EFTA00074500

Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity— The Elements 
To prove the defendant guilty of Count Two, the Government must prove each of the 
following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First, that the defendant knowingly persuaded or induced or enticed or coerced an 
individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce; 
Second, that the individual traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; and 
Third, that the defendant acted with the intent that the individual would engage in sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. 
Count Two relates to Minor Victim-1 during the period 1994 to 1997. 
Adapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
64-6. 
17 
EFTA00074520

Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element 
The first element of Count Two is that the defendant knowingly persuaded or induced or 
enticed or coerced an individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce. The terms 
"persuaded," "induced," "enticed," and "coerced" have their ordinary, everyday meanings. 
The term "interstate or foreign commerce" simply means movement from one state to 
another state or between the United States and a foreign country. The term "State" includes a 
State of the United States and the District of Columbia. 
"Knowingly" Defined 
The defendant must have acted knowingly. An act is done knowingly when it is done 
voluntarily and intentionally and not because of accident, mistake, or some other innocent reason. 
Now, knowledge is a matter of inference from the proven facts. Science has not yet 
devised a manner of looking into a person's mind and knowing what that person is thinking. 
Whether the defendant acted knowingly may be proven by the defendant's conduct and by all of 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. 
Adapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
64-7; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. 
Pizzaro, 17 Cr. 151 (AJN) and in United States v. Le, 15 Cr. 38 
(AN); the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. 
Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. 
Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (ICMW); and the 
charge of the Hon. Sidney H. Stein in United States v. Waqar, 18 
Cr. 342 (SHS). See United States v. Waqar, 997 F.3d 481, 484-85 
(2d Cir. 2021) (stating that the "statutory verbs" in § 2422(b) 
"'attempt, persuade, induce, entice, [and] coerce, though not 
defined in the statute, are words of common usage that have plain 
and ordinary meanings" (citation omitted)). 
18 
EFTA00074521

Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second Element 
The second element of Count Two is that the individual traveled in interstate or foreign 
commerce as alleged in the Indictment. 
As I just stated, "interstate or foreign commerce" simply means movement between one 
state and another or between the United States and a foreign country. 
Adapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, lnstr. 
64-8. 
19 
EFTA00074522

Count Two: Enticement to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Third Element 
The third element of Count Two is that the defendant acted with the intent that the 
individual would engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense. 
Count Two alleges sexual activity for which a person could be charged with a crime 
under the criminal (or penal) law of New York State. I instruct you as a matter of law that 
Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree, the offense set forth in Count Two of the Indictment, was a 
violation of New York State Penal law from at least in or about 1994 up to an including in or 
about 1997, at the time the acts are alleged to have been committed. 
A person violates New York State Penal Law § 130.55, Sexual Abuse in the Third 
Degree, when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter's consent. 
Under New York law, "sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other 
intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party. It 
includes the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing, as well as 
the emission of ejaculate by the actor upon any part of the victim, clothed or unclothed. 
Also under New York law, lack of consent can result from incapacity to consent. A 
person less than seventeen years old is deemed incapable of consent under New York Law. 
Thus, the law deems sexual contact with such a person to be without that person's consent, even 
if in fact that person did consent. However, in order to find that the intended acts were 
nonconsensual solely because of the victim's age, you must find that the defendant knew that the 
victim was less than seventeen years old. 
20 
EFTA00074523

"Intentionally" Defined 
A person acts intentionally when the act is the product of her conscious objective, that is, 
when she acts deliberately and purposefully and not because of a mistake or accident. Direct 
proof of a person's intent is almost never available. It would be a rare case where it could be 
shown that a person wrote or stated that, as of a given time, she committed an act with a 
particular intent. Such direct proof is not required. The ultimate fact of intent, though subjective, 
may be established by circumstantial evidence, based upon the defendant's outward 
manifestations, her words, her conduct, her acts and all the surrounding circumstances disclosed 
by the evidence and the rational or logical inferences that may be drawn from them. 
Adapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 
Instrs. 64-9, 64-18; New York Penal Law §§ 15.20(3), 130.00, 
130.05, 130.55; New York State Pattern Jury Instructions 
§ 130.55; the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. 
Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC); and the charge of the Hon. Ann M. 
Donnelly in United States v. Kelly, 19 Cr. 286 (AMD) (E.D.N.Y.). 
See United States v. Murphy, 942 F.3d 73, 79-84 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(holding under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) that a defendant must know 
the age of the victim where the victim's age distinguishes lawful 
from unlawful conduct). 
21 
EFTA00074524

Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — The Statute 
The relevant statute for Count Four is Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(a), 
which provides that a person who "knowingly transports any individual under the age of 18 years 
in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that such individual engage in ... any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense," is guilty of a federal 
crime. 
22 
EFTA00074525

Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — The Elements 
In order to prove the defendant guilty of Count Four, the Government must 
establish each of the following three elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First that the defendant knowingly transported an individual in interstate or 
foreign commerce as alleged in the Indictment, 
Second, that the defendant transported the individual with the intent that the 
individual engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense; and 
Third, that the individual was less than seventeen years old at the time of the acts 
alleged in Count Four of the Indictment. 
Count Four also relates to Minor Victim-1 during the period 1994 to 1997. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
64-16; the charge of the Hon. Richard J. Arcara in United States v. 
Vickers, 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 708 F. App'x 732 
(2d Cir. 2017); and the charge of the Hon. Thomas P. Greisa in 
United States v. Gilliam, 11 Cr. 1083 (TPG), ard, 842 F.3d 801, 
805 (2d Cir. 2016). 
23 
EFTA00074526

Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element 
The first element of Count Four is that the defendant knowingly transported an individual 
in interstate or foreign commerce. The phrase, "transport an individual in interstate or foreign 
commerce" means to move or carry, or cause someone to be moved or carried, from one state to 
another or between the United States and a foreign country. 
The Government does not have to prove that the defendant personally transported the 
individual across a state line. It is sufficient to satisfy this element that the defendant acted 
through an agent or was engaged in the making of the travel arrangements, such as by purchasing 
tickets necessary for the individual to travel as planned. 
The defendant must have knowingly transported or participated in the transportation of the 
individual in interstate or foreign commerce. This means that the Government must prove that 
the defendant knew both that she was causing the individual to be transported, and that the 
individual was being transported in interstate or foreign commerce. As I have explained, an act is 
done knowingly when it is done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of accident, mistake 
or some innocent reason. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal -hay Instructions, Instr. 
64-17; and the charge of the Hon. Richard J. Arcara in United 
States v. Vickers, 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 708 F. 
App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2017). See United States v. Mi Sun Cho, 713 
F.3d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 2013) (sufficient to show transportation 
where defendant agreed to provide a prostitution job and 
coordinated and prearranged the date and time of travel); United 
States v. Shim, 584 F.3d 394, 396 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 2002) (under general 
knowledge requirement of Mann Act, jury need not find that 
defendant knew that the act being committed was unlawful). 
24 
EFTA00074527

Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — First Element 
— Consent Irrelevant 
With regard to Count Four, whether or not the individual consented to being transported 
or to traveling interstate for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity for which any person can 
be charged with a criminal offense, or the individual otherwise voluntarily participated, is 
irrelevant, as the consent or voluntary participation of the individual is not a defense. 
Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Thomas P. Greisa in United 
States v. Gilliam, 11 Cr. 1083 (TPG), aff'd, 842 F.3d 801, 805 (2d 
Cir. 2016). See also United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 52 (1st 
Cir. 1998) ("Consent is a defense to kidnapping but not to a Mann 
Act charge."); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565-66 (7th 
Cir. 1986); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 712 (8th Cir. 
1978); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1932). 
25 
EFTA00074528

Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second 
Element 
The second element of Count Four is that the defendant transported the individual with 
the intent that the individual engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged 
with a criminal offense. 
In order to establish this element, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that 
engaging in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense was the 
defendant's sole purpose in transporting the individual across a state line. A person may have 
several different purposes or motives for such conduct, and each may prompt in varying degrees 
the act or the person's actions. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
however, that a significant or motivating purpose of the conduct was to have the individual 
engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. In other 
words, the illegal sexual activity must not have been merely incidental to the trip. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, 
Instrs. and 64-4, 64-18; Edward J. Devitt et al., Federal Jury 
Practice and Instructions, Instr. 60-07; and the charge of the Hon. 
Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). See 
United States v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366, 375 (2d Cir. 2013) 
("[T]he contemplated unlawful sexual activity need not be the 
defendant's sole purpose for transporting a minor in interstate or 
foreign commerce. Rather, it must only be a `dominant purpose' of 
the transportation."); United States v. Miller, 148 F.3d 207, 212 
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding no error in jury instruction that engaging in 
illegal sexual activity "need not have been [the defendant's] only 
purpose or motivation, but it must have been more than merely 
incidental; it must have been one of the dominant purposes of the 
trip"). 
26 
EFTA00074529

Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Second 
Element — illegal Sexual Activity 
Count Four alleges that the defendant knowingly transported the individual in interstate 
or foreign commerce with the intent that the individual engage in sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense. 
Like Count Two, Count Four alleges sexual activity for which an individual could be 
charged with a crime under the criminal (or penal) law of New York State, specifically Sexual 
Abuse in the Third Degree. I have already instructed you regarding that crime, and those 
instructions apply equally here. 
Adapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 64-18; 
New York State Penal Law §§ 15.20(3), 130.00, 130.05, 130.55; New 
York State Pattern Jury Instructions § 130.55; the charge of the Hon. 
Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). 
27 
EFTA00074530

Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity — Third 
Element — Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree 
The third element of Count Four is that the individual was less than seventeen years old 
at the time of the offense. Although the text of the law says the individual must be less than 
eighteen, because the New York criminal law provides that a person can consent to sexual 
activity if she is seventeen, this element requires that the individual was less than seventeen at 
the time of the offense. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jay Instructions, Instr. 
64-19 ("Although section 2423(a) requires that the person 
transported be less than eighteen ... [i]f the defendant is charged 
with transporting for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual 
activity, and that underlying activity requires that the victim be less 
than some other age, then it can only confuse the jury to charge 
that the victim must be less than eighteen in this instruction and 
less than that other age elsewhere in the instructions."). See New 
York State Penal Law §§ 15.20(3), 130.55 
28 
EFTA00074531

Counts Two and Four: Failure to Accomplish Intended Activity is Immaterial 
Now, with respect to Counts Two and Four, it is not a defense that the sexual activity 
which may have been intended by the defendant was not accomplished. 
In other words, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that anyone, in fact, 
engaged in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense with 
the individual after she was enticed, for Count Two, or transported, for Count Four, across state 
lines. It is enough if defendant has the requisite intent at the time of the enticement or 
transportation. 
Adapted from Edward J. Devitt, et al., Federal Juiy Practice and 
Instructions, Instr. 60-06. See United States v. Bromoneyer, 616 
F.3d 120, 129-30 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2010) ("The plain wording of the 
statute requires that the mens rea of intent coincide with the actor 
reus of crossing state lines."); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 
14, 20 (1946) ("[G]uilt under the Mann Act turns on the purpose 
which motivates the transportation, not on its accomplishment."). 
29 
EFTA00074532

Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Statute 
The relevant statute for Count Six is Title 18, United States Code, Section 1591, which 
provides, in pertinent part, that "Whoever knowingly in or affecting interstate commerce, 
recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains, by any means a person ... knowing 
that ... the person has not attained the age of eighteen years and will be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act" is guilty of a crime. 
30 
EFTA00074533

Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Elements 
To find the defendant guilty of Count Six you must find that the Government has proven 
each of the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First: The defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or 
obtained a person; 
Second: The defendant knew that the person was under the age of eighteen years; 
Third: The defendant knew the person would be caused to engage in a commercial sex 
act; and 
Fourth:, The defendant's acts were in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 
This Count relates to the alleged abuse of Minor Victim-4 during the period 2001 to 
2004. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
47A-I8; and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in 
United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). 
31 
EFTA00074534

Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — First Element 
The first element of Count Six is that the defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, 
harbored, transported, provided, or obtained a person. The terms "recruited," "enticed," 
"harbored," "transported," "provided," and "obtained" have their ordinary, everyday meanings. 
Adapted from the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United 
States v. Aimonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d 
104, 122 (2d Cir. 2021) ("In interpreting a statute, this Court gives the 
statutory terms their ordinary or natural meaning." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). See, e.g., Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 517 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining that, because the verb "entices" is "not 
defined by Congress," it bears its ordinary meaning). 
32 
EFTA00074535

Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Second Element 
The second element of Count Six is that the defendant knew that the person was under 
eighteen years of age. 
In considering whether the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 
eighteen, please apply the definition of "knowingly" previously provided to you. Remember 
whether a defendant acted knowingly may be proven by what the defendant said and did and by 
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, since direct proof of a person's state of 
mind is rarely available. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
47A-20; and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in 
United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). See United States v. 
Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2018). 
33 
EFTA00074536

Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Third Element 
The third element of Count Six is that the defendant knew that the person would be 
caused to engage in a commercial sex act. 
The term "commercial sex act" means "any sex act, on account of which anything of 
value is given to or received by any person." The thing of value may be money or any other 
tangible or intangible thing of value that may be given to or received by any person, regardless of 
whether the person who receives it is the person performing the commercial sex act. 
It is not relevant whether or not the person was a willing participant in performing 
commercial sex acts. Consent by the person is not a defense to the charge in Count Six of the 
Indictment. It is also not required that the person actually performed a commercial sex act so 
long as the Government has proved that the defendant recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, 
provided, or obtained the person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts. 
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 
47A-22; 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1) (2000) (defining "commercial sex 
act"); and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United 
States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (ICMW). See United States v. Jones, 
847 F. App'x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (affirming the 
use of an instruction drawn from the statute and the Sand treatise); 
United States v. Corley, 679 F. App'x 1, 7 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(summary order) ("[T]he statute does not require that an actual 
commercial sex act have occurred."); United States v. Williams, 
529 F.3d I, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Even if the minor had factually 
consented, that consent would not have been legally valid. In all 
events, factual consent would not eliminate the potential risks that 
confronted the child." (citations omitted)). 
34 
EFTA00074537

Count Six: Sex Trafficking of a Minor — Fourth Element 
The fourth and final element of Count Six is that the defendant's sex trafficking activities 
were in interstate or foreign commerce or affected interstate commerce. The Government need 
not prove both that the activities were in interstate or foreign commerce and affected interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
I instruct you that acts and transactions that cross state lines, or which affect the flow of 
money in the stream of commerce to any degree, however minimal, are acts and transactions 
affecting interstate commerce. For instance, it affects interstate commerce to use products that 
traveled in interstate commerce. 
It is not necessary for the Government to prove that the defendant specifically knew or 
intended that the recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining of a person 
to engage in commercial sex acts would affect interstate commerce; it is only necessary that the 
natural consequences of such conduct would affect interstate commerce in some way, even if 
minor. 
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the recruitment, enticement, harboring, 
transportation, providing, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex 
acts was economic in nature and involved the crossing of state lines, or was economic in nature 
and otherwise affected the flow of money to any degree, however minimal, you may find that the 
interstate commerce requirement of the offense of sex trafficking of a minor has been satisfied. 
I further instruct you that to find that this element has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is not necessary for you to find that any interstate or foreign travel occurred. Proof of 
actual travel is not required. 
Adapted from the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in 
United States v. A/monte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). See United States v. 
Graham, 707 F. App'x 23, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) 
35 
EFTA00074538

("The conduct underlying Graham's conviction was inherently 
commercial, and the government adduced evidence that its 
commission as to all three counts involved the use of intemet 
advertisements, condoms, hotels, and rental cars."); United States 
v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Paris, 
No. 03:06-CR-64 (CFD), 2007 WL 3124724, at *8 & n.10 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 24, 2007) (use of cell phones, use of hotel rooms and 
distribution of condoms all affected interstate commerce in sex 
trafficking venture). 
36 
EFTA00074539