms race in the region, as 
Saudi Arabia has hinted. Some Sunni states might seek to develop the 
bomb in a bid to achieve parity with Iran or to ensure their ability to join 
the nuclear club if Tehran does. Paradoxically, such an arms race might 
provide Tehran the ultimate excuse to produce the bomb: to keep pace with 
the rivals its own actions drove to go nuclear. Even if Iran kept its 
commitment to avoid the bomb, allowing it to retain centrifuges could have 
grave global implications. Should the final compromise include de facto 
recognition of Iran's "right to enrich," the international community would 
find it difficult to insist later that other problematic regimes concede that 
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"right." Unfortunately, the interim agreement has already linked Iran's 
hypothetical future enrichment to its civilian "practical needs." Practical 
needs is interpreted mainly as enrichment needed to fuel nuclear power 
stations. Such a civilian purpose demands more centrifuges than are in 
Iran's inventory. In other words, it seems to allow for even more 
centrifuges than are militarily needed for the annual production of several 
nuclear bombs. 
More than 20 countries produce electricity in nuclear reactors, and dozens 
more are planning to do so. If Iran were ultimately allowed to enrich, how 
would the United States justify its demand that, say, Egypt, Jordan or South 
Korea eschew uranium enrichment for peaceful civilian purposes? How 
would U.S. officials argue that what the deal concedes to the ayatollahs' 
regime, after a decade of flagrant violations of six U.N. Security Council 
resolutions and their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is 
forbidden for more responsible countries? How could the United States 
cast greater legitimacy on the previously clandestine centrifuge facilities in 
Qom and Natanz than on those that would be aboveboard from the outset? 
Inevitably, multiple countries, including some rogue states, would insist on 
their own enrichment facilities. With centrifuges equally capable of 
enriching uranium for nuclear energy or nuclear bombs, such a deal might 
generate many new threshold states. 
Under such circumstances, local disputes or changes in government 
eventually would push some countries across the threshold. Ironically, a 
deal intended to prevent the nuclear armament of one dangerous country, 
Iran, could plant the seeds for the wholesale sprouting of many nuclear 
powers. 
Yuval Steinitz is Israel's minister of intelligence. 
The Washington Institute 
Netanyahu and Obama to Review Progress 
on Iran 
Patrick Clawson 
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February 28, 2014 -- The March 3 meeting between President Obama and 
Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu will likely focus on the U.S. 
framework proposal for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. But another issue 
sure to come up is Iran's nuclear program. 
In November, when Iran and the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, 
Russia, and the United States) announced the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) 
in Geneva, Netanyahu called the first-step nuclear agreement a "historic 
mistake." He added, "Today the world has become a much more dangerous 
place because the most dangerous regime in the world has taken a 
significant step toward attaining the most dangerous weapon in the world." 
On February 22, he reiterated his concerns: "The combination of 
enrichment, weapons, and launching abilities means that Iran is getting 
everything without giving practically anything." Others in Israel have also 
expressed concern that the JPOA may trigger erosion of the sanctions and 
create pressure to reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran even if the 
deal is weak. 
What Netanyahu will say at the Monday summit is beyond the scope of 
this Policy Alert, which only looks at how the U.S. government views its 
own record at implementing the JPOA. The Obama administration believes 
it has taken strong actions on two fronts that should address Israeli 
concerns: enforcing sanctions and staying firm on key JPOA provisions. 
On the first front, the Treasury Department has continued to designate 
additional actors regarding Iranian support for terrorism and proliferation 
even when these designations are politically risky. Its February 6 
proliferation designations included actors from U.S.-allied countries in 
Europe (Germany, Spain, Switzerland) and neighboring Iran (Turkey, 
Georgia, the United Arab Emirates). In the administration's view, these 
measures show its willingness to continue pressing allies to sustain 
sanctions. 
Washington also believes the new designations show its readiness to target 
important Iranian officials despite the potential reaction from Tehran. This 
month, three officers from the elite Qods Force were designated for 
"Tehran's use of terrorism and intelligence operations as tools of influence 
against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan." In 
addition, Treasury believes it has shown that it will target actors based on 
intelligence that flies in the face of common perception. The designation of 
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Olimzhon Adkhamovich Sadikov (also known as Jafar al-Uzbeki and Jafar 
Muidinov) described him as "a key Iran-based [al-Qaeda] facilitator who 
supports [the group's] vital facilitation network in Iran, [which] operates 
there with the knowledge of Iranian authorities...The network also uses 
Iran as a transit point for moving funding and foreign fighters through 
Turkey to support...affiliated elements in Syria, including the al-Nusrah 
Front." Given how much publicity has been given to Iran's support of those 
fighting against al-Qaeda in Syria, Treasury received much skepticism 
about its judgment that Tehran was also helping al-Qaeda elements. Yet the 
department did not flinch from pointing out that in Syria, as in other 
situations, Iran often bets on every horse in the race -- it will work with 
every anti-American actor, even those who are killing Iran's own agents. In 
short, Treasury believes it has been making a strong effort to enforce 
sanctions. 
On the second front, the administration believes it has taken a tough line on 
what the JPOA covers. In particular, it continues to note that the 
comprehensive solution envisioned by the JPOA will include limits on 
missiles. This point is tied to a key Israeli concern -- on February 22, 
Netanyahu complained about Tehran's plan "to build intercontinental 
missiles," arguing that the regime is currently engaged in such plans 
"without hindrance." On February 17 at the Vienna talks, Undersecretary of 
State Wendy Sherman cited the JPOA's provision about "addressing the 
UN Security Council Resolutions," then quoted paragraph 9 of Resolution 
1929, in which the council "decided that Iran shall not undertake any 
activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, 
including launches." On this basis, she said Tehran had agreed in the JPOA 
that talks aimed at reaching a comprehensive solution will include 
negotiations about Iran's ballistic missile program. The Iranian delegation 
complained about this issue, with Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, 
declaring that the talks "will be about Iran's nuclear program and nothing 
else." In response, White House spokesman Jay Carney reiterated, "Per the 
Joint Plan of Action agreed to by Iran, Iran must address the UN Security 
Council resolutions related to its nuclear program before a comprehensive 
resolution can be reached. In other words, they have to deal with matters 
related to their ballistic missile program that are included in the United 
Nations Security Council resolution." 
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The administration appears to believe that it being equally strict about 
other issues broached in the JPOA. For instance, while the interim 
agreement states that a comprehensive solution will "involve a mutually 
defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent 
with practical needs," the U.S. view is that Iran will not be in a situation 
where its practical needs require uranium enrichment any time soon. 
According to that view, the JPOA provision is consistent with a U.S. 
demand that Iran not enrich for years to come. 
In short, the Obama administration believes it is taking a tough stance on 
implementation of the JPOA. Whether Israel agrees with that assessment 
should become clearer after Monday's summit. 
Patrick Clawson is director of research at The Washington Institute. 
Anicic 4. 
The Council on Foreign Relations 
President Obama's March Summit with 
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu 
Robert M. Danin 
February 28, 2014 -- President Barack Obama hosts Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington on Monday. The last time the two 
leaders met together—September 30, 2013, in the same Oval Office—
Obama had big news for the Israeli leader: his administration had been 
engaged in secret high-level negotiations for the previous seven months 
with Israel's most menacing adversary, Iran. 
The upcoming Israeli-American summit will surely lack such drama. While 
their conversation will focus on the same two issues that have dominated 
their nearly five year long dialogue—Iran and peace with the Palestinians 
—the discussion now will be over major negotiating tactics, not 
fundamental strategy. President Obama will not spend time trying to keep 
Israeli aircraft from attacking Iranian nuclear facilities nor will he push 
Netanyahu to stop settlement activity. 
For now, the Obama administration is in the driver's seat, leading 
negotiations both with Iran and between Israel and the Palestinians. 
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Netanyahu is largely a bystander to one process and a reactive participant 
in the other. Differences between the United States and Israel have not 
been removed so much as deferred. Netanyahu will react to Obama; he is 
not positioned to advocate a wholly different approach on either front. 
Iran: The fundamental gap between Obama and Netanyahu's objectives 
regarding Iran remains: the American leader's goal is to prevent Iran from 
developing a nuclear weapon, the Israeli objective is to see Iran deprived of 
the capability to develop a nuclear weapon. But the United States has 
signed an interim nuclear accord with Tehran in the period since Obama 
and Netanyahu last met, and negotiations on a comprehensive deal between 
the P5+1 and Iran are ongoing. 
Given the now open U.S.-Iranian channel, the Israeli leader will settle, for 
now, on trying to affect Obama's negotiating behavior. Israel's declaratory 
position is to demand no Iranian enrichment. In recent talks with Israeli 
officials, lead U.S. negotiator Wendy Sherman suggested that position, 
while desirable, is unattainable. While Netanyahu will adhere to his public 
position, in private he is more likely to focus on the types of constraints on 
Iranian enrichment activity necessary to both detect and prevent an Iranian 
breakout attempt. Should the negotiations with Iran produce an agreement 
with ample safeguards, Israel's planes will likely remain grounded. 
Israeli-Palestinian peace: With the Obama administration's self-imposed 
deadline of April 2014 for a comprehensive, conflict-ending Israeli-
Palestinian peace agreement rapidly approaching, Middle East peace will 
once again feature prominently in the two leader's discussions. But expect 
no dramatic fireworks on this front either. The Obama administration, 
recognizing that a comprehensive peace treaty will not be signed over the 
next few months, is now reportedly preparing a "framework agreement" 
that it will soon present to the Israelis and Palestinians. 
While this remains a work in progress, with details yet to be outlined 
publicly, Secretary of State John Kerry is apparently preparing an outline 
that largely meets Netanyahu's objectives on two issues of paramount 
concern to him: recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, and robust security 
arrangements for Israel as part of a peace agreement. On the area most 
likely to prove difficult for Netanyahu to agree to at this time—the final 
status of Jerusalem—the United States is reportedly preparing formulas 
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sufficiently vague so as to be unobjectionable to the Israeli leader or his 
coalition partners. 
This effort to remove Israeli negotiating objections is likely to achieve its 
intended result. The word out of Jerusalem late this week is that Netanyahu 
will probably accept the U.S. formula, or at least not reject it outright. The 
prime minister's coalition partners most likely to oppose significant 
concessions seem to prefer a U.S. approach that keeps Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations going while allowing them to keep their ministerial posts. 
Hence, the upcoming Obama-Netanyahu Oval Office meeting is likely to 
end in public professions of friendship and comity. 
However, such an encounter would then set the stage for a potentially more 
difficult tete-a-tete when President Obama hosts Palestinian president 
Mahmoud Abbas on March 17. White House officials backgrounded the 
press this week saying "now is a very timely opportunity for [the president] 
to get involved." Yet according to the Palestinian daily al-Quds, Abbas 
reacted angrily to the American proposals when he met recently with 
Secretary Kerry in Paris. To be sure, much haggling will likely continue 
behind the scenes. The March summits with Netanyahu and then Abbas 
will test whether or not this is indeed a "timely opportunity" for President 
Obama. 
Robert M Danin - Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and 
Africa Studies 
NYT 
Why Israel No Longer Trusts Europe 
Clemens Wergin 
Feb. 28, 2014 -- In February, the German politician Martin Schulz, the 
president of the European Parliament and the Social Democratic candidate 
for European Commission president in the coming European Union 
elections, traveled to Israel to address the Knesset. 
The idea of a German politician speaking before the Israeli Parliament is 
newsworthy enough. But it was what he said that caused an uproar: Mr. 
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Schulz quoted a young Palestinian he met in the West Bank, who had asked 
him: "How can it be that an Israeli is allowed to use 70 liters of water a day 
but a Palestinian only 17?" 
Though Mr. Schulz didn't elaborate, his implication was clear: Israel is 
purposely depriving Palestinians of their basic needs. But if his comments 
drew immediate condemnation in the Israeli press, they attracted little 
attention in Europe, perhaps because he was simply expressing what has 
come to be conventional wisdom there: Israel, many Europeans believe, is 
capable of almost anything in its treatment of Palestinians. 
The feelings of distrust are mutual: According to the Global Attitudes 
Project at the Pew Research Center, only 41 percent of Israelis had a 
favorable view of the European Union in 2013, down from 56 percent in 
2009 (even the United States, which under President Obama has been more 
critical of Israel than under his predecessor, was viewed favorably by 83 
percent of Israelis). 
Europe and Israel have hit rough spots before. But the rancor of the last 
few years is different — more vituperative, more widespread. If it remains, 
the hopes for a European role in a final peace deal will be dashed. 
European animosity toward Israel goes beyond the public. The European 
Union recently adopted guidelines forbidding its agencies to send money to 
Israeli companies and organizations in the West Bank; this and other 
similar steps apply a double standard it doesn't use in other conflicts. And 
it seems aimed to increasingly push Israel into a corner. 
Israel, with its dogged commitment to expanding settlements, has brought 
some of that on itself. But Europe has also lost the measure of how one-
sided its approach has become. European officials have a habit of 
aggrandizing obstacles for peace put up by Israel and minimizing those put 
up by the Palestinians. 
To understand Europe's Middle East complex, one has to go back to the 
days when the Continent started to forge a common foreign policy. The 
first joint declaration in foreign affairs emerged in 1973 as a response to 
the Gulf states' oil embargo against the West after the Yom Kippur War. Its 
aim was to appease Arab states and to lift the embargo's pressure on 
European economies. 
The Middle East thus became the subject around which European 
diplomats continued to press a collective response. For decades they had 
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no common foreign policy toward any region of the world but the Middle 
East. 
But instead of finding pragmatic solutions, they settled for airy joint 
resolutions; after having agreed on most subtle wordings, the diplomats in 
Brussels would fly home exhausted — until the next crisis demanded 
another declaration. As a result, European talk about the conflict has 
become terribly cliché-ridden. The "window of opportunity" is always 
closing fast. The "spiral of violence" is always in danger of spinning out of 
control. And the Palestinians are usually seen as victims reacting to Israeli 
measures, and not as authors of their own fate. 
To Europe, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the root of all problems facing 
the region — a view in no way altered by the Arab Human Development 
Reports published by the United Nations since 2002, which showed that 
Arab autocracies and cultural backwardness were the root of the region's 
woes. 
Even after the outbreak of the Arab revolutions revealed that indeed 
corruption — and lack of dignity, democracy and opportunity — were to 
blame for the rage of the Arab street, Europe insisted on the centrality of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
It is striking that Europe always comes to the Israelis with demands for 
concessions when it has itself such a bad track record at helping resolve 
problems in the region. After Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the 
European Union agreed to police the Rafah crossing in order to help 
prevent weapons smuggling. But it essentially abandoned the mission two 
years later. After the 2006 Lebanon war, European nations took over large 
parts of the United Nations mission to prevent weapons smuggling to 
Hezbollah. On their watch the terrorist group acquired tens of thousands of 
new and more sophisticated rockets. If the Europeans were honest with 
themselves, they would admit that some of their long-held assumptions 
didn't pass the reality test. Like the idea that Israel should always swap 
land for peace. It has worked with states like Egypt. But it has failed 
whenever ideologically driven nonstate actors were involved. 
Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon resulted not in the disarming of 
Hezbollah, as many European experts had predicted, but in a heavily armed 
Iranian proxy sitting directly at Israel's border. We've seen much the same 
in Gaza. 
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Despite these discouraging experiences, every Israeli military action 
against radicals in Gaza or Lebanon is met with protests in Europe. Which 
doesn't inspire confidence in Israeli leaders that Europe would accept 
Israel's right to self-defense if a future Palestinian state in the West Bank 
became a similar hotbed of extremism and revisionist politics. 
It is always comfortable for Europeans to demand that Israel make hard 
decisions for peace. But Europe must now ask itself some hard questions, 
too. What guarantees could Europe offer Israel in return for a Palestinian 
state to protect it if the peace experiment failed and radicals took over the 
West Bank? Would Europe be ready to offer membership in NATO and the 
European Union if the Israelis asked for it? 
I am not sure there are any promising answers to these questions. But if all 
Europe has to offer Israel is criticism and disapproval, then it will be part 
of the problem, not the solution. 
Clemens Wergin is the foreign editor of the German newspaper group Die 
Welt and the author of the blog Flatworld. 
Agence Global 
What Are the Motives and Meanings of a 
Jewish State? 
Rami G. Khouri 
1 Mar 2014 -- In my discussions on Palestinian-Israeli negotiations with 
various informed audiences around the United States during the past 
month, the question that comes up most often is about how the Palestinians 
can, should or will respond to the Israeli government demand that they 
must recognize Israel as a "Jewish state." The prevalent Arab and 
Palestinian demand is to rule out any such recognition, on several valid 
grounds, such as: The Jewish state concept is not defined, it does not take 
account of the Palestinian Arab and other non-Jewish Israelis, it does not 
address the implications of such recognition for the UN-acknowledged 
rights of the Palestinian refugees, and it does not have any basis in 
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prevailing international law or diplomatic norms related to how states 
recognize each other. 
These valid points do not seem to impress the Israelis, who have made this 
more central to their demands for any permanent peace agreement. Israel 
also seems to have convinced the United States to come down on its side 
on this issue, as the American president, secretary of state and other senior 
officials routinely confirm when they refer to Israel as "the Jewish state of 
Israel" or some other such formulation. 
It is not clear if Palestinians will cave in and accept the Israeli-American 
demand as they usually do, for three main reasons. First, the demand 
comes in the context of final status negotiations that aim to resolve all 
outstanding disputes, so there is likely to be some room for give-and-take 
in any final agreement. Second, the "Jewish state" concept remains 
undefined, and its clear definition, coupled with agreement on the rights of 
the Palestinians and non-Jewish Israelis, could pave the way for some 
mutual acknowledgments that satisfy both sides. Third, a central 
negotiating demand such as this, which springs up suddenly after over six 
decades of warfare, seems to be a proxy concept that reflects some deeper 
issues that must be resolved. 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has only broadly commented 
on why the Palestinians must recognize Israel as the Jewish state or as "the 
nation-state of the Jewish people." He recently claimed at a conference by 
the Institute for National Security Studies that the Palestinians have long 
had a "basic objection to any Jewish presence," which he traces back to the 
Arab-Zionist clashes of the early decades of the 20th Century, before the 
state of Israel came into being. He sees the Palestinian Arab conflict with 
Israel as reflecting a "struggle against the very existence of the Jewish 
state, against Zionism or any geographic expression of it, any State of 
Israel in any border. The conflict is not over these territories; it is not about 
settlements, and it is not about a Palestinian state .... [T]his conflict has 
gone on because of one reason, the stubborn opposition to recognize the 
Jewish state, the nation-state of the Jewish people." 
As usual, Netanyahu offers a combination of outright lies and views that 
widely reflect Israeli and, to a lesser extent, worldwide Jewish sentiments 
on such core issues. He lies because the Palestinians and other Arabs who 
rejected the formation of a Jewish state in 1948 have since come to terms 
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with it, assuming that Palestinian national and individual rights are also 
implemented in a negotiated accord that both sides accept. The Palestinians 
have also twice in recent decades recognized Israel and accepted its 
existence, on the same reciprocal basis that recognizes and implements 
Palestinian rights. 
The current Palestinian and Arab rejection of the Israeli demand should 
include asking for an authoritative Israeli explanation of the meaning and 
implications of a Jewish state, and the deeper reasons for why Israelis 
make this demand now. I suspect that the need for such recognition mirrors 
profound insecurities and concerns in Israel about three issues: the state's 
ultimate Jewish character, the sincerity of Arab recognition of Israel in a 
peace treaty, and the consequences of a peace accord that is likely to 
include agreement on options for the Palestinian refugees, including a 
limited number returning to what is now Israel. 
If this is the case, Israel should articulate honestly and clearly the issues 
that it needs resolved, so that sincere negotiators can get on with the 
business of crafting an agreement that meets the critical needs of both 
sides. The current Israeli strategy of trying to shape an agreement 
unilaterally while lying to the world about Palestinian sentiments is an 
embarrassment to Jewish traditions of justice, but seems to be a routine 
operating system for the extremists and deceit merchants who shape 
Zionism today. The Palestinians should respond by demanding to know the 
meaning and motives of this idea, so they can formulate a nuanced 
response that promotes an ultimate peace that responds to the legitimate 
rights of both sides, rather than making this impossible, as the Israeli 
approach does. 
Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the 
Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the 
American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon. 
Al Monitor 
US, Saudi still far apart on regional issues 
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Abdulmajeed al-Buluwi 
February 28, 2014 -- As US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns 
explained in his Feb. 19 speech at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington, combating extremism and containing its expansion 
in countries such as Syria and Yemen remain common goals shared by 
Washington and Riyadh. According to Burns, the United States, in 
partnership with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, was trying to 
manage the transitional process taking place in the Arab world in a manner 
that would lead to the establishment of responsible, responsive and 
moderate governments. 
Moreover, the United States sought to guarantee that the comprehensive 
political process in Egypt be welcoming to all, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and offer support to the Iraqi government by embracing 
Shiite political forces in order to distance them from Iran. This comes in 
addition to backing the Bahraini national dialogue in a manner conducive 
to achieving results that would lead to some measure of sustained stability. 
But the dilemma lies in the fact that Riyadh views the changes taking place 
around it, and the American vision of the future, as threatening to its 
interests — or more precisely, the interests of Saudi political elites. As a 
result, any regional partnership with Washington in this regard would be 
very difficult to accept. It would entail that Washington, Riyadh or 
both review their stance vis-à-vis past and present events, or — a more 
likely scenario — decide to deal with contentious regional issues in a 
piecemeal manner. 
To start with, Riyadh disagrees with Washington's characterization of 
regional events. While the latter tends to view events as a manifestation of 
popular aspirations of freedom and dignity, Riyadh describes them as an 
amalgam of chaos and strife, devoid of any real substance. 
And while Washington is of the opinion that political reform is necessary 
to achieve sustainable stability and safeguard existing regimes, Riyadh 
sees political reform as the potential root of instability. 
In the framework of overall relations with Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia 
considers the American proposal to transform the Gulf Cooperation 
Council into a security organization similar to NATO as one that conforms 
to its own aspirations for the council. But this proposal, which would have 
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been a major triumph for Saudi policy in the Gulf, was rejected by smaller 
Gulf states that saw in it a strengthening of Saudi dominion over them. 
Furthermore, Riyadh's opinion of the Iranian threat differs from 
Washington's. Saudi Arabia considers the growing political influence of 
Iran in the Arab world a threat equal to that of nuclear weapons, while the 
United States prefers to differentiate between Iran's nuclear 
cApabilities and its cultural, political or even religious influence in the 
region. 
Riyadh also considers the growing Iranian influence a catalyst for its Shiite 
minority and an instigator for that minority to demand more political 
participation and religious equality in the kingdom. This, to Saudi Arabia, 
is a bigger threat to its security that any Iranian nuclear weapon. 
In addition, Riyadh postulates that the Muslim Brotherhood's ascendency 
in Egypt would afford the Sunni Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia great 
impetus by virtue of the great ideological links that exist among all 
Islamists and would thus threaten Saudi national security. 
Saudi foreign policy cannot be understood without first appreciating its 
internal policies, and new Saudi foreign policies cannot be adopted prior to 
first adopting new internal policies. Riyadh's foreign policy is an extension 
of its internal one, predicated on the interests of local Saudi elites. Riyadh's 
view of external dangers and threats is but a reflection and an extension of 
its assessment of the internal risks and threats faced by the political elite. 
In light of an entrenched conviction not to embark on any political reform 
programs that would expand popular participation in political life, the 
greatest internal threat thus remains the Shiite minority in oil-rich areas, 
and Sunni political Islam in all its forms. This point of view greatly 
explains prevalent Saudi regional policies. 
Moreover, while Iranian influence reinforces the power of the Shiite 
minority, the ascendency of political Islam through democratic processes in 
the region would increase the power of that Islamic movement inside the 
kingdom. As a result, and according to this perspective, both confronting 
regional Iranian influence and thwarting the regional ascendency of the 
Brotherhood are inevitable, in order to achieve internal political goals. This 
dichotomy could thus lead to political confusion when a trade-off between 
the two options becomes necessary. 
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Saudi Arabia would not have cared much about confronting Iranian 
influence in the region, had it not been home to a Shiite minority that 
would become emboldened by that influence and seek to bolster its 
political role. Similarly, Riyadh would not have been much concerned 
about thwarting the democratic rise of political Islam had it not been 
worried that this ascendency would increase the influence of the Islamist 
movement internally, and tempt it to demand more power. 
Current, Saudi foreign policy is not only the product of concerns about the 
country's position on the regional scene. It stems mainly from concerns 
about the role and status of the political elite inside the state. This policy is 
also linked to the elite's relationships with the two main parties in the 
stability equation, namely the Shiite minority and political Islamic groups. 
US-Saudi consensus about the management of change in the Arab world —
as Burns envisions it — is predicated on it being preceded by a 
transformation of the prevailing views about what has and is occurring in 
the region. This change is to be followed by an agreement about how to 
best deal with it. Achieving this concordance in views will not be easy as 
long as Riyadh insists on adopting the same internal policies that view any 
transformation toward a "quasi-constitutional monarchy" as a threat to its 
internal security. Any demands for such a transformation, according to the 
newly adopted anti-terrorism law, subject the perpetrator to charges of 
terrorism. As a result, Riyadh's insistence on continuing with its current 
internal policies leaves it no option but to continue following its current 
foreign policies. 
On the other hand, launching internal political reforms would achieve 
much in the way of foreign gains by facilitating the ironing out of 
differences with the United States over the region, whether concerning Iran 
or Egypt. This would also afford the Saudi state a historical opportunity to 
increase its regional influence, expand its soft power, bolster sustainable 
stability and perhaps neutralize some of the new players in the region. But 
it seems that the Saudi elites still have something different in mind. 
Abdulmajeed al-Buluwi is a political writer who covers Saudi Arabian and 
Gulf policy for Saudi newspapers and websites, and publishes some 
political articles on his blog.
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Article 8. 
Politico 
The Ambivalent Superpower 
Robert Kagan 
February 27, 2014 -- The world never really loved America as much as 
Americans like to think. In the Eisenhower era, to take one period now 
seen in rosy hues, Latin mobs pelted Vice President Richard Nixon's 
motorcade with stones, shouting, "Out, dog! We won't forget Guatemala!" 
Angry Japanese students protested American "imperialism," forcing 
President Dwight Eisenhower to cancel a "goodwill" visit to Tokyo, and 
Ike spent his days wishing he could find a way to get people in other 
countries "to like us instead of hating us." In the late 1960s and again in 
the 1980s, young Europeans took to the streets by the millions to protest 
American foreign policy. Even in the 1990s, with Bill Clinton and Al Gore 
in office, the French foreign minister decried the American "hyperpower " 
while leading intellectual Samuel P. Huntington wrote of a "lonely
auperpower," widely hated across the globe for its "intrusive, 
interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical" 
behavior. 
Yes, it's true that throughout the Cold War much of the world watched 
American movies and was entranced by Jackie Kennedy, but they also saw 
segregation, poverty, riots, political assassinations, rampant capitalism, 
Vietnam and Watergate. And they shook their heads at a country that could 
elect a cowboy and B-movie actor as its president. The popular narrative 
following the Iraq War that there was once a time when the world looked 
up to America, wished to emulate it and eagerly sought its leadership, 
when America wielded immense "soft power" that gained the allegiance of 
others simply by the force of attraction, is more myth than history. 
Yet always there was the other aspect of the United States, the one most 
valued if least spoken about. This was the America that others counted on, 
for security against threatening neighbors, as the defender of the oceans 
and the world's trade routes, as the keeper of the global balance, as the 
guarantor of an economic and political order whose benefits were widely 
enjoyed. This was the America whose troops were invited into Europe as 
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protection against both a resurgent Germany and the Soviets in the late 
1940s. This was the America whose movie-actor president Helmut Kohl, 
Francois Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher looked to for trans-Atlantic 
solidarity, and to whom Polish workers and Soviet dissidents turned for 
hope and inspiration. This was the America that, for all its undeniable 
flaws, became indispensable after World War II and whose departure from 
the scene was usually more feared than its presence. 
For much of the past 70 years, in short, the world has been ambivalent 
about American power, both decrying it and inviting it—sometimes 
simultaneously. Even as Huntington was penning his screed against 
American arrogance in 1998, much of the world was expressing an entirely 
different concern—that the United States might be turning inward. It was 
the time of the Monica Lewinsky scandal. The American president was 
hobbled. Suddenly, as the Times of London wrote, leaders "in all the 
world's trouble spots" were "calculating what will happen when 
Washington's gaze is distracted." The liberal German newspaper 
Frankfurter Rundschau, which had been accusing Americans of 
"camouflaged neocolonialism," suddenly fretted that the "problems in the 
Middle East, in the Balkans or in Asia" could not be solved "without U.S. 
assistance and a president who enjoys respect." The irony was not lost on 
some observers. A French pundit took pleasure in noting (in the left-
leaning Liberation) that those who had only recently been calling the 
United States "overbearing" were suddenly "praying for a quick end to the 
storm." 
A decade and a half later, as another U.S. president makes good on his 
promise to "focus on nation-building here at home," the world is again 
wondering whether the country that has been the principal upholder of the 
global order for the better part of the postwar era is finally pulling back 
from that outsized and unusual role. Anxiety about American isolationism 
is once again matching anxiety about American imperialism. 
Over the past year, the World Economic Forum—the same folks who run 
the annual gathering in the Swiss resort town of Davos—organized a 
unique set of discussions around the world with dozens of international 
leaders, from Saudi bankers to Singaporean academics, African 
entrepreneurs to Latin American economists, seeking unvarnished opinions 
about the United States and its role in the world. Their ambivalence was 
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