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SUBMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN 
Jeffrey Epstein, a successful businessman and noted philanthropist with no prior criminal 
record, has been investigated for potential violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). 
Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by 
Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that 
federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not be stretched to federalize 
conduct not clearly covered by their prohibitions, and that whenever there are two plausible 
constructions of a criminal statute, the narrower construction (hich safeguards liberty) rather than 
the broader construction (which expands the federal prosecutor's arsenal) controls under the 
venerable rule of lenity. 
Mr. Epstein's conduct—including his misconduct—falls within the heartland of historic 
state police and prosecutorial powers. Absent a significant federal nexus, matters involving 
prostitution have always been treated as state-law crimes even when they involve minors. Mr. 
Epstein's conduct lacks any of the hallmarks that would convert this quintessential state crime 
into a federal one under any of the statutes prosecutors are considering. 
Mr. Epstein lived in Palm Beach, and his interstate travel was merely to go home. My 
sexual conduct that occurred after he arrived was incidental to the purposes for his travel. Even 
CEOS admitted that applying § 2423(b) to a citizen traveling home would be "novel." In fact, it 
would be both unprecedented and in conflict with Supreme Court cases that have withstood the 
test of time for over 60 years. 
Moreover, Mr. Epstein did not use the intemet (either via email or chatrooms) to 
communicate with any of the witnesses in this investigation. Indeed, he did not use any other 
facility of interstate commerce, including the phone, to knowingly persuade, entice, or induce 
anyone to visit his home—the "local" locus of all the incidents under investigation—much less 
to persuade, entice, or induce a known minor to engage in prohibited sex acts, as § 2422(b) 
requires. Nor did anyone on his behalf "persuade" or "induce" or "entice" or "coerce" anyone as 
these words are ordinarily understood and as the new Supreme Court decisions mandate they be 
applied: narrowly, without stretching ordinary usage to conform to a prosecutor's case-specific 
need for a broad (and in this case unprecedented) application. In addition, as will be shown 
below, § 2422(b) requires that the object of the communication be a state law offense that "can 
be charged." Yet because the state of Florida's statute of limitations is one year for the first 
prostitution offense and three years for other targeted offenses, and because all or virtually all of 
the offense conduct at issue in the federal investigation occurred prior to June 20, 2005, those 
acts can not be charged by the State, and thus cannot meet this essential clement of federal law. 
Finally, Mr. Epstein neither coerced, nor enslaved, nor trafficked, nor derived any profit 
from his sexual conduct. He was an ordinary "John," not a pimp. But § 1591 is directed only 
against those who engage in force or fraud or coercion or who are in the business of commercial 
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sexual trafficking. The statute has never been applied to a "John," and only a highly and 
impermissibly selective prosecution could stretch § 1591 to reach conduct like that at issue in 
this case. 
In short, without "novel" interpretive expansions—a description used by CEOS itself—it 
cannot be shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by 
prosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal 
law may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as its 
foundation, on impermissibly elastic stretches of each statute beyond any reported precedent; 
beyond the essential elements of each statute; well outside the ordinary construction of each 
statute's limitations; and on a selective, extraordinary, and unwarranted expansion of federal law 
to cover conduct that has always been exclusively within the core of state powers. 
At this point in time, the need for Departmental oversight is critical. We appreciate this 
opportunity to submit our assessment of the key facts in this case and review of the pertinent 
federal statutes, and respectfully request that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General end 
federal involvement in this matter so that the State of Florida may resolve this case appropriately. 
Summary of the Facts 
Mr. Epstein has maintained a home in Palm Beach, Florida for the past 20 years. While 
there, he routinely conducted business, received medical attention, socialized with friends, and 
helped care for his elderly mother. Mr. Epstein also had various women visit his home to 
perform massages. He did not personally schedule the massage appointments or communicate 
with the women over the phone or the Internet. Rather, Mr. Epstein's personal assistants 
scheduled many types of appointments, personal trainers, chiropractors, business meetings and 
massages. 
The phone message pad taken from his house and in the possession of the 
government confirmed that in many cases, the women themselves contacted Mr. Epstein's 
assistants to inquire about his availability—rather than vice versa. 
The majority of the massages were just that and nothing else. Mr. Epstein often would be 
on the telephone conducting business while he received his massage. At times, the masseuses 
would be topless, and some sexual activity might occur—primarily self-masturbation on the part 
of Mr. Epstein. On other occasions, no sexual activity would occur at all. There was no pattern 
or practice regarding which masseuse would be scheduled on a particular day—if one would be 
scheduled at all—or whether any sexual activity might occur. Indeed, Mr. Epstein almost never 
knew which masseuse his assistants had scheduled until she arrived. See Tab 3, 
Toll 
Records. 
Mr. Epstein specifically requested that each masseuse be at least 18 years old. The vast 
majority of the masseuses were in fact in their twenties, many accompanied to Mr. Epstein's 
home by friends or even other family members. Furthermore, most of the women who have 
testified that they were actually under 18 have specifically admitted tbrimatically lying to 
Mr. Epstein about their age. See Tab 4 
. at 38-39; Tab 5, 
Tr. at 16; Tab 6, 
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FR
Tr. at 6 8, 22, 45; Tab 7, 
Tr. 13; Tab 8 Robson Tr. at 8; Tab 9, 
Tr. at 5; and 
O, MI 
Tr. at 14-15 (excerpts from these transcripts are included below). Furthermore, 
the women who visited Mr. Epstein's home all visited voluntarily and many willingly returned 
several times. 
The State Attorney's Office (the "SAO") has vast experience prosecuting sex crimes and 
conducted an exhaustive, 15-month investigation of Mr. Epstein. A Grand Jury has concluded 
that Mr. Epstein was merely a local "John," guilty of soliciting prostitution in violation of state 
law. Notably, Florida law distinguishes soliciting from procuring and compelling prostitution if 
minors are involved. Indeed, soliciting is a misdemeanor except for the commission of a third 
subsequent offense, turning it into a felony. The SAO, therefore, sought and obtained an 
indictment charging Mr. Epstein with felony solicitation of prostitution. Mr. Epstein is prepared 
to plead guilty and accept a sentence for that offense—a sentence that, notably, is far more 
severe than that meted out to other "Johns" convicted of violating Florida's solicitation laws for 
cases in which sexual activity was alleged. 
Though CEOS points out its admirable goal of "protecting children," a moniker that 
engenders high emotions, the conduct alleged here involves women over 16, which is the age of 
consent in 38 states and supplies the effective federal age of consent. The young women were by 
no means the target of high-school trolling; they were individuals who, with friends, visited Mr. 
Epstein's house—a home full of friends and staff. The civil complaints filed against Mr. Epstein 
reiterate the fact that the individuals who visited Mr. Epstein would visit with their friends. And 
Mr. Epstein never spoke to or had any contact with these women before they arrived at his 
house. And again, the State is handling this matter appropriately. 
We respectfully submit that that should be the beginning and the end of this matter. As 
you know, the Department's Petite Policy precludes successive federal prosecutions after a State 
has acted: "[A] state judgment of conviction, plea agreement [here held in abeyance solely as a 
result of the federal investigation], or acquittal on the merits shall be a bar to any subsequent 
federal prosecution for the same act or acts." 
U.S.A.M. § 9-2.031A (emphasis added). 
Consistent with that principle, and of particular relevance to this case, the Department itself just 
recently observed the following: 
[P]rostitution-related offenses have historically been prosecuted at the state or 
local level. This allocation between state and Federal enforcement authority does 
not imply that these crimes arc less serious, but rather reflects important structural 
allocations of responsibility between state and Federal governments.... [T]he 
Department is not aware of any reasons why state and local authorities are not 
currently able to pursue prostitution-related crimes such that Federal jurisdiction 
is necessary. 
See Tab 11, November 9, 2007 Letter from Justice Department Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Brian Benczkowski to the House Committee on the Judiciary, p. 8-9. 
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Summary of the Law 
We have reviewed every reported case under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b), and 2423(b), 
and cannot find a single one that resulted in a conviction on facts akin to the ones here. In some 
respects, it is not surprising that no precedent supports federal prosecution of a man who engaged 
in consensual conduct, in his home, that amounts to solicitation under State law. After all, 
prostitution, even when the allegations involve minors, is fundamentally a State concern, United 
States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that federal law "does not 
criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state regulation)"), and there 
is no evidence that Palm Beach County authorities and Florida prosecutors cannot effectively 
prosecute and punish the conduct. See also Batchelder v. Gonzalez, No. 4:07-cv-00330-SPM-
AK, 2007 WL 5022105 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2007). In fact, the opposite is true—the state-elected 
officials, cognizant of the local mores of the community, have a lauded history of just such 
prosecutions. 
In any event, and as set forth below, none of the federal statutes in this case remotely 
supports a prosecution on the facts of this case without each and every element being stretched in 
a novel way to encompass the behavior at issue. We begin with first principles. Courts in this 
country have "traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of federal criminal statutes, 
both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 
(1985), and out of concern that `a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the 
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed!" Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 
U.S. 25, 27 (1931)) (citation omitted). 
Two recent Supreme Court decisions dramatically underscore these principles and help to 
highlight why federal prosecution in this case would be improper as a matter of both law and 
policy. See United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005 (June 2, 2008); Cuellar v. United States, No. 
06-1456 (June 2, 2008). Though they both address the interpretation and application of the 
federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, the principles they set forth are equally 
applicable here. In Santos, the Court held that the statutory term "proceeds" means "profits" 
rather than "receipts," and thus gave the statute a significantly narrower interpretation than what 
the government had urged. In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized that where a 
statutory term in a criminal statute could support either a narrow or broad application, the narrow 
interpretation must be adopted because "[A/c interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of 
defendants, not prosecutors." Slip op. at 12. As his opinion explained, the rule of lenity "not 
only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held accountable for a 
violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not 
clearly proscribed. It also places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce 
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Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead." 
Slip op. at 6.' 
In Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mere rea 
requirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful textual analysis of the 
statute and its structure, the Court ruled that the defendant's conviction could be sustained only if 
he knew that the transportation of funds to Mexico was designed to conceal their nature, 
location, source, ownership or control—not merely that the defendant knew that the funds had 
been hidden during their transportation to Mexico. Slip op. at 10-17. 
Both decisions relied on the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms Congress chose. 
And both rejected attempts to broaden those words to cover conduct not clearly targeted by 
Congress. Taken together, these decisions reject the notion that prosecutors can take language 
from a narrowly drawn federal statute—especially one that itself federalizes the prosecution of 
conduct traditionally within the heartland of State police powers—and convert it into a license to 
reach additional conduct by ignoring, rewriting or expansively interpreting the law. Both cases 
additionally rejected the notion that statutes should be broadly construed in order to facilitate 
prosecutions or to in anyway diminish the burden on prosecutors to prove each essential element 
of a federal charge in conformity with Congress's determinations as to what is within the federal 
criminal law and what is not. The conflict between the Santos and Cuellar decisions and 
CEOS's grant of effectively unlimited discretionary authority to the USAO to take federal law to 
"novel" places where they have never reached before could not be starker. 
These lessons have no less force in the context of Executive Branch decision-making 
than they do in the context of Judicial interpretation. As you are aware, when federal prosecutors 
exercise their discretion, they bear an independent constitutional obligation to faithfully interpret 
the law as written—not to broaden its scope beyond the limits endorsed by both Congress and 
the President. There is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately 
decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself 
has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check 
or remedy such usurpation does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 
12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the 
Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To 
Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm. 
In this case, the text, structure, and history of the relevant federal statutes unambiguously 
indicate that these statutes were designed to address problems of a national and international 
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, also acknowledged the rule of lenity, calling the plurality opinion's 
discussion of that rule "surely persuasive." United States v. Santos, No. 06-1005, slip op. at 5 (June 2, 2008) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
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scope—not the local conduct that is alleged here—and each of these statutes requires proof of 
the defendant's actual knowledge that simply is not present in this case. Any attempt to stretch 
the language of these statutes to cover this case would be a misuse of the law and contrary to 
express legislative intent. In short, the elements under each federal statute-18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 
2422(b) and 2423(b)—are not satisfied here. 
1. 
18 U.S.C. & 2422(b1 
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant engaged in communications over an interstate facility (e.g., the Internet or phone) with 
four concurrent intentions: (I) to knowingly (2) persuade, induce, entice or coerce, or attempt to 
persuade, induce, entice, or coerce (3) a minor (4) to engage in prostitution or criminal sexual 
activity for which the person can be charged. Mr. Epstein's conduct does not satisfy the 
elements of § 2422(b). Each element must be individually stretched, and then conflated in a 
tenuous chain to encompass the alleged conduct with any individual woman. 
As the statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the 
resulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: 
The defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(b) `requires the 
specific intent to commit illegal sexual acts rather than just the intent to persuade 
or solicit the minor victim to commit sexual acts.' Id. at 638. In response, the 
court held `[w]hile it may be rare for there to be a separation between the intent to 
persuade and the follow-up intent to perform the act after persuasion, they are two 
clearly separate and different intents and the Congress has made a clear choice to 
criminalize persuasion and the attempt to persuade, not the performance of the 
sexual acts themselves. Hence, a conviction under the statute only requires a 
finding that the defendant had an intent to persuade or to attempt to persuade.' 
United States v. Murrell 368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Bailey, 
228 F.3d 637, 638-39 (6th Cir.2000)). Thus, the targeted criminal conduct must occur through 
the interstate facility, not thereafter, and the scienter element must be present at the time of the 
call or Internet contact. 
In this case, however, Mr. Epstein did not use an interstate facility to communicate any 
illegal intention in this case; the phone calls were made by his assistants in the course of setting 
up many other appointments. Neither a conspiracy charge nor a charge of aiding and abetting 
can fulfill the mens rea requirement here. Indeed, neither Mr. Epstein nor his assistants knew 
whether sexual activity would necessarily result from a scheduled massage. And certainly, no 
such activity was ever discussed on the phone by either Mr. Epstein or his assistants. Instead, as 
the record in this case makes clear, many appointments resulted in no illegal sexual activity, and 
often, as confirmed by the masseuses' own testimony, several individuals who were contacted by 
phone visited Mr. Epstein's house and did not perform a massage at all. Where sexual activity 
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did result, it was mainly self-pleasuring masturbation and not necessarily illegal, but spontaneous 
and resulted from face-to-face conversations during the massage. Thus, the fact that Mr. Epstein 
later may have persuaded any particular masseuse to engage in unlawful activity during the 
massage does not work retroactively to render the earlier scheduling phone call an offense under 
§ 2422(b). Nor is there any evidence that women who returned to Mr. Epstein's home time and 
again were somehow coerced or induced over a facility of interstate commerce to do so. 
The first essential element of § 2422(b) that "[w]hoever, using the mail or any facility or 
means of interstate or foreign commerce," by its plain language, requires that the 
communication, which is the essence of the crime and its actus reus, take place during the use of 
the facility of interstate commerce (in this case, unlike the vast majority of Internet chat room 
sting operations, a telephone). The statute is not ambiguous. It requires that the criminal 
conduct occur while the defendant is "using" (i.e. engaged in the communication), not thereafter. 
Given the utter lack of direct evidence against Mr. Epstein, prosecutors have signaled that 
they intend to offer a purely circumstantial case if this matter proceeds to trial—essentially 
arguing that "routine and habit" evidence could substitute for actual proof that an interstate 
facility was used to solicit sex from minors. Thus, despite the fact that the calls themselves were 
not made by Mr. Epstein and did not contain the necessary explicit communication to knowingly 
induce minors to provide sexual favors for money, prosecutors are seeking to turn the phrase "are 
you available"—the same phrase used with friends, chiropractors, and trainers—into a ten-year 
mandatory prison sentence. In any case, the prosecution's attenuated argument regarding 
"routine and habit" will also not fit the facts of this case. The witness testimony at issue makes 
clear that there was no clear "routine or habit" with respect to the interactions at issue. And in 
those unpredictable instances where sexual contact resulted, it was a product of what occurred 
after the benign phone communication, not during the call itself. 
The prosecution's theory of liability—that a call to a person merely to schedule a visit to 
the defendant's residence followed by a decision made at the residence to engage in prohibited 
sexual activity is sufficient—cannot survive either a "plain language" test or the rule of lenity as 
they have been authoritatively construed in the recent Santos and Cuellar cases. The statute 
cannot be read otherwise. As the Cuellar decision makes clear, a proper interpretation of a 
federal criminal statute is guided "by the words of the operative statutory provision," not by 
outside objectives, such as those facilitating successful prosecution. See Cuellar, supra, Slip op. 
at 7. As Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion, the government must prove not just the 
"effect" of the secretive transportation, but also that "petitioner knew that achieving one of these 
effects was a design (i.e. purpose) of the transportation" of currency. Cuellar v. United States, 
supra, 553 U.S., Slip op. At 1 (Alito, J. concurring). Similarly, it is not enough that one effect of 
a communication scheduling a visit between Mr. Epstein and a minor was that there might be 
subsequent face-to-face inducement. Instead, the statute, as drafted, defines the crime as the 
communication and demands that far more be proven than that the use of an interstate facility 
resulted in a later meeting where even an inducement (as opposed to a solicitation) was made. 
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The prosecution has never represented to counsel that they have evidence that would 
prove that the inducement or enticement to engage in illegal sexual acts occurred over the phone 
(or Internet). The prosecution's references to "routine and habit" evidence that would substitute 
for the explicit communications usually found in the transcripts from chat rooms or sting 
operations is tenuous at best. In essence, the prosecution would be alleging communications 
understood, but not spoken, by two people, one of whom was usually a secretary or assistant. 
Separating the actus reus and the mens rea, however, and premising criminal liability on 
persuasion that might occur after the communication, or on the existence of a specific intent to 
engage in illegal sex with a minor that arises after the communication would violate the bedrock 
principle of criminal law that predicates liability on the concurrence of the act and the criminal 
state of mind. Even if, arguendo, the communication and mens rea could be separated (a 
premise which is at odds with the requirement of concurrence), Mr. Epstein denies that the 
factual proof demonstrates such a pattern or practice. Instead, the evidence compellingly proves 
that there was no regularity or predictability to the content of the communication or in what 
occurred at meetings that were telephonically scheduled (including those that are the subject of 
this investigation). 
A second essential element of 2422(6) requires that the defendant "knowingly" induce, 
persuade, entice or coerce a person believed to be a minor. " .. . [K]knowingly . . . induces . .." 
requires the Court to define inducement so it is consistent with its ordinary usage and so the term 
is not so broad that it subsumes the separate statutory terms of "entices" and "persuades." 
Inducement has a common legal meaning that has been endorsed by the government when it 
operates to narrow the affirmative defense of entrapment. Inducement must be more than "mere 
solicitation;" it must be more than an offer or the providing of an opportunity to engage in 
prohibited conduct. See, e.g,. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 76-77 (ls' Cir. 
2005); United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995). The government cannot fairly, 
or consistent with the rule of lenity, advocate a broader definition of the same term when it 
expands a citizen's exposure to criminal liability than when it limits the ambit of an affirmative 
defense to criminal conduct. If the term is ambiguous, absent clear Congressional intent on the 
issue, the Court's decision in Santos requires that the narrower rather than the broader definition 
be used. 
The facts simply do not prove Mr. Epstein's culpability for knowingly inducing or 
persuading minors. First, in the case of masseuses who agreed or even sought to return to see 
Mr. Epstein on successive occasions, there is no evidence that there was any inducement, 
persuasion, enticement or coercion over the phone. And, for masseuses seeing Mr. Epstein for 
the first time, there was generally no telephone contact with Mr. Epstein and there was no 
knowledge that any third party at Mr. Epstein's specific direction was inviting them to Mr. 
Epstein's home over the phone rather than in face-to-face meetings. The women who visited Mr. 
Epstein's home were all friends of friends. Contrary to the facts in this case, § 2422(b)'s 
knowing inducement element is essential to federal liability and, given its hefty minimum 
mandatory punishment, it should not be interpreted as a strict liability statute. 
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There is insufficient evidence that Mr. Epstein targeted minors, as required. 
The 
evidentiary pattern does not even establish willful blindness since Mr. Epstein took steps to 
ensure his visitors were over 18—and certainly took none to avoid knowing. But, even if the 
government contends that it possesses evidence that could demonstrate that Mr. Epstein knew or 
should have known or suspected that a small number of the masseuses were underage, that would 
still not make this an appropriate case for federal, rather than state prosecution. The federal 
statutes were not intended to supersede state prosecutions involving isolated instances of 
underage sex. 
Instead, the federal statutes were intended for large-scale rings or for an 
individual who was engaged, while using interstate facilities such as the Internet, with the willful 
targeting of minors. 
The government's evidence, even when stretched to the limit, will not show a pattern of 
targeting underage persons for illegal sexual activity. A federal prosecution should not become a 
contest between the prosecution and defense over whether the defendant knew, suspected or 
should have known whether a particular person was or was not over age. The history of cases 
brought under this statute make crystal clear that knowledge of the defendant regarding the age 
of the women is required—either by admission or by incontrovertible transcripts of 
conversations (i.e. stings operations which require repeated acknowledgment of the defendant's 
awareness of the victims' age). Even states with absolute liability about mistake regarding age 
rarely prosecute cases where definitive proof is lacking (Palm Beach County rarely does and 
when it does, it imposes house arrest sentences). This is a matter for the exercise of state 
prosecutorial discretion and not federal mandatory minimum statutes that were not intended to 
cover such conduct. 
A third essential element of § 2422(b) is the requirement that the government prove that 
the defendant actually believed that the person being persuaded (coerced, etc.) was a minor at the 
time of the communication. See e.g., Offense Instruction 80, Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury 
Instructions-Criminal (2003) ("The defendant can be found guilty of that offense only if...the 
defendant believed that such individual was less than (18) years of age..."); United States v. 
Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (§ 2422(b) requires that the defendant knowingly 
target a minor). Importantly, then, all the elements must be proven with respect to a specific 
person. However, we arc told that the majority of proof is no more than toll records, not 
recorded conversations or Internet chat transcripts, but toll re-cords and perhaps a memory of 
what was said years ago on a particular call for a particular request from a particular person 
acting at Mr. Epstein's direction. 
Two final points bear special emphasis here. The statute, which according to Santos and 
Cuellar must be narrowly construed, also requires that the inducement be to engage in 
prostitution or sexual activity "for which [the defendant] can be charged." 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 
However, simple prostitution is not defined (or made punishable) in the U.S. Code, and state law 
thus supplies the appropriate reference point. Under Florida law, "prostitution" entails the 
"giving or receiving of the body for sexual activity for hire," Fla. Stat. § 796.07(1)(a), and the 
term "sexual activity" is limited to "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the 
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sexual organ of another; anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; or the 
handling or fondling of the sexual organ of another for the purpose of masturbation." Fla. Stat. § 
796.01(1Xd). Also, the Florida Supreme Court jury instructions define prostitution as involving 
"sexual intercourse." As a result, topless massages—even ones for hire that include self-
masturbation—fall outside the ambit of the state-law definition of prostitution. Absent proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the critical time of the communication, Mr. Epstein had a 
specific intent to persuade another to engage in prostitution or "sexual activity," as defined by 
Florida law, he cannot be guilty of an offense under § 2422(b). 
As important, the plain language of the phrase "for which any person can be charged" 
necessarily excludes acts as to which the state's statute of limitations has run. Under Florida 
law, prostitution and prostitution-related offenses are misdemeanors in the second degree for a 
first violation.2 See Fla. Stat.. § 796.07(4)(a). The limitations period for a misdemeanor in the 
second degree is one year, and there is no tolling provision based upon the victim's age. See Fla. 
Stat. § 775.15(6). Even as to allegations of third degree felonies, the statute of limitations is 
three years. Thus, any conduct alleged to have occurred before mid-June 2005 cannot be 
charged as a matter of state law and thus cannot be a predicate for a § 2422(b) offense—even if 
the federal statute of limitations has not run on any given § 2422(b) offense because of the 
lengthier statute codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Thus, no prosecution under § 2422(b) can be 
brought based upon inducement of prostitution or sexual activity for which Florida's statute of 
limitation has run. Furthermore, in Florida, the statute of limitations does not simply give rise to 
an affirmative defense. On the contrary, statute of limitations "creates a substantive right which 
prevents prosecution and conviction of an individual after the statute has run." See State v. King, 
282 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1973); Tucker v. State, 417 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982) (citing 
cases). 
Given the one-year statute of limitations, any conduct that might amount to prostitution 
or other chargeable sexual activity that occurred before one year from today is not conduct for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. Also, given the three year statute of 
limitations for third degree felonies, any allegations of illegal state criminal conduct that is 
classified as a third degree felony cannot be charged in the state and, concomitantly, cannot be 
the basis for a federal charge und 
the extent that it occurred—as did almost all of 
the pivotal allegations (e.g., the 
allegation which was made in March of 2005) 
prior to mid-June of 2005. 
2. 
18 U.S.C. 4 1591 
2 
The offense is a felony of the third degree only for a third or subsequent violation. Fla. Stat. § 796.07(4)( c). 
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18 U.S.C. § 1591, a sex trafficking statute, provides up to 40 years' imprisonment for 
anyone (1) who recruits or obtains by any means a person in interstate commerce (ii) knowing 
that the person is under 18 and (iii) knowing that the person will be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act. The most heinous of crimes, described on the CEOS website, fall within 
this statute and include the buying and selling of children and the forced servitude of third-world 
immigrants brought to this country to be enslaved. Mr. Epstein's behavior is nowhere near the 
heartland of this statute. This statute has also been previously reserved for prostitution rings 
involving violence, drugs and force. In stark contrast, there is no jurisdictional hook that brings 
Mr. Epstein's conduct within the ambit of the statute, and securing a prosecution on these facts 
would require a court to set aside both reason and precedent to convict a local `John' with a sex-
slavery crime. It can not be said that Mr. Epstein engaged in trafficking and slavery nor did he 
knowingly recruit or obtain underage women with knowledge that they would be caused to 
engage in a commercial sex act. Thus, prosecuting him under this statute would expand the law 
far beyond its scope. 
To the extent there are cases where prosecutors think that Mr. Epstein should have known 
that certain women were underage, there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein "caused [them] to 
engage in a commercial sex act." The term "cause" naturally implies the application of some 
sort of force, coercion, or undue pressure, but there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein's interactions 
with the women were anything but consensual. Again, many of the women phoned Mr. 
Epstein's assistant themselves in order to determine whether he wanted a massage. Nor can the 
cause requirement be proved simply by the fact that Mr. Epstein compensated the women. After 
all, the statute elsewhere requires that the women "engage in a commercial sex act," which by 
definition means that they would have received something of value in exchange for sexual 
services. Interpreting the statute to authorize prosecution whenever a commercial sex act results 
from solicitation thus would render the term "caused" superfluous, and would make every `John' 
who interacts with an underage prostitute guilty of a federal crime—even where the transaction 
is entirely local. Read in context, then, there is no doubt that the statute targets pimps and sex-
traffickers who knowingly obtain underage girls and direct them to engage in prostitution. There 
is not a shred of evidence that Mr. Epstein (or his assistants) did any such thing, and he cannot be 
prosecuted under this statute. 
The Cuellar and Santos decisions also foreclose a prosecution under § 1591. Just as the 
federal money laundering statute did not come down to a proscription against transportation of 
criminal proceeds that are hidden, the sex trafficking of children statute cannot be boiled down 
and expanded to a federal proscription of commercial sexual activity with persons who turn out 
to be below the age of 18. 
3. 
18 U.S.C. 4 2423 
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18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), a statute enacted to prevent sex tourism, provides up to 30 years of 
imprisonment for anyone who travels across state lines (i) for the purpose of engaging in (ii) 
illicit sexual conduct with a minor. Neither of those elements is satisfied here. 
Mr. Epstein did not travel to Palm Beach for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity 
with a minor, within the meaning of the statute. The evidence is indisputable that Palm Beach 
was where Mr. Epstein spent most of his discretionary time, and that his travels to Palm Beach 
were merely trips returning often to his home of twenty years—not the escapades of a sex tourist 
off to some destination inextricably intertwined with the required significant or dominant 
purpose of that trip to be to have "illicit sexual conduct." Epstein's trips to Palm Beach were 
simply those of a businessperson traveling home for weekends or stopping over on his way to or 
from New York and St. Thomas or to visit his sick and dying mother in the hospital for months 
on end. He certainly did not travel to his home in Florida for the dominant purpose of engaging 
in sexual conduct with a person who he knew was under 18 when he did not know, at the time he 
decided to travel, from whom he was to receive a massage, if he were to receive one at all. 
In Cuellar, the unanimous Supreme Court linked the term "design" in the money-
laundering statute to the terms "purpose" and "plan," and stressed that those terms all required 
the defendant to "formulate a plan for; devise"; "[t]o create or contrive for a particular purpose or 
effect"; [carry out] "[a] plan or scheme"; or "to conceive and plan out in the mind." Slip. op. at 
12 (citing dictionary definitions). The same link is present here, and it simply cannot be said that 
Mr. Epstein's design, plan, or purpose in traveling to Palm Beach was to engage in illicit sexual 
conduct with minors; his design or plan or purpose was simply to return to his home. 
Any construction of § 2423(b)'s "for the purpose of language to include purposes 
beyond the dominant purpose of the travel would run afoul of the rule of lenity and due process 
principles discussed earlier. Any attempted prosecution of Mr. Epstein under a more expansive 
construction of the "for the purpose of language would also violate the separation of powers 
doctrine. Congress, which selected the "for the purpose of language signaled no clear intention 
to make it a federal crime whenever an actor has engaged in illicit sexual conduct following his 
crossing of state lines as long as it might be said that sexual activity at his destination was among 
the activities he pursued there. Congress well knows how to write a statute in this field which 
eliminates a purpose requirement. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c)("Any United States citizen or alien 
admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit 
sexual conduct with another person ..."). § 2423(b) is not such a statute. 
Federal court decisions watering down the "for the purpose of " requirement fly in the 
face of the two Supreme Court decisions addressing that element. See Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 
559 (1934); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944). Santos and Cuellar speak loudly 
and clearly against prosecutors seeing such elasticity in federal criminal statutes, including those 
enacted to protect important federal interests. In cases involving the federalization of activity 
that is within the States' historic police power, Congress must speak with particular clarity. See, 
e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). 
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Relevant Past Cases 
We have not been able to find a single federal prosecution based on facts like these—but 
have voluminous evidence of federal prosecutors routinely declining to bring charges in cases far 
more egregious than this one. To take just one obvious example, federal prosecutors have self-
consciously refrained from involvement in the literally dozens of sexual cases of former priests, 
opting instead to allow seasoned state prosecutors (like the ones in this case) to pursue the 
accused former clergymen. That is so despite (1) the large number of victims, (2) the vast 
geographic diversity of the cases, and (3) the fact that some of these cases involve allegations 
that the defendant forcibly molested, abused, or raped literally dozens of children—including 
some as young as five years old—over a period of years. Nonetheless, federal prosecutors have 
not hesitated to let their state counterparts pursue these cases free from federal interference—
even though the sentences meted out vary greatly on account of the fact that "[c]riminal penalties 
are specific to localities or jurisdictions."3 The facts of this case, which involve the solicitation 
of consensual topless massages and some sexual contact, entirely in the privacy of his home and 
almost entirely by women over the age of 18, pale in comparison to the outright sexual abuse and 
degradation of preteen minors in many of the priest cases. 
Nor does this case bear any of the hallmarks that typify the cases that federal prosecutors 
have pursued under the federal statutes at issue here. When asked, the closest case suggested by 
the prosecutors was United States v. Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's 
case. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine 
base to minors, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 84I(a)(1), and 859(a); being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I); and sex trafficking of children in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1591. United States v. Boehm, Case No. 3:04CR00003 (11 
Alaska 2004). Boehm's actions, unlike Mr. Epstein's, also had a strong interstate nexus: Boehm 
purchased and distributed large quantities of crack cocaine and cocaine that traveled in interstate 
commerce, and he used his home and hotels (which were used by interstate travelers) to purchase 
drugs and distribute them to minors while also arranging for these minors to have sex with him 
and others. Indeed, Boehm not only (1) purchased cocaine in large quantities; (2) distributed the 
drugs to minors; (3) possessed illegal firearms; (4) and arranged for the minors to have sex with 
other members of the conspiracy in exchange for drugs; but (5) admitted to knowing the ages of 
the individuals involved.4 Here, by contrast, as previous stated, all of the conduct took place in 
Mr. Epstein's private home in Palm Beach; there was no for-profit enterprise; no interstate 
component; no use by Mr. Epstein of an instrumentality of interstate commerce; no violence; no 
force; no alcohol; no drugs; no guns; and no child pornography. 
See http://www.bishop-accountability.org/reports/2004_02_27 johnJay/2004_02_27_Terry_Johniay_3.htrn 
#cleric7. 
4 
In fact, Boehm and his co-defendants distributed drugs to approximately 12 persons between the ages of 13 and 
21. Boehm also had a prior criminal history—and one that clearly showed he was a danger to society: he 
previously had been convicted of raping both a thirteen year-old girl and a fifteen year-old girl. (Day 7 of 
Sentencing hearing p. 32). 
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To the extent there is a similar, but more egregious, local Florida case on the books, it is 
that of Barry Kutun, a former North Miami city attorney accused of having sex with underage 
prostitutes and videotaping the sessions. Mr. Kutun pleaded guilty on May 18, 2007 in a Miami-
Dade County courtroom as part of an agreement with State prosecutors and he received five 
years probation and a withholding of adjudication with no requirement to register as a sex 
offender—all without a shred of involvement by federal prosecutors, who declined to prosecute 
him. Indeed, given the wide use of the telephone in today's society, it gives a rogue prosecutor 
carte blanche to turn any local crime into a federal offense. Given the federal government's 
decision to abstain from prosecuting that case, it is hard to understand how the federal 
prosecutors responsible for this case think that the State's treatment of Mr. Epstein somehow 
leaves federal interests substantially unvindicated. There is simply no basis for the federal 
prosecutors' disparate treatment of Mr. Epstein. 
Summary of the Evidence 
Finally, we wish to share new evidence—obtained through discovery in connection with 
the civil lawsuits filed in this matter—which confirms that further federal involvement in this 
matter would be inappropriate. This testimony taken to date categorically confirms that (i) Mr. 
Epstein did not target minors; (ii) women under 18 often lied to Mr. Epstein about their ages; (iii) 
Mr. Epstein did not travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual 
activity; (iv) Mr. Epstein did not use the Internet, telephone or any other means of interstate 
communication to coerce or entice alleged victims; (v) Mr. Epstein did not apply force or 
coercion to obtain sexual favors; and (vi) all sexual activity that occurred was unplanned and 
purely consensual. The women's own statements—made under oath—demonstrate the absence 
of a legitimate federal concern in this matter, and highlight the serious practical difficulties an 
attempted federal prosecution would face. 
• Mr. Epstein did not recruit or obtain these women in interstate commerce (necessary 
for a conviction under § 1591). 
confirmed that she did not know Mr. Epstein and had 
absolutely no contact with him—be it through Internet, chat rooms email, 
or phone—prior to their arrival at his home. See Tab 13, 
(deposition), p. 30. 
has stated that like man other women) she first met Mr. 
in
Epste 
when her friend, 
introduced her to him. See Tab 
14, 
Tr. A, p. 4-5. 
• 
Mr. Epstein was told the girls were over 18. 
o Ms. 
ex pressl admitted to lying to Mr. Epstein about her age. 
See Tab 13, 
. (deposition), p. 37 ("Q. So you told Jeff that you 
were 18 years old, coned? A. Yes."). 
stated that she not only always made sure she had a fake ID 
with her and lied to Mr. Epstein by telling him she was 18, but that she 
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also had conversations with other women in which these women hoped 
that "Jeffrey didn't find out [their] age[s]." See Tab 6, 
Tr., p. 45. 
o Ms. 
also stated that she: "would tell my girlfriends just like 
approached me. Make sure you tell him you're 18. Well, these girls that I 
brought, I know that they were 18 or 19 or 20. And the girls that I didn't 
know and I don't know if they were lyiiiinot, I would say make sure 
that you tell him you're 18." See Tab 6, 
Tr., p. 22. 
o Ms. 
stated that Ms.. 
told her say that she was 18 if asked. See 
Tab 14, 
Tr. A, p. 8. 
stated that she "told him I was 19." See Tab 5, 
Tr., p. 16. 
• 
Mr. Epstein did not know these women would be caused to engage in a sex act 
(necessary for a conviction under § 1591) and any sexual activity that took place was 
unplanned. 
o Ms. 
stated "sometimes [Mr. Epstein] likes topless massages, but 
you don't have to do an
 you don't want to do. He just likes 
massages." See Tab 6, 
Tr., p. 7. 
o Ms. 
also stated "[s]ometimes [Mr. Epstein] just wanted his feet 
massaged. Sometimes he just wanted a back massage." See Tab 6, 
Tr., p. 19. 
• 
Mr. Epstein did not use an interstate facility to communicate an illegal objective to 
the alleged victims (necessary for a conviction under § 2422(b)). 
o Ms. 
confirmed that Mr. Epstein never emailed texted, or chatted 
in an Internet chat room with her. See Tab 13, 
(deposition), 
p. 30. 
• 
Mr. Epstein did not target minors (necessary for a conviction under § 2422(6)) 
o Ms. 
stated, "I arinade sure -- I had a fake ID, anyways, saying 
that I was 18. And I 
(who is 
friend who brought her to 
Mr. Epstein's home)] just said make sure sire 
18 because Jeffrey 
doesn't want any underage girls." See Tab 6, 
Tr., p. 8. 
• 
Mr. Epstein did not use the phone or the Internet to induce proscribed sexual activity 
(necessary for a conviction under § 2422(b)). 
o Ms. 
stated that there was never any discussion over the phone about 
her coming over to Mr. Epstein's home to engage in sexual activity: "The 
"'
thing that ever occurred on any of these phone calls [with 
or another assistant] was, `Are you willing to come over,' or, 
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`Would you like to come over and give a massage." See Tab 14, 
Tr. 
A, p. 15 
o Ms. 
confirmed that she was informed that she was going to Mr. 
Epstein's house to give him a massage and nothing else, and that no one 
"said anything to [her] on the telephone or over the Internet] about sexual 
activity with Mr. Epstein." See Tab 13, 
. (deposition), p. 24-
25. 
o Ms. 
also confirmed that no one associated with Mr. Epstein ever 
tried to call her or contact her through the Internet to try to persuade, 
induce, entice or coerce her to engage in any sexual activity. See Tab 13, 
. (deposition), p. 31. 
• 
Mr. Epstein did not travel to Palm Beach for the purpose of engaging in sexual 
activity with a minor (necessary for a conviction under § 2423(b)). 
o Mr. Epstein spent at least 100 days a year in Palm Beach for family 
purposes, business purposes, and social purposes, and to maintain a home. 
o While in Palm Beach, Mr. Epstein routinely visits family members and 
close friends, has seen his primary care physician for checkups and 
prescribed tests in the Palm Beach area, and until her death in April of 
2004, regularly saw his mother who was hospitalized and then 
convalesced in south Florida. 
o From 2003 through 2005 there was no month when Mr. Epstein did not 
spend at least one weekend in Palm Beach. 
o The Palm Beach area is the home base for his flight operations, for 
maintenance of his aircraft, and for periodic FAA inspections. 
o Additionally, Mr. Epstein's pilots and engineers all resided in Florida. 
• 
Mr. Epstein's conduct did not involve force, coercion or violence and any sexual 
activity that took place was consensual. The witness transcripts are replete with 
statements such as the following: 
o Ms. 
stated that she was not persuaded, induced, enticed or 
coerced by anyone to engage in any sexual activity. See Tab 13, 
Tr. (deposition), p. 31. 
o Ms. 
stated: "[Mr. Epstein] never tried to force me to do anything." 
See Tab 14, 
Tr. A, p. 12. 
o Ms. 
stated, "I said, I told Jeffrey, I heard you like massages topless. 
And he's like, yeah, he said, but you don't have to do anything that you 
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don't feel comfortable with. And I said okay, but I willingly took it off." 
See Tab 6, 
Tr., p. 10. 
o Ms. 
also stated "[s  mimgirls didn't want to go topless and Jeffrey 
didn't mind." See Tab 6, 
Tr., p. 23. 
• 
Mr. Epstein did not engage in luring. 
o Mr. Epstein's message books show that several masseuses would regularly 
call Mr. Epstein's assistants, without any prompting by Mr. Epstein or his 
assistants, asking to visit Mr. Epstein at his home. 
o Ms. 
stated "a lot of girls begged me to bring them back [to Mr. 
Epstein's house]." 
• 
There was no alcohol or drugs involved, a fact that is not in dispute. 
• 
Mr. Epstein has no prior criminal history, a fact that is not in dispute. 
• 
These women do not see themselves as victims. 
o Ms. 
indicated under oath that the FBI attempted to persuade her that 
she was in fact a "victim" of federal crimes when she herself repeatedly 
confirmed that she was not. See Tab 14, 
Tr. A, p. 9-12 and Tab 15, 
Tr. B, p. 7. 
Conclusion 
Jeffrey Epstein, a self-made businessman with no prior criminal history, should not be 
prosecuted federally for conduct that amounts to, the solicitation of prostitution. A federal 
prosecution based on these facts would be an unprecedented exercise of federal power, a misuse 
of federal resources, and a prosecution that would carry with it the appearance, if not the reality, 
of unwarranted selectivity given the incongruity between the facts as developed in this matter 
and the factual paradigms for all other reported federal prosecutions under each of the three 
statutes being considered. It would require the pursuit of a novel legal theory never before 
sanctioned by federal law—and that indeed is inconsistent with each of the statutes prosecutors 
have identified. Accordingly, we respectfully request that you direct the U.S. Attorney's Office 
for the Southern District of Florida to discontinue its involvement in this matter, and return 
responsibility for this case to the State of Florida. 
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