EFTA00074500

Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States 
v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 
(AJN). 
57 
EFTA00074560

Inferences 
During the trial, and as I give you these instructions, you have heard and will hear the 
term "inference." For instance, in their closing arguments, the attorneys have asked you to infer, 
based on your reason, experience, and common sense, from one or more established facts, the 
existence of some other fact. I have instructed you on circumstantial evidence and that it 
involves inferring a fact based on other facts, your reason, and common sense. 
What is an "inference"? What does it mean to "infer" something? An inference is not a 
suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical decision to conclude that a disputed fact exists 
based on another fact that you are satisfied exists. 
There are times when different inferences may be drawn from facts, whether proven by 
direct or circumstantial evidence. The Government asks you to draw one set of inferences, while 
the defense asks you to draw another. It is for you, and you alone, to decide what inferences you 
will draw. 
The process of drawing inferences from facts in evidence is not a matter of guesswork or 
speculation. An inference is a deduction or conclusion that you, the jury, are permitted but not 
required to draw from the facts that have been established by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. In drawing inferences, you should exercise your common sense. 
Therefore, while you are considering the evidence presented to you, you may draw, from 
the facts that you find to be proven, such reasonable inferences as would be justified in light of 
your experience. 
Some inferences, however, are impermissible. You may not infer that the defendant is 
guilty of participating in criminal conduct if you find merely that she was present at the time the 
crime was being committed and had knowledge that it was being committed. Nor may you use 
58 
EFTA00074561

evidence that I have instructed you was admitted for a limited purpose for any inference beyond 
that limited purpose. 
In addition, you may not infer that the defendant is guilty of participating in criminal 
conduct merely from the fact that he associated with other people who were guilty of 
wrongdoing or merely because he has or had knowledge of the wrongdoing of others. 
Here again, let me remind you that, whether based upon direct or circumstantial evidence, 
or upon the logical, reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence, you must be satisfied of 
the guilt of the defendant as to each count charged before you may convict her as to that count. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States 
v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 
(MN). 
59 
EFTA00074562

Credibility of Witnesses 
You have had the opportunity to observe the witnesses. It is your job to decide how 
believable each witness was in his or her testimony. You are the sole judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses. How do you evaluate the credibility or believability of the witnesses? The answer 
is that you use your common sense, judgment, and experience. Common sense is your greatest 
asset as a juror. You should ask yourselves, did the witness impress you as honest, open, and 
candid? Or did the witness appear evasive, as though the witness was trying to hide something? 
How responsive was the witness to the questions asked on direct examination and on cross-
examination? Consider the witness's demeanor, manner of testifying, and accuracy of the 
witness's recollection. In addition, consider how well the witness recounted what was heard or 
observed, as the witness may be honest but mistaken. 
If you find that a witness is intentionally telling a falsehood that is always a matter of 
importance that you should weigh carefully. If you find that any witness has lied under oath at 
this trial, you should view the testimony of such a witness cautiously and weigh it with great 
care. You may reject the entirety of the witness testimony, part of it or none of it. It is for you to 
decide how much of any witness's testimony, if any, you wish to credit. A witness may be 
inaccurate, contradictory, or even untruthful in some respects and yet entirely believable and 
truthful in other respects. It is for you to determine whether such untruths or inconsistencies are 
significant or inconsequential, and whether to accept or reject all or to accept some and reject the 
balance of the testimony of any witness. 
On some occasions during this trial, witnesses were asked to explain an apparent 
inconsistency between testimony offered at this trial and previous statements made by the 
witness. It is for you to determine whether a prior statement was inconsistent, and if so, how 
much (if any) weight to give to an inconsistent statement in assessing the witness's credibility at 
60 
EFTA00074563

trial. You can credit the prior inconsistent statement or credit the witness' statement at trial. 
You make the determination based on your assessment of the witness. 
In evaluating credibility of the witnesses, you should take into account any evidence that 
the witness who testified may benefit in some way from the outcome of this case. If you find 
that any witness whose testimony you are considering may have an interest in the outcome of 
this trial, then you should bear that factor in mind when evaluating the credibility of his or her 
testimony and accept it with great care. This is not to suggest that any witness who has an 
interest in the outcome of a case would testify falsely. It is for you to decide to what extent, if at 
all, the witness's interest has affected or colored his or her testimony. 
You are not required to accept testimony even though the testimony is not contradicted 
and the witness's testimony is not challenged. You may decide because of the witness's bearing 
or demeanor, or because of the inherent improbability of the testimony, or for other reasons 
sufficient to yourselves that the testimony is not worthy of belief. On the other hand, you may 
find, because of a witness's bearing and demeanor and based upon your consideration of all the 
other evidence in the case, that the witness is truthful. 
Thus, there is no magic formula by which you can evaluate testimony. You bring to this 
courtroom all your experience and common sense. You determine for yourselves in many 
circumstances the reliability of statements that are made by others to you and upon which you 
are asked to rely and act. You may use the same tests here that you use in your everyday lives. 
You may consider the interest of any witness in the outcome of this case and any bias or 
prejudice of any such witness, and this is true regardless of who called or questioned the witness. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States 
v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 
(MN). 
61 
EFTA00074564

Credibility of Witnesses — Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement 
[If applicable] 
You have heard evidence that a witness made a statement on an earlier occasion which 
counsel argues is inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony. Evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement is not to be considered by you as affirmative evidence bearing on either defendant's 
guilt. Evidence of the prior inconsistent statement was placed before you for the more limited 
purpose of helping you decide whether to believe the trial testimony of the witness who 
contradicted him or herself. If you find that the witness made an earlier statement that conflicts 
with his or her trial testimony, you may consider that fact in deciding how much of the trial 
testimony, if any, to believe. 
In making this determination, you may consider whether the witness purposely made a 
false statement or whether it was an innocent mistake; whether the inconsistency concerns an 
important fact or whether it had to do with a small detail; whether the witness had an explanation 
for the inconsistency; and whether that explanation appealed to your common sense. 
It is exclusively your duty, based on all of the evidence and your own good judgment, to 
determine whether the prior statement was inconsistent, and if so how much, if any, weight to be 
given to the inconsistent statement in determining whether to believe all or part of the witness's 
testimony. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States 
v. Lebedev, IS Cr. 769 (MN). 
62 
EFTA00074565

Conscious Avoidance 
[If applicable] 
As I have explained, each of the counts charged in the Indictment requires the 
Government to prove that the defendant acted knowingly, as I have already defined that term. 
If a person is actually aware of a fact, then she knows that fact. But, in determining 
whether the defendant acted knowingly, you may also consider whether the defendant 
deliberately closed her eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious. 
To be clear, the necessary knowledge on the part of the defendant with respect to any 
particular charge cannot be established by showing that that defendant was careless, negligent, or 
foolish. However, one may not willfully and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact material and 
important to her conduct in order to escape the consequences of criminal law. The law calls this 
"conscious avoidance" or "willful blindness." 
Thus, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that there was 
a high probability a crime was being committed, but that the defendant deliberately and 
consciously avoided confirming this fact, such as by purposely closing her eyes to it or 
intentionally failing to investigate it, then you may treat this deliberate avoidance of positive 
knowledge as the equivalent of knowledge, unless you find that the defendant actually believed 
that she was not engaged in such unlawful behavior. In other words, a defendant cannot avoid 
criminal responsibility for her own conduct by "deliberately closing her eyes," or remaining 
purposefully ignorant of facts which would confirm to her that she was engaged in unlawful 
conduct. 
With respect to the conspiracy counts, you must also keep in mind that there is an 
important difference between knowingly and intentionally participating in a conspiracy—which I 
just explained to you—and knowing the specific objective of the conspiracy on the other. You 
63 
EFTA00074566

may consider conscious avoidance in deciding whether the defendant knew the objective of a 
conspiracy, that is, whether she reasonably believed that there was a high probability that a goal 
of the conspiracy was to commit the crime charged as objects of the conspiracy and took 
deliberate and conscious action to avoid confirming that fact but participated in the conspiracy 
anyway. But conscious avoidance cannot be used as a substitute for finding that the defendant 
knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy in the first place. It is logically impossible for 
a defendant to intend and agree to join a conspiracy if she does not actually know it exists. 
However, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly chose to 
participate in such a joint undertaking, you may consider whether the defendant took deliberate 
and conscious action to avoid confirming otherwise obvious facts about the purpose of that 
undertaking. 
In sum, if you find that a defendant believed there was a high probability that a fact was 
so and that the defendant took deliberate and conscious action to avoid learning the truth of that 
fact, you may find that the defendant acted knowingly with respect to that fact. However, if you 
find that the defendant actually believed the fact was not so, then you may not find that she acted 
knowingly with respect to that fact. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States 
v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (MN); the charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel 
in United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC); and Sand et al., 
Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 3A-2. See United States v. 
Lange, 834 F.3d 58, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Conscious avoidance may 
not be used to support a finding as to . . .intent to participate in a 
conspiracy, but it may be used to support a finding with respect to . 
. . knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful goals." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
64 
EFTA00074567

Venue 
[If requested by defense] 
With respect to each of the counts in the indictment, you must also consider the issue of 
venue, namely, whether any act in furtherance of the unlawful activity occurred within the 
Southern District of New York. The Southern District of New York encompasses the following 
counties: New York County (i.e., Manhattan), Bronx, Westchester, Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, 
Orange and Sullivan Counties. Anything that occurs in any of those places occurs in the 
Southern District of New York. 
Venue must be examined separately for each count in the Indictment. Venue on one 
count does not establish venue on another count, though if applicable, you may rely on the same 
evidence to establish venue on multiple counts. 
As to the conspiracy charges, the Government need not prove that any crime was 
completed in this District or that the defendant or any of her co-conspirators were physically 
present here. Rather, venue is proper in this District if the defendant or any of her co-conspirators 
caused any act or event to occur in this District in furtherance of the offense, and it was 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the act would take place in the Southern District of 
New York. 
As to the substantive counts — that is, the non-conspiracy counts — the Government again 
need not prove that any crime was completed in this District or that the defendant was physically 
present here. Rather, venue is proper in this District provided that any act in furtherance of the 
essential conduct of the crime took place in the Southern District of New York. Again, the 
defendant need not have specifically intended to cause an act or event to happen in this District, 
or even known that he was causing an act or event to happen here, as long as it was reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant that such act would occur in this District and it in fact occurred. 
65 
EFTA00074568

On the issue of venue—and this alone—the Government need not prove venue beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but only by a mere preponderance of the evidence. A "preponderance of the 
evidence" means more likely than not. Thus, the Government, which does bear the burden of 
proving venue, has satisfied that burden as to venue if you conclude that it is more likely than not 
that some act or communication in furtherance of each charged offense occurred in the Southern 
District of New York, and it was reasonably foreseeable to each Defendant that the act would so 
occur. If, on the other hand, you find that the Government has failed to prove the venue 
requirement as to a particular offense, then you must acquit the Defendant of that offense, even if 
all the other elements of the offense are proven. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jwy Instructions, Instr. 
3-11; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. 
Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote 
in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and the charge of the 
Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William Walters, 16 Cr. 338 
(PKC). See also United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F.4th 279 (2d Cir. 
2021) ("The government bears the burden of proving appropriate 
venue on each count, as to each defendant, by a preponderance of 
the evidence."). 
66 
EFTA00074569

Time of Offense 
The Indictment alleges that certain conduct occurred on or about various dates or during 
various time periods. It is not necessary, however, for the Government to prove that any 
conduct alleged occurred exactly on such dates or throughout any such time periods. As long as 
the conduct occurred around any dates or within any time periods the Indictment alleges it 
occurred, that is sufficient. 
This is also a good opportunity to instruct you that it does not matter if a specific event 
or transaction is alleged to have occurred on or about a certain date, and the evidence indicates 
that in fact it occurred on another date. The law only requires a substantial similarity between 
the dates alleged in the Indictment and the dates established by the testimony and other 
evidence. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United 
States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba 
M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the 
charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William 
Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC). 
67 
EFTA00074570

Law Enforcement and Government Employee Witnesses 
You have heard testimony from law enforcement officials and employees of the 
Government. The fact that a witness may be employed by the Federal Government as a law 
enforcement official or employee does not mean that his or her testimony is necessarily 
deserving of more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that of an ordinary 
witness. 
In this context, defense counsel is allowed to try to attack the credibility of such a 
witness on the ground that his or her testimony may be colored by a personal or professional 
interest in the outcome of the case. 
It is your decision, after reviewing all the evidence, whether to accept the testimony of 
the law enforcement or Government employee witness and to give to that testimony the 
weight you find it deserves. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
7-16; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. 
Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 
(MN). 
68 
EFTA00074571

Formal In formal Immunity of Government Witnesses 
[If applicable] 
You have heard the testimony of [witnesses] who have testified under a grant of 
immunity from this Court. What this means is that the testimony of the witness may not be used 
against him or her in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the immunity order of this court. 
Such testimony should be scrutinized by you with great care and you should act upon it 
with caution. You should examine it closely to determine whether or not it is colored in such a 
way as to place guilt upon the defendant in order to further the witnesses' own interests. If you 
believe the testimony to be true and determine to accept it, you may give it such weight, if any, 
as you believe it deserves. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
7-8; and the charge of the Hon. Loran G. Schofield in United 
States v. Calk, 19 Cr. 366 (LGS). 
69 
EFTA00074572

Expert Testimony 
[If applicable] 
You have heard testimony from a witness/certain witnesses who was/were proffered as 
(an) expert(s) in different areas. An expert is allowed to express his or her opinion on those 
matters about which he or she has special knowledge and training. Expert testimony is presented 
to you on the theory that someone who is experienced in the field can assist you in understanding 
the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts. 
In weighing an expert's testimony, you may consider the expert's qualifications, 
opinions, reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply 
when you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness's testimony. You may give the expert 
testimony whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves in light of all the evidence in this case. 
You should not, however, accept a witness's testimony merely because he or she is an 
expert. Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment, and common sense. The 
determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
7-21; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States 
v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 (AJN). 
70 
EFTA00074573

Limiting Instruction — Similar Act Evidence 
[If Applicable] 
The Government has offered evidence tending to show that on different occasions, the 
defendant engaged in conduct similar to the charges in the Indictment. 
Let me remind you that the defendant is on trial only for committing acts alleged in the 
Indictment. Accordingly, you may not consider this evidence of similar acts as a substitute for 
proof that the defendant committed the crimes charged. Nor may you consider this evidence as 
proof that a defendant has a criminal personality or bad character. The evidence of the other, 
similar acts was admitted for a much more limited purpose and you may consider it only for that 
limited purpose. 
If you determine that the defendant committed the acts charged in the Indictment and the 
similar acts as well, then you may, but you need not draw an inference that in doing the acts 
charged in the Indictment, that defendant acted knowingly and intentionally and not because of 
some mistake, accident, or other innocent reasons. You may also consider this evidence in 
determining whether the defendant utilized a common scheme or plan in committing both the 
crimes charged in the Indictment and the similar acts introduced by the Government. 
Evidence of similar acts may not be considered by you for any other purpose. 
Specifically, you may not consider it as evidence that the defendant is of bad character or has the 
propensity to commit crimes. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jwy Instructions, Instr. 
5-25; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. 
Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN). 
71 
EFTA00074574

Defendant's Testimony 
[Requested only i f the defendant testifies] 
[The Government respectfully requests that the Court include the following instruction 
in its general instruction on witness credibility, rather than as a separate instruction:] 
The defendant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. You should 
examine and evaluate this testimony just as you would the testimony of any witness. 
See United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 249 & n.8 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
72 
EFTA00074575

Defendant's Right Not to Testify 
[If requested by defense] 
The defendant did not testify in this case. Under our Constitution, a defendant has no 
obligation to testify or to present any evidence, because it is the Government's burden to prove 
a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden remains with the Government 
throughout the entire trial and never shifts to a defendant. A defendant is never required to 
prove that she is innocent. 
You may not attach any significance to the fact that the defendant did not testify. 
No adverse inference against the defendant may be drawn by you because the 
defendant did not take the witness stand. You may not consider this against the defendant in 
any way in your deliberations in the jury room. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jug Instructions, Instr. 
5-21; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. 
Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (MN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 
(MN). 
73 
EFTA00074576

Uncalled Witnesses — Equally Available to Both Sides 
There are people whose names you heard during the course of the trial but did not appear 
to testify. [If applicable: One or more of the attorneys has referred to their absence from the 
trial.] I instruct you that each party had an equal opportunity or lack of opportunity to call any of 
these witnesses. Therefore, you should not draw any inferences or reach any conclusions as to 
what they would have testified to had they been called. Their absence should not affect your 
judgment in any way. 
You should remember my instruction, however, that the law does not impose on the 
defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any 
evidence. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jwy Instructions, Instr. 
6-7; and the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. 
Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Le, 15 Cr. 38 (AJN). 
74 
EFTA00074577

Particular Investigative Techniques Not Required 
[If applicable] 
You have heard reference, in the arguments of defense counsel in this case, to the fact 
that certain investigative techniques were used or not used by the Government. There is no legal 
requirement, however, that the Government prove its case through any particular means. While 
you are to carefully consider the evidence adduced by the Government, you are not to speculate 
as to why they used the techniques they did or why they did not use other techniques. The 
Government is not on trial. Law enforcement techniques are not your concern. 
Your concern is to determine whether or not, on the evidence or lack of evidence, the 
defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United 
States v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AJN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 
Cr. 151 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United 
States v. illmonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); the charge of the Hon. 
Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and 
the charge of the Hon. P. Kevin Castel in United States v. William 
Walters, 16 Cr. 338 (PKC). 
75 
EFTA00074578

Use of Evidence from Searches 
You have heard testimony about evidence seized in connection with certain searches 
conducted by law enforcement officers. Evidence obtained from these searches was properly 
admitted in this case, and may be properly considered by you. Such searches were appropriate 
law enforcement actions. Whether you approve or disapprove of how the evidence was obtained 
should not enter into your deliberations, because I instruct you that the Government's use of the 
evidence is entirely lawful. You must, therefore, regardless of your personal opinions, give this 
evidence full consideration along with all the other evidence in the case in determining whether 
the Government has proven the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As with all 
evidence, it is for you to determine what weight, if any, to give such evidence. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States 
v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (MN). 
76 
EFTA00074579